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Palestinian Affairs

'Arafat Adviser Condemns Likud Meeting Outcome

NC0507195689 Paris AFP in English 1944 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Excerpts] Tel Aviv, July 5 (AFP)—Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir gained the support of his Likud bloc Wednesday for a plan to hold elections in the Israeli-occupied territories after accepting the inclusion of key amendments backed by hardliners. [passage omitted]

The amendments were likely to make the plan completely unpalatable not only to the PLO but also to the so-called moderate Palestinians in the territories that Mr. Shamir would like to reach in a bid to bypass the PLO.

The PLO has already rejected the plan in its present form, but it has been kept alive largely by the United States, which has urged the organisation to consider the proposal as a basis for discussion.

(Bassam Abu Sharif, adviser to PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat, said the outcome of the Likud caucus was "very bad, but expected," adding that it was a "new hard blow from Mr. Shamir and the Israeli government for peace efforts."

(The amendments were "new proof of the (Israeli) policy that rejects peace and negotiations as a means to achieve a global peace," Mr. Abu Sharif told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE.

(They also served to highlight Israel's "expansionist" policies, he said, pointing to the link between the refusal to negotiate with the PLO and the pledge to pursue Jewish settlements despite United Nations condemnation.)

Fatah Assails Jordan for Foiling Kidnap Operation

NC0507152989 Beirut Voice of National Resistance in Arabic 1430 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] The Fatah Uprising has released a statement which revealed intelligence and military collaboration between the agent Jordanian regime and the usurper Zionist entity. The statement says: Once again the agent Jordanian regime unmasks its true face—a conspirator regime that is the enemy of the masses of our Arab nation, the faithful servant of imperialism, and the guard of the Zionist entity.

One of our fedayeen groups crossed the Jordan River near Kefar Ruppin in the northern valley. The group succeeded in capturing two Zionist settlers and brought them to a street on the East Bank. When patriotic soldier 'Isa Mahmud Ahmad became aware that Zionist soldiers were chasing the fedayeen, he crossed to the West Bank of the river and engaged the Zionist soldiers until he was martyred. As a result, military units of the Jordanian regime were placed on alert and military intelligence teams attacked the position of the fedayeen group, in order to release the detained Zionists and hand them over to their command. Zionists came by helicopter to take the two captured Zionists back to the western side of the Jordan River. The statement said that while Fatah holds the agent Jordanian regime responsible for killing our heroic martyr and for the life of the hero detained by the military intelligence clique, it renews the pledge to continue the revolution until the whole of Palestine is liberated.

PLO, Unofficial Israeli Envoys Discuss Peace

AU0307095689 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 3 Jul 89 p 3

[Livia Klingl report: "Vienna: PLO Representatives and Unofficial Representatives of Israeli Government Parties Meet"]

[Excerpt] Vienna—Official PLO representatives and—unofficial—members of the Israeli Government parties, Likud and Labor, discussed topical issues at a Middle East symposium at the Renner Institute during the weekend [1-2 July]. The PLO was officially represented at the Vienna meeting by Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahia, member of the PLO Executive Committee. Knesset deputies Arie Eliav (Labor Party), two members of the Central Office of the Labor Party, as well as Elie Halali, member of the Likud Central Committee and former mayor of Dimona, participated as private persons, not as representatives of their parties. The Israeli delegation also included Knesset deputies of other leftist parties, members of the civil rights movement, as well as journalists and scientists.

The meeting was also attended by parliamentarians from Belgium, the FRG, France, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, the CSSR, Hungary, and the Soviet Union.

Austria was represented by deputies Felix Ermacora (Austrian People's Party) and Peter Jankowitsch (Socialist Party of Austria).

The participants adopted a seven-point "minimum consensus" plan:

—A just and lasting peace in the Middle East should be brought about that grants the same national rights to Palestinians and Israelis. A settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be founded on mutual respect and peaceful coexistence between the state of Israel and the state of Palestine.

—A solution can only be achieved if Israeli occupation in terminated.

—The problem of the Palestinian refugees must also be settled.

—All differences of opinion must be removed through talks between the duly appointed representatives of the parties concerned, that is of the Government of Israel and the PLO. The peoples in the region should be allowed to live without threat and violence within secure and recognized borders.

—A moratorium should be adopted by both parties against acts of violence.

—Talks should be held between all parties within the framework of an international peace conference.
—All parties concerned should recognize that a lasting solution must be found and not an interim solution to a lasting conflict. [passage omitted]

PLO Official on Jewish-Palestinian Vienna Meeting

JN0607074889 Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic 0500 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Randah Habib dispatch from Amman]

[Text] PLO Executive Committee member 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya told this station that the current meeting in Spain between 40 Oriental Jews and a large Palestinian delegation including Executive Committee members Mahmud 'Abbas and Mahmud Darwish is to promote the hitherto non-existent relations with Oriental Jews in Israel.

Al-Yahya had chaired a Palestinian delegation which met with Israeli personalities in Vienna last week. They included members of the Knesset and Israeli political parties, including the Likud. European parliamentarians and personalities from the Soviet Union and the United States, including (Roy Atterson) and (Harold Saunders), also participated in the meeting. Al-Yahya said the conferees approved seven principles proposed in the basic working paper, calling for the following:

1. The need to establish a just and lasting peace guaranteeing equal national rights for all peoples in the region, including the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.
2. The need to reach a solution based on terminating the Israeli occupation resulting from the 1967 War.
3. The final settlement should include solving all aspects of the problem of refugees.
4. Differences should be resolved through negotiations between representatives of the Israeli Government and the PLO.
5. All parties should declare their renunciation of violence.
6. Negotiations between all parties should be held within the framework of an international peace conference.
7. There can be no solution to the conflict as long as the parties concerned do not admit that the issue lies in a permanent, not a phased, solution.

PNC Speaker on U.S.-PLO Talks, Damascus Trip

JN0107095189 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 1 Jul 89 pp 28, 23

[By Tawfiq 'Abid]

[Excerpts] His Eminence Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, speaker of the Palestine National Council [PNC] has stressed that it was the blessed intifadah [uprising] which gave the Palestine question a spirit and great power on all levels. He added: We are determined to continue struggle until the attainment of the intifadah aims represented by independence and establishment of a Palestinian state, whose capital is Jerusalem.

Speaking at a news conference held at the Embassy of Palestine in Amman yesterday morning on the occasion of the beginning on 1 July of the week of Palestinian people's heritage, His Eminence said: The Palestinians will never cede their legitimate rights to their homeland. Our Palestinian and Arab masses as well as the peace-loving forces will continue to support our people's revolution despite the Israeli attempts to sow despair and question positions.

He added: Our masses in the occupied homeland are determined to continue their confrontation of occupation and repressive measures. These masses no longer care for beatings, starvation, curfews, breaking of bones, or deportations. What is important is that the torch of the intifadah continues to burn the occupation and foil its aims and achieve Palestinian aspirations. [passage omitted]

Replying to a question, his eminence welcomed the Madrid EC statement. He termed it an important statement and a qualitative step indicating that Europe has reached the conviction that unless a just and comprehensive solution is found, and unless the Palestinian people are given their full legitimate rights, the Middle East region will witness serious events that jeopardize world peace and security.

He said Palestinian-U.S. dialogue is very slow and the U.S. positions come in occasional spurts. He hoped that the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue will be a step toward Yasir 'Arafat's meeting with U.S. President George Bush in the near future.

He went on to say: Our cause is one of right and justice, but the world has deviated from right, especially the United States, which is supporting Israel's aggression and extending unlimited support to it in order to continue its occupation of our land and its persecution of our people, and prevent the realization of our national aspirations.

His Eminence called on the Arab states to stand in solidarity against the U.S. Administration and to make it understand that friendship with it hinges upon its adoption of balanced stands in the region, abstention from backing the Israeli aggression, and recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and establishment of their independent state on their national soil with Jerusalem as their capital.

Regarding 'Arafat's visit to Damascus, His Eminence Shaykh al-Sa'ih said: A Palestinian delegation led by Faruq Qaddumi, head of the PLO Political Department, will pave the way for 'Arafat's visit and improve Syrian-Palestinian relations.

PLO Tunis Envoy Presents Memo to Pelletreau

JN0207083589 Baghdad Voice of the PLO in Arabic 1827 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Brother Hakam Bal'awi, ambassador of the State of Palestine in the Tunisian Republic, yesterday morning met with Mr Robert Pelletreau, U.S. ambassador in

Tunis. Discussions centered on the continuing escalation of the Israeli terrorist and oppression campaigns against the sons of our Palestinian people in the occupied homeland, the latest measure being the Israeli occupation forces' deportation of eight Palestinian citizens. Through this, they have exceeded their extreme defiance of the will of the international community and attacks on the simplest human rights. They are exploiting the U.S. position sympathetic with and supportive of this criminal policy, which provides it with the cover and encouragement to continue and escalate, especially since the United States is using its veto to thwart any international effort to remove and confront Israeli terrorism and provide protection for our people. This emphasizes to the U.S. Administration the importance of reviewing its positions and shouldering its international responsibilities by adopting practical positions through which it honestly expresses its response to the international will to condemn Israeli terrorism by taking committed and deterrent resolutions.

Brother Hakam Bal'awi presented the ambassador with an official memo from the PLO addressed to the U.S. Administration, asking it to take effective measures on the Israeli terrorist acts in the occupied terrorities and confront them.

Israel Said Increasing Jamming of Radio
JN0407120089 (Clandestine) Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic 1110 GMT 4 Jul 89

[Unscheduled announcement]

[Text] Brother citizens, the Zionist enemy has never been able to tolerate your radio and began jamming it only 1 month after Al-Quds radio began transmission.

Brother strugglers, the enemy has recently stepped up its jamming of Al-Quds radio. However, our people's adherence to their radio and the material it broadcasts is increasing.

Brother citizens, for many days, the enemy has been tightening its grip on the Palestinian cities, villages, and camps in order to isolate them from the neighboring areas and the world. Yet, our correspondents are covering the news of our people's glorious intifadah [uprising] with all the risks and efforts that this entails. Al-Quds radio, the Palestinian Arab radio for the liberation of land and man, will continue to devote every effort for the sake of Palestine and the Palestinian martyrs, heroes, and people.

God is with us, victory is close, and together we march on the path of liberating the land and man.

Fatah To Convene Fifth Conference in July
LD0407092289 Kuwait KUNA in English 0833 GMT 4 Jul 89

[Text] Tunis, July 4 (KUNA)—The Central Committee of the Palestinian Fatah movement currently holds here several meetings under the chairmanship of Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat and with the attendance of all committee members.

Well informed Palestinian sources said yesterday that these meetings come more than two months after the meeting of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, the 70 members of whom decided to hold a general conference during the next four weeks.

The same sources said that the Fatah Committee will discuss during its meetings organizational issues, current developments of the Palestinian cause, Israeli Premier Yitzhaq Shamir's plan on holding elections in the occupied territories and the stance of each of the United States and the Soviet Union toward these elections.

They noted that the committee will set up a date and venue for its general conference, during which new members of the Central Committee and Revolutionary Council will be elected.

Meanwhile, a prominent member of the Fatah Central Committee, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) announced that the movement will hold its fifth conference within this month after it has been postponed for several times during the past nine years due to the circumstances witnessed by the Palestinian revolution.

Abu Iyad told reporters in Tunis that the convocation of the forthcoming conference, the first since 1980, comes at the recommendation of 'Arafat.

The Palestinian official said that the general conference will review the important events witnessed by the Palestinian cause in addition to organizational matters.

The conference will also renew the leadership of Fatah movement, the major Palestinian faction, to give a chance to young blood to enter the higher apparatuses of Fatah.

Abu Iyad noted that there is a suggestion to expand the membership of the movement's Central Committee.

Saudi Arabia Donates to Intifadah Support Fund
JN0507132989 Paris Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic 1200 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] PLO Representative in Riyadh Rafiq al-Natshah has stated that Saudi Arabia yesterday handed the PLO a check for $6,020,000 which represents the sixth installment of its contribution to the Intifadah [Uprising] Support Fund.

Egypt

Sudan's Al-Mirghani Requests Residency

JN0507152689 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 4 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] Cairo, AL-ITTIHAD—AL-ITTIHAD has learned that former Sudanese State Council Chairman Ahmad 'Ali al-Mirghani expressed to the Egyptian Government his desire to reside in Alexandria. It is to be recalled that Al-Mirghani was on vacation with his family in the Greek island of Rhodes when the recent change took place in Sudan.

Papers Welcome Coup

NC0507070689 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0605 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Cairo, 5 Jul (MENA)—AL-AHRAM stresses that the initial statements and communiques issued by the leader of the Sudanese revolution and the Revolution Command Council [RCC] represent a good start and show that Sudan is on the threshold of an era of comprehensive reforms within the framework of the three principal declared aims, namely the purge, meeting the masses' basic needs, and solving the problem of the south, and that it will adopt a new concept of relations between Egypt and Sudan within the framework of Nile valley unity.

In today's editorial, the paper says that the popular welcome, the absence of resistance, and the elements of stability which the revolution quickly achieved prove that the atmosphere that has accompanied the revolution has been an appropriate one and that it came at a decisive time in response to appeals that stemmed from the people's conscience. Hence its measures are expected to be generally accepted and the Sudanese masses will voluntarily and directly respond to them because these measures embody their feelings and aspirations at a critical stage in the country's development.

AL-AHRAM adds: The wise political trend to improve relations with Egypt, demonstrated in the new Sudanese leaders' communiques and statements, is an important sign of a serious policy that aims to improve the ties of historic neighborliness and establish firm bases for cooperation after a period of setback brought about by the former regime.

Concluding its editorial, AL-AHRAM adds that the Egyptian Government and people have welcomed this trend in the RCC's priorities because it restores the eternal relations to the right track and rectifies abnormal situations which some parties had wanted to use in order to disfigure a unique historic example.

For its part and under the headline "Sudan in the Heart of Egypt," AL-JUMHURIYAH underlines in its editorial today the support of the Egyptian Government and people for the national salvation revolution in Sudan and their hopes for its stability and the fulfillment of its aspirations. It notes that the northern part of the Nile valley will be the first to listen to fraternal Sudan's requests and the first to respond to them.

The paper says that Cairo was the first Arab capital to receive the RCC delegation, and President Husni Mubarak's envoy was the first Arab envoy received in the Sudanese capital. The envoy, it adds, was sent to be assured about the situation in the southern part of the valley and to underline Egypt's readiness to extend help to Sudan and its fraternal people. The paper notes that the national salvation revolution command has initiated urgent measures to organize the Sudanese house amid a collective Arab welcoming and a popular rallying. This stresses everybody's desire to see the noble Sudanese people overcome their tribulations which had reached such a level that it compelled the revolution command to speed up its action to save the homeland from ruin and destruction.

Official 'Source' Denies 'Chill' in Libya Ties

JN0507162489 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 4 Jul 89 p 3

[Text] Cairo, AL-ITTIHAD—A responsible Egyptian source has denied to AL-ITTIHAD allegations that a chill in Egyptian-Libyan relations has resurfaced. He added that bilateral contacts continue and remain unchanged.

The sources [as published] went on to say that the failure so far of each country to open a liaison office in the other is linked only to insignificant procedural problems. He said that the liaison offices of the two countries will be launched when these problems are resolved through the materialization of proper solutions.

Mubarak Phones Arab Leaders; Exchanges Views

NC0207055689 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Text] President Muhammad Husni Mubarak last night placed telephone calls to Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz of Saudi Arabia, King Husayn of Jordan, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, and Yemeni Arab Republic President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. President Mubarak and the Arab leaders exchanged views on current issues and latest developments in the region.

Mubarak Meets U.S. Congressional Delegation

NC0207080289 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0705 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Text] Cairo, 2 Jul (MENA)—President Muhammad Husni Mubarak this morning received the U.S. congressional delegation, which is currently visiting Egypt, headed by William Gray, chairman of the Congressional Budget Committee and member of the congressional Appropriations Committee.

Frank Wisner, U.S. ambassador in Cairo, was present at the meeting.

Envoy to U.S. Concerned Over Israeli Practices

NC0507202489 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1945 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Excerpt] Washington, 5 Jul (MENA)—Today Egypt told the U.S. Government of its concern over Israeli practices and the repressive measures which the Israeli occupation forces are taking in the occupied Arab territories. Egypt also expressed its concern over the negative effects of these practices on the peace process.

'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Ridi, Egypt's ambassador in Washington, raised this issue during his meeting with John Kelly, assistant secretary of state for Middle East affairs. The ambassador asserted that the Israeli occupation authorities' acts of deportation and arrest, which have been recurring in a manner causing anxiety in the recent period, will complicate matters in the region and obstruct the efforts to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement.

Al-Ridi stressed the importance of creating an appropriate atmosphere which would help push the peace process forward. He further stressed the responsibility of all parties to contribute to the creation of this atmosphere. [passage omitted]

'Abd-al-Majid Sends Message to 'Arafat

NC0307135689 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1315 GMT 3 Jul 89

[Text] Cairo, 3 Jul (MENA)—Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, has sent a message to Yasir 'Arafat, president of the Palestinian state, dealing with the recent U.S. stand on the elections in the occupied territories. The message was conveyed to PLO representative in Cairo Sa'id Kamal during his meeting with Dr 'Abd-al-Majid today.

Kamal said the talks during the meeting dealt with the latest developments on the Arab situation, pointing to the PLO's reservations about Israeli Prime Minister Shamir's proposals regarding elections in the occupied land.

The Palestinian official called on the U.S. Congress to endorse U.S. President George Bush's efforts to terminate Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip so that peace will prevail, and ensure Israel's security, in addition to preparing well for the international peace conference and the implementation of the Palestinian people's political rights in order to eliminate the Palestinian fears about Shamir's proposals.

Sa'id Kamal described the U.S.-Palestinian dialogue as good, expressing the hope that this dialogue will expand to include Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

IMF Official Ends 3-Day Visit to Cairo

NC0107085989 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0810 GMT 1 Jul 89

[Text] Cairo, 1 Jul (MENA)—Dr 'Abd-al-Shakur Sha'lan, director of IMF operations in the Middle East, left Cairo this morning for Washington after a 3-day visit to Egypt.

During his visit, Dr Sha'lan held talks with Prime Minister Dr 'Atif Sidqi and Egyptian Cabinet ministers on the Egyptian economy, rescheduling Egypt's old debts, and the possibility of extending new loans to Egypt. A letter of intent, detailing Egyptian economic reform measures, is expected to be formulated in Washington. Dr Sha'lan will then return to Cairo with the final version of the letter to be submitted to the officials in Egypt. The procedures for holding talks at the Paris Club will then begin.

Official Interviewed

JN0207153589 Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 30 Jun 89 pp 14, 15

[Interview with Dr 'Abd-al-Shakur Sha'lan, executive director of the IMF's Middle East operations by Majid 'Atiyah in Cairo—date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] ['Atiyah] How will it be possible to reconcile the IMF's standpoint on subsidies and its appreciation for social goals given that this has been a bone of contention between Egypt and the Fund?

[Sha'lan] Who says that as a fund we are opposed to subsidies to the poor? If anything we see the need for supporting low-income groups. The disagreement, however, centered on how to go about subsidies and the attendant waste and irregularities. Imagine the government purchasing a ton of flour for $200 or 600 Egyptian pounds on the free market and selling it at 30 pounds to bakeries to make pastries and achieve profits in millions in the name of subsidies for the poor. And still you find people lining up for bread despite the fact that the average bread consumption in Egypt is the highest in the world.

['Atiyah] And what kind of solution does the IMF contemplate to redress the balance?

[Sha'lan] We and the government are trying to find a solution. The government has its own blueprint and together we are trying to work out a plan whereby subsidies are retained for those who are deserving. One of the ideas on the table—and this is my viewpoint—is why not calculate the subsidies allocated for the individual and then give him a cash substitute according to his income under the name of "subsidy allowance." Especially since there are approximately 11 million people employed by the government, the public sector, and the local government, with the possible addition of Army personnel with an average household of four. But the actual number is 44 million. That way the subsidy would serve its purpose and benefit the deserving. It may be

said here that it will thus be possible to achieve a 30 percent saving in the consumption of wheat and flour and to preclude irregularities in the foodstuffs supply sector.

['Atiyah] And what about the rest of the population—10 million people?

[Sha'lan] You know that the rest are mostly traders, merchants, and landed farmers. I do not think these are in need of state subsidies.

['Atiyah] You have announced that you are against inflation. Yet some of your suggestions like deregulating prices in agriculture, the public sector, and cash subsidies as alternatives to subsidies in kind are bound to push up prices and eventually produce inflation?

[Sha'lan] There is a difference between inflation which must be combated and prices resulting from redressing the economic structure. Inflation is the outcome of a fault in the structures like the budget deficits and the balance of payment deficits and the interest rates and the like. But the "corrective prices" are the product of redressing the imbalance. With continuing corrective action prices will necessarily stabilize.

['Atiyah] But this may have an adverse impact on the economic growth rate?

[Sha'lan] On the contrary, this policy should raise the economic growth rate so as to create greater job opportunities and correct the joblessness problem.

['Atiyah] What, in your opinion, are the best corrective measures to be adopted and which are now the subject of talks?

['Atiyah] A reduction in the budget deficit and pursuing flexible exchange rate policies, a liberalization of the administration and prices of the public sector, and decreeing an interest rate for savings to make up for inflation.

['Atiyah] The interest rate decided by the Egyptian Government, which is 16 percent, is tax free. If taxes are added, it will reach 24 percent, which is almost the highest in the world. This increase will also have a negative impact on investments.

[Sha'lan] You might be surprised if I tell you that the IMF is against raising the interest rate. We always favor low interest rates, but when the rate of inflation gets so high that it eats up the value of these savings, then the remedy must be an increase of the interest rate. The interest rate is not always fixed, it can be reduced whenever the inflation rate goes down. The interest rate is one of the tools of reform, and decisionmakers use these tools in a way that serves the growth rates and preserves the value of the savings.

Perhaps the most important result of the interest rate, especially as regards foreign currency savings, is that it helps the central bank build adequate reserves to balance the exchange rates and meet the demand.

['Atiyah] Egypt is among the top 10 debtor states, and, being a developing country, it is perhaps entitled to benefit from the easy loans that the IMF decided to provide about 2 years ago.

[Sha'lan] There are currently two major projects for the poor debtor countries that are moving toward reform. The first project: The IMF gives loans to these countries with an interest rate of only 0.5 percent for 10 years, with a grace period of 5 years after which repayment begins. The second project is known as the Brady plan, with reference to the U.S. secretary of the treasury. This concerns the states that owe commercial banks, such as Mexico and the Philippines.

['Atiyah] Does Egypt belong to the first project?

[Sha'lan] Regrettably no, because this project is confined to poorer countries. Egypt also does not belong to the second project because 90 percent of its loans are either government or government-guaranteed loans; they are not commercial loans.

Egypt is not alone in this. Jordan has a similar situation. We in the IMF are currently searching for a solution to this situation.

['Atiyah] How far has the dialogue with the Egyptian Government gone? And when will there be an agreement on the program?

[Sha'lan] The Egyptian Government has indeed made important steps toward reform. We are currently working toward an agreement on the new program, and I hope this will be reached over the next few weeks.

['Atiyah] What about rescheduling the burden?

[Sha'lan] As soon as we sign the agreement, we can go to the Paris Club for rescheduling.

['Atiyah] This is the burden of the past year, and we are entering a new year.

[Sha'lan] We even can, if we accomplish the agreement, reschedule the burden of 18 coming months as well as that of the year ending in June 1989.

['Atiyah] What is your estimations of this burden depending on the exchanged figures between you and the government?

[Sha'lan] For the whole period I defined, the burden that needs to be rescheduled (installments plus interest arrears) is between 8 and 10 billion dollars.

['Atiyah] What assistance will the IMF provide for the government's reform program, especially as regards the flexibility of the exchange rate?

[Sha'lan] The government is entitled, in accordance with its program, to have its debts rescheduled for 3 years and to obtain during the period of the program about $500 million for an interest rate of 8 percent over a period of 5 years.

['Atiyah] Egypt has the right to ask for a longer repayment period, and is entitled to obtain a larger amount of money.

[Sha'lan] As for the repayment period, the IMF, as I said, is discussing the case of Egypt and Jordan. As for the amount of money, this depends on the program itself, and it is possible for the government to actually obtain an amount larger than the said figure.

Sudan

Al-Bashir Interviewed on Coup 2 Jul

LD0307005289 Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 1940 GMT 2 Jul 89

[Interview with Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, chairman of the Revolution Command Council for National Salvation, by Makram Muhammad Makram, doyen of the Egyptian Journalists' Syndicate, on 2 July; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Makram] Naturally, we congratulate you on this bloodless revolution. But there are still many questions in the Arab world about this revolution. Perhaps all the people are asking: Who are you, and why did you do this?

[Al-Bashir] As a matter of fact, and to begin, I would like to thank you for your interest and the interest of the brothers in the Arab Republic of Egypt in what is going on in the Sudan. This interest is natural because Egypt and the Sudan are one—an indivisible part—as only circumstances created two separate states.

The reasons for our move may be known to all those who have observed the situation in Sudan—the situation deteriorated and reached rock-bottom, and there was devastation in all utilities and in all policies and in all establishments. Fear that Sudan would be lost and we would become a burden on others and live as refugees in neighbouring states motivated us to act, because we felt that to wait and do nothng about the chaos in Sudan would be a crime for which the Sudanese people, and history, would not forgive us. Proceeding from this we moved to save Sudan—the Sudanese people—from the destruction and devastation. We are a group of national officers; we do not belong to any party; we have no racial loyalties; we have no regional loyalties. We represent all provinces of Sudan, and all orientations of Sudan. We felt that this hated partisanship and sectarianism would lead to the loss of Sudan. Therefore we have no party links; we have no sectarian links; we have no links at all; we are a grouping of national officers whose aim is to save the Sudan.

[Makram] Your Excellency the Chairman, allow me to ask you a question: How were your relations with each other in the Revolution Command Council [RCC] established? Were you an organization, or were you just a group of officers who were upset with what was going on in the country and banded together prior to the event?

[Al-Bashir] As a matter of fact, some time ago, after our backing for the uprising against Numayri, and for the parties to assume authority, we especially felt that those parties, which had some 16 years of experience in opposing the Numayri regime, had ready-made programs which could be implemented. We therefore agreed that those parties could assume authority. But, regrettably, the parties right from the very first day let us down and we felt that those parties would lead Sudan to destruction and devastation. We then began contacting some of the officers, expressing the general view that the situation would, if allowed to continue, lead to the destruction of Sudan. Contacts began; coordination among the officers began individually, and bilaterally; we began to group ourselves with total secrecy on the basis that we should be ready if and when there was a need to act to save the homeland. Praise be to God, we were successful—this group and this organization remained a secret because we wanted all the people whom we contacted to be precise, loyal, and nationalist, as well as brave and loyal and able to keep a secret.

[Makram] Your Excellency the Lieutenant General: It has been said that there is a relationship—is there any relationship whatever between this organization and former president Ja'far Numayri?

[Al-Bashir] There is no relationship of this organization with Ja'far Namayri. No person on this council has any previous relations with Ja'far Numayri or with any person who used to work with Ja'far Numayri.

[Makram] How do you view his experiment of ruling?

[Al-Bashir] Numayri's experiment of ruling was accompanied by many mistakes. His rule actually began as a nationalist revolution with pan-Arab orientation; all the people rallied round Numayri. But then some groups of benefit-seeking and boasting people were able to encircle Numayri and control him and manipulate him for their own selfish interests, so much so that he lost his [word indstinct] for the Sudanese people; a matter which led to many problems which harmed the Sudanese people and the homeland. Therefore the Sudanese people in the end abandoned him collectively.

[Makram] What will be the difference between your own experiment and Numayri's?

[Al-Bashir] Our own experiment is that we are a group of nationalist officers—perhaps more mature than the officers who participated in the uprising against Numayri; we are experienced people; we are not adventurous; we are nationalists whose aim is to save the homeland. We have Numayri's experiment—we lived with it for 17 years; all its mistakes are there before our eyes; we will avoid these mistakes. We hope that God will help and assist us as we represent a line totally different from that of Numayri because we rejected the Numayri method after having actively participated in it in order to remove Numayri.

[Makram] How does your experiment differ from that of Siwar al-Dhahab?

[Al-Bashir] The experiment of Siwar al-Dhahab was an operation whose aim was to transfer authority from Numayri to the parties. Our operation is to end the parties, the partisanship, and sectarianism in the Sudan. We want to build a new united Sudanese nation free from inter-party conflicts, and free of regional and tribal conflicts. We want to melt the Sudanese people in a crucible so that they can produce and solve their own problems in a manner that will enable us to realize eventual prosperity for the Sudanese citizen.

[Makram] Your Excellency the Lieutenant General: What is the practical formula for realizing this? Will there be a RCC and then a civilian government, and how will they relate to each other?

[Al-Bashir] There is currently a RCC which combines the executive and legislative authorities; there will be a council of ministers, consisting of qualified and honest as well as experienced civilians, free from party fanaticism. The chairman of the RCC will be the chairman of the council of ministers. The deputy chairman of the RCC will be the deputy chairman of the council of ministers. This will be the relationship between the RCC and the council of ministers.

[Makram] Therefore you will stay until you complete your program.

[Al-Bashir] God willing, we will stay in power until we complete our program. This is because one of Numayri's mistakes was that he abandoned members of the then Revolution Command Council and moved to the republican system too quickly, before he realized his program.

[Makram] Your Excellency the Lieutenant General: What will you do with the trade unions? Will you continue to ban trade unions and newspapers?

[Al-Bashir] Regarding the trade unions, naturally one cannot ban the trade unions or trade unionist activities in the Sudan; these activities are developed and have their own roots; there are nationalist and clean trade unionist leaders who we cannot do without; we cannot abandon them. We want to draft new laws required by the next phase, and according to these laws the trade unions and the associations shall be formed, God willing. As for the press, the press is important and we want the press to reflect the views of the general public; we want public scrutiny over what we do—the popular scrutiny which is represented by the press. We have suspended the papers because there was no law governing them. We will issue a law for the press and publications. After the issuance of this law we will allow people to submit their requests to obtain licences to publish newspapers. There will be an independent press; a free press, but within the limits of the pan-Arab orientation.

[Makram] When will this take place? Soon? Or in the distant future? The transitional period until the trade unions return to practice their activities—how long will this be?

[Al-Bashir] This transitional period will be as short as possible. The current period is a period of guaranteeing the regime—the period of establishing the regime itself. God willing, after that we will move toward the establishment of other institutions and organizations.

[Makram] How long do you expect this period to last?

[Al-Bashir] This will depend on developments. We are very pleased that the first stage of seizing power did not take as long as we had expected, and therefore this will give us an opportunity to shorten the time taken for building institutions and licencing papers. This will be a short time, lasting 1 or 2 months at the most, God willing.

[Makram] Your Excellency the Lieutenant General: How many have you arrested during the coup? Was the coup bloodless in fact? Was there any incident at all?

[Al-Bashir] The coup was totally bloodless; there was no resistance at all. As I have mentioned, the coup took place with the complete support of the Armed Forces; all the units inside the capital took part and contributed to the seizure of power. All units outside the capital, as soon as they were told that power was seized, supported what took place in Khartoum. There was no confrontation because no unit was moved from its place—each unit took control of its own barracks. We then moved units to protect public installations. There was one incident: A medical officer in Omdurman, instead of entering through the gate, jumped over the fence and was met by a patrol which fired on him because he was violating a military zone; the patrol did not know who he was. The patrol did not know his intention. The patrol saw him as a person who scaled the fence and fired on him. Regrettably, he was killed. The other incident...

[Makram, interrupting] One of your unit, sir?

[Al-Bashir] No. A person scaled the fence and the patrol that fired on him was not one of the units or forces belonging to us. It was an ordinary patrol that happened to be in the area. It merely did its duty. The second incident

is that a politician apparently had armed guards outside his house and the guards opened fire and hit a soldier in the eye. Therefore we have a martyr in our forces. The other brother martyr was the one killed by mistake.

[Makram] Was that all that happened?

[Al-Bashir] That was all.

[Makram] What is the current number of detainees?

[Al-Bashir] The number of detainees is about 30 so far, among the politicians.

[Makram] Are there any detainees among the officers?

[Al-Bashir] There are the leaders of the Armed Forces—we kept them under custody because we felt their presence during the seizure of power constituted a danger to the carrying out of the mission; we kept them under custody because their positions made it inevitable for us to keep them in custody. I visited them; I visited the military leaders in custody and when I tried to explain our motives to them, they themselves said that they understood the circumstances, and that they had expected the coup. The general officer commanding is now at home—he is under house arrest with his own family. This is because he is a symbol of the Armed Forces.

[Makram] What do you intend to do with the politicians? Do you intend to try them?

[Al-Bashir] We will try all politicians and nonpoliticians who were corrupt, who committed crimes and who made mistakes—they all should be brought to book and tried and punished. All innocent people will be released at the appropriate time according to the dictates of security.

[Makram] Was the corruption so great that it requires digging up the past?

[Al-Bashir] The magnitude of the corruption was unbelievable; it was devastating. It was an unforgiveable crime. If we forgave this crime it might encourage us and the elements cooperating with us to make the same mistakes. We want to lay down a principle which says: He who assumes authority and corrupts—regardless of the magnitude of the corruption—should be punished. No one shall be appointed to a position by force. If he chooses to assume that post, he should be devoid of corruption and serve that post. If he corrupts this post, he shall be punished, irrespective of his position, beginning with the members of the RCC.

[Makram] Will these trials be military or civil trials? How can we aim at justice in these trials so that what happened in previous revolutions may not be repeated?

[Al-Bashir] These courts will be just courts. All means and facilities will be provided for the accused to defend themselves. They will have all the opportunities for appeal against the verdicts. They will be fair trials, God willing. They will be open courts and not closed or secret courts. People may attend them.

[Makram] Mr Chairman: Earlier we discussed corruption; can you give an example of the extent of this frightening corruption?

[Al-Bashir] I can give you a simple example. When Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi first took over, there was a piece of land which was (?privately owned). The government requisitioned it in the public interest. Al-Mahdi's family was compensated for this land at the prevailing price. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi received (?compensation) [words indistinct]. The price of land rose; he fixed the price of the land and compensated himself 35 million at a time when the country was suffering from poverty and government officials could not (?earn enough) to meet their needs because the economy made it impossible. But the economy permitted the payment of compensation to the Al-Mahdi family of 35 million in one go.

[Makram] Thirty-five million Sudanese pounds?

[Al-Bashir] Thirty-five million Sudanese pounds.

[Makram] Who used to be in charge of Army contracts and was there corruption in Army contracts?

[Al-Bashir] We have not yet found any thing apparent. There are accusations and suspicions. Honest investigation will take place and the corrupt person will be brought to trial.

[Makram] What is the fate of Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi? Some people say that he has disappeared, some say that he fled, and others say that he was killed.

[Al-Bashir] Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi has disappeared; he is in hiding in the capital because when he left his post he was still in the capital. He cannot leave the capital since all the security services are cooperating and coordinating their search for him. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was not killed, and contrary to what has been reported by some sources, he has not been arrested, so far.

[Makram] There are what you may call protagonists who are talking about the possibility that Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's militia or the Muslim Brotherhood militia or the militia of some other groups may move against the Army; is this possible?

[Al-Bashir] No move can be made against the Army. Even those which are so-called militia are sons of the Army or they are former soldiers and have close ties with the Army. The parties tried to make these militia bigger than they are. The aim is to frighten the Army into inaction by the threat from the militia. We knew that they were few and not exceeding scores at the best of times, and they were incapable of confronting the Armed Forces.

[Makram] Many are saying that what is distinctive about Gen 'Umar is that he is a religious man. Does this religious devotion reflect a specific Islamic political outlook? Are you religious like all devout Sudanese? Do you belong to a religious party?

[Al-Bashir] I do not belong to a religious party or any nonreligious party. We, as officers, belong to the Armed Forces; religious devotion is a gift from God; one likes to achieve it and one would hope that this attribute which is given to (?us) is real. Belonging to parties is not in our character; we have never worked inside parties, even in school. We were not members of party formations.

[Makram] Were you one of those who signed the 20 February petition?

[Al-Bashir] I did not sign the 20 February petition, because I was absent in the military area west of al-Nuwayrah. The commanders of the southern military areas did not attend the meetings at which the signing of the note took place.

[Makram] Why did the signing of the 20 February note fail?

[Al-Bashir] It failed because the note came about as a result of events; the outlook was not clear; that is, if these provisions were not implemented, people expected that by signing the note the command will adopt measures which it would impose on the politicians for implementation. But the military command failed to make the politicians implement the note, and sufficed itself by claiming that part of it was implemented, despite the fact that none of it was implemented, except possibly a small part on change of authority.

[Makram] One final question. In the first communique you said that the previous regime did not provide the Army with the means to fight the war in the south and that they did not make peace. What exactly do you want? Do you want peace or war? And what are your views on the issue of the south?

[Al-Bashir] Peace is our first choice. We strive for peace and are of the opinion that the best solution for the problem of the south lies in arriving at solutions through peaceful negotiations. Resorting to negotiatons does not mean neglecting the Armed Forces. Peace requires a force to protect it. We think that the military solution is the best solution [as heard] but the Armed Forces constitute the prestige of the state and safeguard peace; they can help the people achieve peace.

[Makram] Do you know Garang?

[Al-Bashir] I have not dealt with him; I have not met him.

[Makram] Has there been any contact between you and those in the south so far?

[Al-Bashir] There has been no contact with Garang so far, but we have some brothers with us in the Council who are from the south. Some have strong contacts with him and with some of those who are working with him.

Interviewed 4 Jul

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[Interview with leader of the national salvation revolution, Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, by unidentified correspondent on 4 July—live or recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Welcome Your Excellency Lieutenant General. The first question: The revolution for national salvation has received unanimous support from the Armed Forces and the rest of the regular forces. It has also received popular and noticeably great support. Did you expect such support and such a welcome?

[Al-Bashir] In the name of God, the compassionate and the merciful. Peace and prayers be upon the noblest messenger, our master Muhammad, his family, and all his friends. In fact, when we decided to move in order to seize power we had in mind the total rejection of the then regime in Sudan. We had great confidence in the support of the Armed Forces and the Sudanese masses to the new era. It was not a surprise to us. Had not we thought that we were going to receive the support of the people and the Armed Forces we would not have moved. Our move was fundamentally initiated by the total rejection and the desire for change.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much. Another question. Undoubtedly you have inherited a seriously deteriorating situation in all aspects of Sudanese life, a matter which needs serious work at least in order to stop the deterioration and the collapse in preparation for a new lease of life toward development and prosperity. What are the priorities in you program of reforms?

[Al-Bashir] In actual fact the basic issues are summed up in two issues, namely, the security issue and the economic issue. We decided our priorities: The security issue was placed first in order to solve the war in the south. On this we decided that the best solution is through negotiations. The second solution is to solve security problems in other areas, particularly the Darfur area and south Kordofan and the rest of the areas. We gave security first priority because we consider that when security and stability are established we would be taking a very great step toward solving Sudan's economic problem.

In the economic field, our priority first of all is to combat corruption; in combating corruption we would be stopping the exhaustion of the state's revenues, raising the morale of the Sudanese people so that it can blossom and produce—production is the best solution to solve these problems, of course.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much. Regional rule in the way it was implemented during May and the former pluralist system—do you not see that it has dragged the country into to disintegration and aroused tribal and regional fanaticisms; do you intend to reexamine it?

[Al-Bashir] This is certain; all our security problems in Darfur, Kordofan, the Blue Nile, in all areas—the main cause of it might be the revival of racial and tribal chauvinism through the regional government which existed in the past. We have come along and now, God willing, we will change this form of government so that we can ensure that all the masses in Sudan are molded together.

[Correspondent] Thank you. This leads us also to the issue of local people's rule and local administration. Can we hear something about your principled vision on this matter, due to its importance and its direct relation to stability and the provision of services to citizens?.

[Al-Bashir] We consider popular participation as fundamental and important in the solution of people's problems, the administration of services, even in participating with us in decisionmaking. We are for the people's local rule, we are for the local and responsible administration whose sole interest is the citizen's life and the solution of their problems far removed from the hegemony that existed in the past, far removed from exploitation and party as well as tribal loyalties that existed in the past.

[Correspondent] The problem of the exodus, immigration and exile: What is your vision on tackling this problem that represents a danger to stability, security, and production?

[Al-Bashir] The issue of exodus and exile were imposed by extenuating circumstances. There is no human being who leaves his homeland out of choice and out of his own freedom unless he was forced to leave his country. The exodus created a number of security problems. We aim to solve these security problems, and if these security problems are resolved we aim to fight the circumstances that forced these brothers to leave their region. We will solve these problems by trying to benefit from this exodus, because the exodus has its negative sides; we aim to pinpoint the positive side of this exodus by reaping benefit from this potential by using it in other spheres of productivity. We will benefit from the exodus operation itself by trying to create a form of integration between brothers who come from the south and those in the regions of the north where they have settled, because among the problems facing us is giving birth to the Sudanese nation. We must give birth to the Sudanese nation by working together, by removing these differences, our experience in the Armed Forces in removing differences between brothers from the south and the north is a very significant experience. We will try to draw the lessons from this experience. We believe that despite the huge problems arising from the exodus, this exodus presents us with the opportunity to bring about this integration.

[Correspondent] Thank you. The security condition in Darfur and the south of Kordofan has reached a threatening level of deterioration, which causes concern among the masses of our people throughout the homeland. What is Your Excellency's comment?.

[Al-Bashir] The deterioration of the situation in Darfur and the south of Kordofan—according to my experience of what is going on in the south or Kordofan, as I used to live in this region and near it—the main factor which used to nourish it was the party conflicts that used to exist in the region. With the disappearance and dissolution of the parties we have made a tremendous step toward solving this problem and the reasons for its existence. The remaining problem is removing the effects of the conflict. Now, the situation in these regions, according to the news we are receiving, is going in a very reassuring direction.

[Correspondent] Thank you. The issue of the war in the south. This issue has been draining the resources of the homeland since 1950, before independence, up to now. It has been hampering its development and claiming the lives of many of its children. The situation suffered confusion between peace and war during the previous era. Undoubtedly, this issue is the citizens' first concern. To what extent do you expect the rebellion movement to respond to your call to agree on reaching a peaceful, permanent, and just solution to this issue?

[Al-Bashir] The truth is that the problem of the south has obviously been stopping the Sudanese people from sleeping. It was the reason for the failure of all the previous governments, and the political changes which have occurred in Sudan. We are experiencing the problem of the south directly, because of our presence in its center as fighters. We are nearer than any other side to the brothers raising arms on the other side. The people who belong to the rebellion movement, or those who lead the rebellion, are military men the majority of whom used to be with us in the Armed Forces as colleagues. We used to confront each other on the field. We are the closest people who can understand each other, because we think in the same way. We are confident in the response, the quick response from the brothers in the rebellion movement. We have no doubts about this.

We are the people most able to reach an understanding with them and come to drastic solutions. We have begun to take practical steps to reach this solution and, God willing, the results will emerge.

[Correspondent] Thank you. There is no doubt that the Armed Forces are the shield and the safety valve of the people and the homeland vis-a-vis all internal and external challenges. And they were clearly neglected in their preparation for the confrontation of those challenges. What is your plan to strengthen the Armed Forces so that they shoulder their role of defending our national soil?

[Al-Bashir] The Armed Forces have indeed been neglected intentionally by the previous regime. The previous regime hated the Armed Forces and thought that they deprived it from ruling the May revolution for 16 years. The previous regime thought that the only danger to it came from the Armed Forces. From this premise, the previous regime fought the Armed Forces, tried to weaken them and eliminate them. Because of the importance of the Armed Forces and their role in maintaining peace and security, because there is no peace without strong Armed Forces, we shall show special consideration for the training and development of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces at the level of personnel need consolidation and additions, the training of soldiers and the improvement of their equipment and weapons so that they come up to the level of modern forces and armies. This operation costs huge quantities of money and the deteriorating economic situation may not permit the Sudanese economy to carry out this task. Thus we rely on the backing of our brothers and friends to rebuild and train the Armed Forces.

We greatly hope that Sudanese people and Sudanese youth—there was abstention from enlistment—will respond to the national call and enlist in the ranks of the Armed Forces, God willing. We have great hope that the Armed Forces will become capable of preserving peace inside Sudan and defend its borders in a manner which upholds Sudan's dignity—as a homeland—its status and respect in the region.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much. Leader of the revolution for national salvation, our citizens want to know when the new council of ministers will be formed and is there an intention to curb the phenomenon of the abundance of ministers and the ministers of state?

[Al-Bashir] The council of minsters, in truth, that is, the procedure for selection is not an easy operation, because we are looking for specific precepts in ministers who will be taking office. Basically we seek honesty and uprightness, a clean record, competence, nonpartisan opinions; these precepts are a bit difficult to meet. We are working day and night scrutinizing names and turning pages and studying. We have come up with a large number of nominations but the time has not yet come for us to announce them. We will announce them only after we contact the people; we have marked each ministry with the choices; there are a number of people to contact and negotiate with them and persuade them to take part. We do not give the ministry responsibility or the people who ask for it. A number of people contacted us to inquire; they said they were ready to offer their services. The man who asks for the ministry, we do not give it to him, but we give it to the one who we believe will be work and who will make sacrifices. We want people who make sacrifices. We want fedayeen; it is because the country is drowning and we want divers who dive to save this country.

[Correspondent] There is no doubt that the civil service has become bloated and weak as a result of the confusion in policies. How do you visualize spreading stability in the civil service and reorganizing it so that it can carry out its task in a better manner, to serve citizens?

[Al-Bashir] The civil service is a fundamental part of government. The civil service suffered from banishment, favoritism, and corruption. The civil service lost its prestige during the past period. Our plan is to restore the prestige of the civil service and to restore the prestige of the commanders of the civil service, so that they are the people who have power and authority in the institutions, and the positions they are in charge of, because without a civil service that is effective, strong, and capable, we cannot implement anything.

[Correspondent] Thank you. The economic situation: This situation needs urgent attention in order to end its deterioration. Will we expect an urgent program which will treat the economic situation?

[Al-Bashir] As I said in my talk, the economic question is among our priorities. The fundamental solution to the economic problem consists in raising productivity. Raising productivity cannot be achieved without raising the morale of the Sudanese people, creating an appropriate climate for production, and providing for the basic needs, [words indistinct]. Our priorities are building a strong infrastructure, requalifying the institutions and the projects for resettling people. These are our priorities in improving the Sudanese economy. We hope that after this period that we can start thinking about settling other additional projects.

[Correspondent] Question: Mr Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, chairman of the RCC, the problem of the standard of living and providing for the necessary basic needs such as food, clothes, housing, treatment, medicines, and security for the citizens, represents the concern of the big majority of the masses of our people. How are you planning to deal with this problem?

[Al-Bashir] The livelihood problem and the other problems which the Sudanese citizen suffers from are summed up in certain issues, they are: The black market, smuggling, and the neglect prevailing in the various service utilities. We came with a war against corruption, a war against smuggling, a war against the black market. And if we are able to combat the black market, smuggling, and eliminate neglect—and this as I mentioned previously—by restructuring the civil service, we believe that we can find drastic and honorable solutions to the problems of the Sudanese citizen.

There is a simple fact: Go to any home tonight, you will find it gets all the sugar that it needs. How does it get it? Mostly from the black market. All the sugar in Sudan is supply sugar, government sugar, which is supposed to reach the citizen at the legal price fixed by the government. At every corner you find that there is a difference between the government price and that of the black market in the region of 10-12 pounds at times. Thus

10-12 pounds goes into the pockets of people unjustly. These are the real criminals who we will hit mercilessly. They are the cause of the tragedies of the Sudanese people. They are the cause of the ordeals of the Sudanese people. They are the ones who built palaces from the blood of the Sudanese people and housed the Sudanese people in huts. They are the ones who have displaced the people, starved them, and made the Sudanese people suffer from everything.

If we are able, with God's assistance and the help of the masses to eliminate the black market and smuggling, we would solve almost 90 percent of the problems facing the Sudanese people.

[Correspondent] Here is a question on foreign policy. We would like to ask what the main aspects of the foreign policy during the era of the revolution for national salvation are? Also, what is your stance toward Arab groupings like the Arab Cooperation Council [ACC], the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], and so on?

[Al-Bashir] As far as the principles and the aims of our foreign policy are concerned we previously announced them during our meeting with ambassadors of fraternal and friendly countries accredited to the Republic of Sudan. If there is no objection I will repeat them again at this meeting. First, our commitment and adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, particularly those principles dealing with the countries' sovereignty upon their territories, noninterference in others internal affairs and working for resolving conflicts peacefully. Sudan is part of the Arab and African worlds and its adherence to the Arab League Charter and the OAU Charter and its belief in its special responsibility toward bolstering and consolidating the Arab-African cooperation; its firm support for the Palestinian Arab people and its aid and help for it so that is may regain its inalienable rights to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state upon its territory.

Firm support for the African people's struggle against racism, apartheid and the liberation of Namibia. Sudan's commitment to the ICO [Islamic Conference Organization] Charter and to effectively work in order to consolidate and bolster relations with all Islamic countries. Adherence to the principles of nonalignment and to pursue a foreign policy which takes into consideration the country's supreme interest and guarantees total neutrality, away from axes and pacts. To work with developing countries to consecrate international economic cooperation and narrow the gap between developed and developing countries in order to achieve a new and just economic order. Sudan knows very well the repercussions of the economic crisis which it is going through; it focuses its efforts on working with friendly countries as well as concerned economic and financial international institutions to lay down the bases of a healthy and sound economy which would bolster the country's comprehensive development and ease the suffering of the masses of the Sudanese people. We reaffirm that Sudan will spare no efforts to continue its national efforts through its institutions and establishments, which were set up recently, to confront its problems arising from [word indistinct].

With regard to the political direction in the foreign policy as far as the current groupings of Arab states are concerned, as represented in the ACC, the GCC, the UMA [Arab Maghreb Union]—we see this as a good sign and a stage toward building comprehensive Arab unity because we are [words indistinct]. Arab unity is considered to be a strategic objective and we will work to attain it and we regard the groupings which exist now as a nucleus for this comprehensive unity.

As a new regime and a new face, and after the recognition which we have received from all the states, we see that we are qualified to take part in more than one of these groupings, that is, we can join the UMA states and we can also join the ACC and at the same time we will try seriously, God willing, to set up a tripartite union which includes Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. It is because we think that the three-sided grouping will represent the heart of the Arab world, because the eastern wing is represented by the GCC and ACC and the northern wing is represented by the UMA states.

We are going to make an effort God willing, and we pray to God to help us, to succeed in setting up this tripartite union.

[Correspondent] Thank you, leader of the revolution. Before we come to the end of this meeting: Has the revolution given any martyrs?

[Al-Bashir] Actually, when we acted, as I said, we had great faith that complete unanimity and agreement would be apparent among the Armed Forces. This was confirmed during the implementation operation, with the exception of one single incident: Our brother martyr Dr Major Ahmad Gasim, who was one of the brothers who organized, and who started implementing his mission. The mission he was entrusted with was the arrest of some political personalities. He, in fact, carried out the first assignment and arrested Al-Tijani al-Tayyib. After having handed him over, he was going back to arrest another person, and (?because) of lack of time and speed, from fear of discovery of the action, and fleeing from the people to be arrested, a (?kind) of mistake was made, and he was hit by the patrol on the spot and was martyred for the sake of the duty of saving this country. We ask God to receive him well and to give him his position among the righteous, and the martyrs, [words indistinct]. We have another brother soldier, who belonged to the group who went to arrest Ahmad Sa'd 'Umar. The guards who were with Ahmad Sa'd resisted, and he was hit and martyred. These are all the losses which occurred during the implementation of the operation.

I think that this is a tremendous achievement, and the losses are insignificant. We ask God to receive our martyrs well and to give them the position of the righteous, with the martyrs and the upright [words indistinct].

[Correspondent] Lieutenent General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, chairman of the RCC. Our last question: How do you perceive the future of Sudan after the advent of the revolution for national salvation?

[Al-Bashir] The truth is that in accordance with our vision when we staged this revolution, if we accomplish our program, then Sudan will be, God willing, an example of a refined state, an economically strong state, and a militarily strong state; a socially cohesive state, without security and economic problems, able to influence itself and influence its surroundings in a positive way that serves security and peace in the whole region.

Al-Bashir Praises Military in Speech

LD0507113389 Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 1820 GMT 4 Jul 89

[Speech by Lieutenant General 'Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, chairman of the Revolution Command Council for National Salvation, in Bahri, date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful; prayers and peace be upon the last messenger, our lord Muhammad, and all his kith and kin and companions and all those who followed them.

Brother commanders, officers, NCO's, and soldiers of the Bahri military region, peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon you. Today I am very pleased to visit you. I am very sorry for the delay, which was due to the circumstances and much work. I hope that you will forgive us for this delay. As a matter of fact the Bahri region played a pioneering and effective role in fulfilling the task of seizing power. [applause and cheers] I want to recall that all units of the capital—all the units inside the capital—effectively participated in seizing power. When I single out the northern region it is because the northern region is the only one among the three that totally carried out its task 100 percent. [applause and cheers]

The first task assigned to the northern region was to ensure the control on its barracks. Two hours after zero hour the barracks of the northern region were totally under control. The northern region was asked to sever contacts—electronic and microwave telecommunications and others—at 0205 hours I was informed that the task was successfully carried out. The northern region was then entrusted with the task of arresting some of the personalities who were in the area. All those personalities who were to be arrested in the northern region were arrested—100 percent. [applause and cheers]

For this reason I would like to congratulate the Khartoum north region in particular for their great and precise achievement. As a matter of fact, the situation that existed and the reasons we made our move are probably clear to you individually. Every soldier and every NCO who know me used to say to me when met: What are you waiting for? Naturally one could not answer that we were working for the change. That answer was not possible. We knew that everyone in the Armed Forces was totally convinced that that regime should be changed and removed. We did not say that we contacted NCO's and soldiers in order to tell them to come and join us in an organization. No. We were confident that when the zero hour came we would alert the soldiers to tell them we had decided to change the regime. Come with us. We were confident that the soldiers would move with us. In actual fact they did so at all barracks. [applause and cheers]

Naturally you all have lived together with the ruins, corruption, and irresponsibility of the previous responsible officials. In fact they do not deserve to be called responsible officials, because they were irresponsible people. They dealt with this country as if they were enemies and not rulers of this country. They ruined and plundered the country and have led it to a point where it would have been a crime for us to wait any longer. We, the Armed Forces, consider ourselves to be the safety valve for this country, and to sit as spectators watching such people ruin and plunder the country, starve the people and make them homeless while we are watching them with our arms unsheathed to protect them, by God this would have been a crime, a crime history would have never forgiven because had we waited a little more this country would have been divided [words indistinct] saying that if the country was ruined, reach and take what you can for yourself. All were working according to this concept. Therefore, we have moved and thanks to God our move was successful due to the support, and thanks to your stand by us and the stand of the Sudanese people and ultimately the success granted by God.

We in the Revolution Command Council pledge to you that all of your aspirations, hopes, and all you were looking for will be fulfilled, God willing. The point I would like to emphasize is that all your aspirations, hopes, and all the things you were hoping for we will seriously endeavor to accomplish. I would like to emphasize to you once more that we have neither a parliament nor a constituent assembly but the brother officers and the NCO's will be our parliament and our constituent assembly. We are going to come back to you for consultation in all our decisions. We are going to listen to all your views and suggestions and I hope that you will deal with us in total sincerity. We are confident; we are not in need of anybody to trumpet for us telling us that all what we have done is good. No, what we do cannot all be good. We are humans and every human is prone to mistakes and we need your views when we commit mistakes. When we do something good it will be because our intentions were good and we do not need any mention but when we make mistakes then we will be in need of warnings and remainders so we can reconsider our actions.

Previous officials did not take into account the views of the masses; they did not care about the masses' sufferings because they believed that they were masters [sadah] and the country belonged to them. Their motto was: The country is ours and we are the masters of the country. When the people spoke about compensations, Mubarak al-Fadil replied: [words indistinct] only 35 million; all the country is ours.

Following the uprising [against Numayri]—and you yourselves carried out the uprising, for if you had stood with Numayri the uprising would not have taken place at all [applause and cheers]—the uprising did not bring Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi to power as he did not have any role in it. We used to contact him so that he would preach at the Friday prayers to the Ansar [Al-Mahdi's supporters] and incite them, but he refused. That was until he heard at night that we had decided to seize power. He spoke then after the last evening prayers and made himself appear as a hero and leader; he reaped the fruit of the uprising which was carried out by the Sudanese people and their Armed Forces for the sake of the prosperity of the Sudanese people. He [applause and cheers] thought, Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi thought that the uprising was staged to compensate him for the 16 years when he was not in power. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and his [?followers] are malevolent toward the Sudanese people because the latter supported Numayri and ask: Why didn't the Sudanese people topple Numayri and bring us to power? Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was full of rancor toward the Armed Forces because he thought that the Armed Forces brought Numayri in and protected him. He thought the Armed Forces deprived him of 16 years of ruling Sudan.

That is why Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi—after having assumed power—considered the Armed Forces as his number one enemy. He believed that the Armed Forces had deprived him of authority and that they would remove him from power once more if he let them. For this reason he worked to destroy the Armed Forces. You all lived through the previous periods and saw what the soldiers had to put up with. [passage omitted]

Despite the misdeeds of Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi the Armed Forces remained steadfast; they remained in position defending Sudan and Sudanese soil and made every sacrifice possible. There were a large number of martyrs, from all ranks. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi used to enjoy himself doing that. He used to feel happy on receiving news that this place had fallen or that the Army at this or that location was hit and gave so many martyrs. He used to think that his aspirations would be realized—the Armed Forces would be destroyed and then he would bring the militias to rule Sudan by them forever. [applause]

But God is greater than him. God enabled us—and with your support—to remove this nightmare. He thought that he would intimidate us. We did not fear him. We challenged him and challenged his militias. [applause and cheers] If he can with the help of his militias occupy a post which has three soldiers on patrol then I will hand over authority to him. [applause and cheers] God willing, we will capture Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and put him on trial. We will—God willing—mercilessly stride all those who supported Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi on corruption—those whom Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi protected, those who corrupted and sucked the blood of the Sudanese people—the men of the black market, the smugglers, the corrupt, the traitors, and the lackeys. [applause and cheers]

We are confident that if we do not strike at the corruption in this country we will have offered nothing to this country, and will not be able to offer anything. Any person who committed a crime and corrupted against Sudan will receive his just punishment. We will not forgive them and will not turn over a page and say let bygones be bygones—we have no such policy. [applause and cheers] We are confident and our confidence is in the Sudanese people and in God—it is a great confidence. We will take the Sudanese people to the shores of safety. Then we, the members of the council, will give up authority and hand it over the the people—and not to the parties. We will then return to our barracks or to our homes satisfied with the achievement we have accomplished. As soon as your revolution broke out all the Armed Forces—and as I said at the beginning of my speech, all the units of the capital without exception—met and participated in the seizure of the authority. We did not need to move forces from one barracks to another in order to control the latter. [applause and cheers]

There was no unit that needed reinforcement. Maybe some deployments took place after the barracks were brought under control. Controlling the strategic installations needed redeployment of forces. We began to move forces from the areas where many forces were present to these installations. The operation was carried out successfully without losses thanks to God. We lost only two martyrs—one a doctor with the rank of major and the other a naval rating. [passage omitted]

All the Arab states have supported the blessed revolution. Their envoys and ambassadors arrived to express congratulations and best wishes. They asked us to inform them of our urgent needs so that they could meet them. Some states took it upon themselves to send assistance which we urgently need without us asking them—before we had asked them for it. An oil tanker is on its way to Port Sudan from Egypt—it is expected to arrive tonight at Port Sudan; this is even before we talked to them about it and before we asked them. We have not bought it. They loaded the tanker and sent it. [applause]

Tonight there will be a bridge from the Arab Republic of Egypt airlifting medicine. There are ships at anchor in the port of Jeddah being loaded with wheat. We have a delegation currently in Saudi Arabia—at the request of the latter—to negotiate how oil can be loaded and delivered to us—free of charge. [applause and cheers]

Brothers in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar are insisting on giving us aid; each one of them wants to be the first to render aid to the Sudan. [applause and cheers]

As is customary, the Libyan brothers are friends of the Sudanese people—they have actually proved that they are friends of the Sudanese people and not friends of the Sudanese regimes. They gave us their support right from the very 1st day. Their delegation arrived on the 2d day. We sat for long hours discussing our problems and our needs. They spoke as if they were each one of us—we did not feel that they were strangers as far as our problems are concerned. They spoke about the problems of the Sudanese people as if they were us who were doing the talking. The brothers in Libya totally stood by us; they totally supported us, and will give us all necessary assistance. Their assistance in the past is well-known to all. We in the Armed Forces for months during the past year have totally depended on Libyan support. They supported us with aircraft—of various types—transport and fighter aircraft, military equipment, weapons, ammunition—they supported us with strategic aircraft. We thank the brothers in Libya for their past assistance, and will continue to thank them for the support of the Libyan people. They too are already prepared and, God willing, will give us all our needs and requirements without any hesitation. We feel that we are in a position acceptable to all the Arab states.

Before we came to power Sudan was totally isolated. All the Arab states grouped with each other—the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] member states, the member states of the Arab Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Union [UMA]—all the Arab states are members in this or that group, except Sudan. All these groups have opened their doors for Sudan. Tonight we are able to join any one of these federations—the Arab cooperation federation [as heard] or the UMA, or to establish a new unit—we are able to establish a tripartite unity with Libya and Egypt, we can establish a unity with Egypt, as the unity of the Nile Valley. All these choices are open to us. We will see what is suitable for the Sudanese people and which one the Sudanese people aspire for and do it. We are sure that we will receive acceptance for any request that we make. [passage omitted]

Our problems are two-fold: The problem of security and the economic problem. The security problem is manifested in the war in the south. We have a declaration about the problem of the south, and God willing this declaration will receive acceptance from the popular movement. This declaration will be the beginning of a serious solution for the problem of the south. We know the south correctly because we lived in the south. We fight and we pay the real price for the war of the south. The politicians used to trade with the war in the south. They sought gains. We fought and died. Each one of us used to live in trenches full of water; we were under fire. If your brother next to you was killed you could not bury him; if he was wounded you could not treat his wound. All these circumstances we witnessed; we lived them. The politicians used to sit in air-conditioned offices and used to trade with the issue. [applause and cheers]

Our main choice with regard to the problem of the south is to arrive at a solution to the problem through negotiations. We as Sudanese should sit and negotiate with each other and find out the appropriate solution and agree on it and then implement it. We have no enmity toward southerners. We are sure that southerners do not harbor enmity toward northerners. Proof of this lies in the fact that the southerners who were made homeless as a result of the war did not go to other countries; they came north. This indicates that they have no enmity toward the north. [passage omitted]

Most of our southern brothers who are in the movement used to be officers with us in the Army. We know them personally. Those who were not in the Army we fought in the jungles. We know them, too. I used to be commander of a region and used to know the commander of the region opposing me. I knew what his qualifications were and he knew who I was. We knew each other. We can sit and reach understanding. [passage omitted]

Tonight we will submit our (?declaration); we will outline our program tonight. We are sure that it will receive the acceptance of the movement. The declaration will constitute a firm ground for the solution or the basis on which we can build the solution. We want to arrive at a final solution—a final and fundamental solution for the problem of the south—not a temporary one. [applause and cheers]

The other problems—those in Darfur and in southern Kordofan—these are the legacies of the parties. The interparty struggle and the struggle for party gains detonated the situation in Darfur and Kordofan. As soon as the parties were finished, the reasons behind the feud were removed. We will only need to exert a simple effort to remove the feelings left as a result of the struggle during the past period, but the causes of the struggle have ended. [passage omitted]

As for the economic problem, the country has vast resources. I said so during the uprising. Sudan resembles a cow that gives milk. We in the Army were holding the cow by the horns while the thieving politicians were milking it and drinking the milk. [cheers and applause] The country has many resources and the Sudanese people are a great people with vast energies. [passage omitted]

We will fight corruption; we will defeat corruption. Fighting corruption will raise the morale of the Sudanese people. We will create the atmosphere and climate for the Sudanese citizen to produce. We are confident that the Sudanese people will produce. [passage omitted]

The final point I want to stress is that for this country to continue to exist and for the program we hope for to be realized, we need only rely on the comprehensive unity of the Armed Forces. The unity of the Armed Forces is very important. [passage omitted]

Numayri Interviewed on Relations With Coupists

JN0507192589 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic
4 Jul 89 p 29

[Interview with former Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri by Hasan Sati in Cairo on 1 July]

[Text] [Sati] Where were you all this time?

[Numayri] I was in Egypt and never left it, although I was on the verge of leaving it to lead a war against the regime that was abolished by the national salvation movement. I refrained from doing so now that there are no reasons for this.

[Sati] Did you really intend to participate in the power struggle in Sudan through a war at this age, thus adding another war to one that is already raging in southern Sudan?

[Numayri] Yes. The war I was intending to wage against the defunct regime differs from the war in southern Sudan. This is a war for a clear cause: The liberation of Sudan from parties and sectarianism, a war I have been incessantly fighting since we launched the people's revolution, the 1969 May revolution. Therefore, the first instrument of this war will always be the mobilization of the masses, who hate the defunct regime. From this premise, it is a war to liberate Sudan from the clique that was ruling it.

Let me pause at your expression "at this age." If you mean that I am too old for wars, this is not true. I am a warrior and very patient. I excel at guerrilla warfare, and I have at my disposal means with which I could have kept the ruling clique in Khartoum sleepless.

[Sati] But the regime in Khartoum came to power through elections. Why are you against democracy?

[Numayri] What democracy? If you have in mind Western democracy, it suffices me to say that it has failed three times in Sudan, did not come to Sudan's rescue, and did not tackle its problems. The southern Sudanese problem became exacerbated during these times. I am against such a democracy because it is controlled by people having sectarian bases. My experience in power in Sudan has convinced me that Western democracy is a failure in Sudan for many reasons because parties and sectarianism seek to safeguard their own interests. They can never work for Sudan's interests. They depend on nepotism and corruption. The May experience used to allow a democracy of another type because individuals could carry out opposition through the institutions.

[Sati] Now that the new salvation movement has succeeded, we would like to ask you whether you personally know these officers who are leading the movement. What are their inclinations? What is your assessment of their move and of their ability to sustain it and help it succeed?

[Numayri] Have you forgotten that I served as commander in chief of the People's Armed Forces? Yes, I know them as well as their abilities and ethics. They are sincere nationalists free of any party inclinations. They derive this trait from the peculiarity of belonging to the Sudanese Armed Forces, as the latter represents the only group of the Sudanese working people in which the values of national unity are embodied and crystallized.

As for my assessment of their move, I would like first to say that I support them. I issued a statement voicing my full support for them and their leadership. (AL-ANBA' published the text of the statement yesterday.)

As for their ability to remain in power, this would be contingent upon how firm they will be in their efforts to protect themselves from the ceaseless conspiracies hatched by the reactionary, partisan, and sectarian forces. This will also be contingent upon their seriously tackling the pressing issues of the homeland—namely, the civil war, development, the rehabilitation of economic projects, and seeking to end the citizens' suffering. The road ahead of them, just like any other road that must be taken to achieve progress, is going to be hard and long. However, my confidence in them is great.

[Sati] If you were asked about your fears concerning this move, what would you say? And what is your advice to prevent these fears from becoming realities?

[Numayri] (After a long pause) I have fears regarding them from the communists. These fears are not related to possible future attempts by the communists to contain them [the new leaders]. No, my fears concern the sabotage that the communists might carry out. According to the little information that I have received so far, the communists, in an attempt to undermine the unanimous popular support with which the new movement was greeted, seek to win the support of some leaders of the unions, which have been dissolved.

Besides, I have fears that they might lend an ear to the opportunists who will act hypocritically to benefit from the regime through their hypocrisy and to work to serve their old affiliations to help revive sectarianism and hateful partisanship in Sudan. Many people displayed this opportunism during the "May revolution" and later denied that they were once functionaries in that revolution. In this regard, they can read about the experience of the May revolution to benefit from that experience.

My advice is that they must stand on the side of the people, be honest in their political stance, abide by the unity of the Armed Forces, and protect the Armed

Forces from any infiltration attempt by the defunct sectarian and party remnants. Finally, I advise the salvation command to maintain unity among its members to avoid the dangers of containing this command or sowing divisions among its members. The salvation command should establish effective media to restore the homeland's unity, which was lost during the past 4 years, and mobilize public opinion to rectify the economic and social destruction inflicted on the country. This is in addition to the persistent endeavor to stopping the civil wars in the south and west as soon as possible.

[Sati] It was propagated that you participated in planning the 18 June coup attempt, which was discovered. We also learned from some sources that you contacted the General Command of the Sudanese Army. Is this correct?

[Numayri] Yes, this is correct, I contacted the Army General Command. Lieutenant General Fathi, the commander in chief of the Army, refused to talk to me on the pretext that he was in a meeting. Lieutenant General 'Abd-al-Rahim Sa'id talked to me instead.

[Sati] What did you say to him?

[Numayri] I told him that I have a message for the Armed Forces in the form of a question. Are the Armed Forces, whose uniform you are wearing and whose oath you swore, belong to the people of Sudan or to Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and the al-Ummah Party? What is taking place in Sudan? The country is being destroyed; what are you waiting for?

[Sati] You may continue to answer our question on mentioning your name in the 18 June movement?

[Numayri] I expressed my opinion at that time. And I believe it was made public. I can say that Sudan recently was in a state of turmoil, waiting for the revolution. Sudan's history shows that the Armed Forces lead the revolution. What the leaders of the 18 June movement did was an expression of this. However, I had nothing to do with what happened and did not plan with them. They are patriotic officers, like all those in the Armed Forces. They wanted to end the chaos that prevailed in the country. God did not want this, and their brothers accomplished the mission after less than 2 weeks and saw that justice was done to them. This is the spirit of the Armed Forces in Sudan—pride in and faithfulness to comradeship.

[Sati] Do you believe that the success of the salvation movement in seizing power has put an end to your political activity?

[Numayri] My activity ends when my existence ends. I will continue to work for the sake of my homeland, make sacrifices for it, and defend its values and principles as long as I can and as long as I have ideas that can help the homeland. I supported those heroes in the salvation command because they realized many of my aspirations. I am a soldier in the homeland. I work whenever this homeland needs me and in any position even if the homeland wants me to become a guard.

[Sati] What were your aspirations?

[Numayri] I hoped that the Armed Forces would restore their unity and coherence. I hoped that all the Armed Forces would confront the sectarian parties so that they will not be described as the forces of the al-Ummah Party and Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi.

[Sati] If the salvation leaders ask you or if they allow you to return to Sudan to live as a normal citizen, will you go?

[Numayri] For your information, I wanted to go to Sudan before this movement. My plans were to fight the defunct regime from outside and inside. I made plans for this, and began to work through the media for this purpose. We were planning to launch military acts to provoke the Sudanese people. This is in addition to other plans for mobilization.

[Sati] We notice that you have repeated "the military acts against the defunct regime." Did not you have other methods?

[Numayri] Yes, I repeated this because they did not deserve less than this. I am a military man, what do you expect me to do toward some insults made by Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi against the Army?

[Sati] Are there examples of these insults?

[Numayri] Yes. During a meeting between some military commanders and an Arab ambassador, the discussion became violent between the ambassador and one of the senior commanders in the Sudanese Army. The ambassador asked Al-Sadiq to expel the officer from the Army. Al-Sadiq expelled the officer the next day. If you have enough space in your newspaper, I will provide you with many examples.

Security Chief Cited on Al-Mahdi, Other Issues

JN0507181489 Al-Dammam AL-YAWM in Arabic 4 Jul 89 p 1

[By 'Uthman Sayyid Ahmad from Khartoum]

[Excerpts] Brigadier General Ibrahim Nayil Idam, member of Sudan's Revolutionary Command Council [RCC] for National Salvation and head of the National Security Authority, has affirmed that relations between the Kingdom and Sudan are deep-rooted.

In an exclusive statement to AL-YAWM, Brig Gen Idam said: We in the new command extend our many thanks to the Kingdom under King Fahd Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz, custodian of the two holy mosques, and His Highness

Crown Prince 'Abdallah Ibn-'Abd-al-'Aziz for its truthful and positive sentiments toward us and for their good, noble initiative after hearing about the change that took place in Sudan. [passage omitted]

On Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's whereabouts and the possibility of apprehending him, Brig Gen Idam said competent authorities are besieging the places where he might be hiding and that he will be apprehended within hours, in addition to a few former leaders who have not yet been found.

He indicated that Mubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi, former interior minister, has not been apprehended yet. He denied reports yesterday that Mubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi has been apprehended and affirmed that he is still on the run.

Asked by AL-YAWM about the content of the message received by the new military command from former President Numayri, Brig Gen Idam said the RCC has not received any message from Numayri, although the RCC considers Numayri a Sudanese citizen who has the right to welcome, congratulate, and support the new regime. On Numayri's return as an ordinary citizen, he said nothing has been decided yet and that this matter is premature.

On the release of Numayri's old companions, Brig Gen Idam said this will be decided soon when their situation, along with that of others, is considered.

Commenting on reports published by Gulf papers yesterday to the effect that Al-Mahdi and his militias warned the new regime that they will launch a countercoup within 72 hours, Brig Gen Idam said the militias are launching psychological warfare and claim to be doing something. He said the militias will be unable to do anything, and if they try, they will be dealt with strongly and left completely powerless.

He declared: I confirm those militias are not active at all. We have everything under control, and we are monitoring the situation confidently. Quarters affiliated with the defunct parties and militias are propagating lies and baseless allegations.

Brig Gen Idam explained that intensive consultations are under way to form a civilian cabinet within the coming days. He said the appointed ministers will be known for their honesty, integrity, and efficiency. The governors of regions will continue to be military. They were originally the commanders of military units in the regions and were tasked with running matters in place of the former regional governors. He said the military governors will maintain their posts until further notice.

Regarding the action of the Sudanese embassies abroad under the new regime, Brig Gen Idam said the ambassadors will continue to assume their tasks in a normal manner. He said no new ambassadors will be appointed now, but in the future this will be up to the RCC.

Regarding the internal front and its cohesion, he said this front is strong and cohesive and that the al-Ummah Party headed by Al-Mahdi will never be able to undermine this cohesion throughout Sudan.

On the new command's plans to solve the southern Sudan problem, he said all past vestiges with the neighboring countries will be removed first, then a peaceful solution will be sought to the southern Sudan problem. He added: We will enter into a positive dialogue with Ethiopia to solve the Eritrean problem. We will not barter the southern Sudan problem with the Eritrean problem. We will explain to the Ethiopians that the presence of Eritreans in our territory causes us problems. We are interested in good relations between Sudan and neighboring countries in general, including Ethiopia. Sudan must launch positive foreign policies and take the initiative in its relations with all states.

Brig Gen Idam indicated that the RCC will focus on equipping the Sudanese Army with good, sophisticated weapons because this is a necessity.

Regarding the cities occupied by Garang and how they will be recaptured, he said that he who moves toward peace must prepare himself for war. He said this is the new principle on which the Army is based. This means that while a hand is extended for peace, we must prepare ourselves and train the Armed Forces according to new, sophisticated methods, he said. [passage omitted]

Former Security Adviser Surrenders

NC0507162686 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1246 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Excerpt] Khartoum, 5 Jul (MENA)—A Sudanese security source has told the MENA correspondent in Khartoum that 'Abd-al-Rahman Farah, security adviser to former Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, has surrendered to Sudanese authorities in response to a call by the Revolutionary Command Council that persons who served in constitutional or political posts under the previous regime report to the authorities to undergo investigations.

'Abd-al-Rahman Farah had been in hiding since the outbreak of the national salvation revolution on 30 June. [passage omitted]

Garang Political Adviser Comments on New Regime

NC0507185386 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1805 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Cairo, 5 Jul (MENA)—Dr Mansur Khalid, political adviser of Colonel John Garang, commander of the rebels in southern Sudan, has stated that Sudan's unity requires a secular legal system. He added that, because of their nature, religious laws lead to division among the sons of the same nation.

In the first official reaction by the Sudanese rebel movement, Dr Khalid said: There is an old agreement in Sudan—the Kukadam [as received] agreement—which stipulates that the issue of religious laws should be decided by a Sudanese constitutional conference.

On why the rebel movement in southern Sudan has been slow to issue a statement explaining its position on the new regime in Sudan, Dr Khalid said: Our movement is a political one. It could not be expected to rush into expressing support or opposition before the new regime's policies became clear.

Khalid said that the previous regime in Sudan collapsed because it used to say one thing and do another. He added that former Prime Minister al-Saqid al-Mahdi sought to abort his ministers' attempts to establish peace in Sudan.

Dr Khalid declared that the new regime in Sudan should issue a statement on its policies and the issue of peace. Such a statement he said, should make it clear whether peace will be established on the basis of the initiative which was undertaken last November.

Dr Khalid added: We will wait to see what the new regime will do regarding the issues which the previous regime failed to resolve. We will also wait to see how the new regime views the future of Sudan.

Dr Khalid explained that all the political forces in the country, with the exception of the Islamic Front, approved an agreement in November last year. He said: We will wait to see what the new regime will do about this agreement.

Spokesman Denies Meeting Reports

NC0507193289 Paris AFP in English 1857 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Excerpt] Cairo, July 5 (AFP)—[passage omitted] In Addis Ababa a spokesman for the SPLA's [Sudan People's Liberation Army's] political wing denied reports from Khartoum that the rebels planned a meeting with the military junta.

AL-QUWAT AL-MUSALLAHAH, the only paper authorized in Khartoum since the coup said the SPLA had replied "positively" late Tuesday to Gen. al-Bashir's request for a meeting, agreeing to meet a delegation from the junta in Addis Ababa in the next few days

But the rebel source, who did not wish to be identified, said that as far as he knew there had been no contact at any level between the movement and the new leaders in Khartoum.

"Two sides must agree for a meeting to take place, and arrangements must be made in advance at what level," the source said. "This has been customary in our dealings with Khartoum before but this has not been done so far this time," he added.

He said Col Garang was not in Addis Ababa and could not meet a delegation even if it came.

Gen al-Bashir's Revolution Command Council for National Salvation is reported to have declared a 1-month cease-fire as a "goodwill gesture" and to have offered a general amnesty to opponents of the Sudanese authorities.

It has also said that ending the civil war is a top priority. But the SPLA has complained of a lack of precise policy commitments.

In Addis Ababa, Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile mariam on Wednesday affirmed his country's readiness to cooperate with Sudan's new rulers, saying this would help establish and safeguard peace and stability in the region.

President Mengistu sent Gen al-Bashir a message saying he was pleased to learn of the high priority the new rulers intended to give to the promotion of national and regional peace.

"Convinced that the policy of peace you have announced deserves the support of all peace-loving forces, I would like to extend to you and to your government my best wishes for the successful discharge of the onerous tasks and responsibilities you have just assumed," the message said.

Ethiopia was ready to cooperate with the new regime "in order to establish and safeguard peace and stability in our region and to further strengthen the bilateral relations between the two states," the message added.

Addis Ababa has not so far formally recognized the new government in Khartoum, but the message suggests this step is not far behind.

Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia, on the mend since the civilians took over power in Khartoum in 1986, had been stormy during the rule of former President Ja'far Numayri.

Their differences stemmed from mutual accusations of support for dissidents.

Prime Minister Shamir Addresses Likud Forum 5 Jul
TA0507174989 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1502 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Address by Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir before the Likud Central Committee meeting at the Tel Aviv Fairgrounds on 5 July—live]

[Text] [Applause] My friend, the chairman of the session; dear acting Movement Chairman Minister David Levi [applause]; my friend, the Knesset speaker; fellow ministers; Knesset members; Central Committee members; friends; Dr Bader [longtime Likud ideologue] [applause]; new and veteran mayors [applause]; dear guests; my friends—ladies and gentlemen. I would like to devote the beginning of my address to the Likud Central Committee to a very important issue, perhaps the most important one in the country's social system: By that I mean the plight of the development towns and their inhabitants. [applause]

The citizens of Israel who populate the development towns in the north, the south, and the central part of the country maintain the vital national decree of spreading the population throughout the homeland every day, 24 hours a day. They fulfill the edict of expanding urban settlement, and of building Eretz Yisra'el. Young and old, they ensure that the people of Israel will not be defenseless and exposed along the Mediterranean shores. They thereby constitute a democratic and geopolitical shield for the nation and the state in the various corners of the land. Their distress has recently reached dimensions that extend beyond the tolerance level of any human being. The state must stand by them and find practical solutions to the serious problems currently afflicting them.

Perhaps it would befit us to devote a special Central Committee session to the issue, [applause] but I find it my duty to emphasize, before I move on to the main topic of this session, that we will under no circumstances defer handling the problems of the development towns. We will muster all our efforts to help them! [applause]

Central Committee members: In my Knesset speech on 9 Iyar, 14 May 1989, on the Israeli Government's peace initiative, I said, among other things: No negotiations with any external element on the implementation of the initiative have yet begun. The entire initiative is still food for thought and for deliberation in the international arena. It is too premature to determine whether it will indeed become reality. Therefore, it is too early, and it is unjustified to turn the issue into a bitter, internal feud. Such an unnecessary war will only gladden and encourage our enemies.

I said all that out of my long-standing desire, which has guided me throughout my actions in the national arena, to avoid as much as possible any internal strife that may shatter our national unity. I said the same thing to the Cabinet as well, when I presented the peace initiative. I feared that even before the initiative could contribute anything toward reducing the hostility between us and the Arabs, it could—heaven forbid—lead to fighting, perhaps worse fighting, among us. This, both inside the overall, interpartisan national arena, as well as among the people.

When I said this, I never dreamed—I admit—that this initiative would become a source of friction within the national camp [the Likud] itself. I never imagined that such a move—which could promote the peace we all desire, and which could also strengthen our influence and standing at home—would result in a dispute among brothers. And when? At a time when we are so fortunate as to have gained strength in the public and scored further victories in the political conflicts with our opponents; [applause] when we are on the brink of promising chances for success in imminent conflicts in the elections to the Histadrut; [applause] and when I am hopeful that when the general elections come, our representation will increase. All this will happen if we continue to remain united in outlining our path and pursuing it.

After all, there is no doubt that the initiative which is today's topic for discussion has won us the sympathy of friends in Israel and abroad. Each one of us, who observes our continuing rise in power, prays every day that this process will continue! [applause]

I am no longer so young, for all my sins, and sometimes memories can be a burden. At the same time, they also illuminate the path. Many of my colleagues who are here with us this evening can remember a certain period during the 1930's when the national movement registered constant growth for a certain period of time—becoming a tidal wave which won increasing sympathy and persuaded many to join its ranks—until something happened which severed that upswing, leaving the political arena an empty front for our foes and opponents for a long time, until the 1977 Knesset elections, more than 40 years. We spent more than 40 years in the wilderness, in one move we forfeited 40 years. Who can tell what could have happened during those 40 years, what changes and processes we could have spurred or bred? One does not cry over spilled milk, but we must learn from this. We must learn how to draw the proper conclusions from the past, and make absolutely sure that we preserve a sober view and balanced consideration, and most importantly maintain adherence and faithfulness to the cause.

I read my speech to the Knesset before we reached a full consensus here, yet I find it necessary to repeat this portion. Let us not bring disaster upon ourselves, our nation. Let us continue to march forward assuredly, with determination and wisdom. I hope this forum and this argument will be the end, and finally close the door on our dispute.... [Shamir is interrupted for applause] rather than, heaven forbid, serve as the spark that lights an alien fire that could eat away at us. I call upon all our

friends to do everything today, and tomorrow too, to extinguish the fire, and awaken tomorrow morning fresh, confident, and ready to continue to march along the path together, boldly, with mutual respect, and with faith in our strength and objective! [applause]

How was our peace initiative conceived? Over the past 2 years a dynamic to dispel tension and resolve conflicts peacefully has emerged. During that period we observed an improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the cessation of war between Iraq and Iran, the resolution of the conflicts between the countries bordering on South Africa. All these have redirected world attention to the Middle East, increasing pressure for political solutions in that part of the world as well.

Since we had no doubt that we are the element working for peace in the region, we pursued our path, insisting on our argument that we are peace seekers. Yet Israel's peace declarations can no longer offer anything new, and they failed to garner any world attention. On the other hand, the declarations of moderation by Arab bodies—particularly the terrorist organizations—these did constitute a novelty. Thus the terrorist organizations jumped on the bandwagon of world sympathy thanks to deceitful declarations and promises, which merely distort reality. Thus a new method of warfare was added by the Arabs against Israel—that of daily violence, involving masses of women and children. Israel was obligated to give its political response, in addition to the measures it employed to curtail the violence and restore order. It became necessary for Israel to assume the political initiative, present the truth to one and all, and explain to everyone that its path is the path of peace, which it has pursued since the establishment of the state.

The initiative was timely. It presented in the proper light the necessity to contend with violence with one arm clutching the sword of defending ourselves, while the other is stretched out in an offer of peace. Much has been said about the components of the initiative, and I shall repeat them briefly: Article One: The strengthening and expansion of the Camp David accords. These accords are not moribund; they must serve as the cornerstone for Middle East peace. The cosignatories to these agreements—Egypt, Israel, and the United States—must all work to broaden the area of peace in this part of the world.

Article Two: Changing the nature of relations between the Arab countries and Israel by revoking the Arab boycott, granting diplomatic recognition to Israel, and ending the political fight against Israel in the international organizations—all this, in lieu of whispers by Arab leaders in the ears of Western politicians that they are seeking peace. Article three: Solving the problem of the Arab refugee camps in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, where hundreds of thousands of Arabs suffer without any justification. They must be eliminated. That requires an international financial effort. Article four: Solving the problem of the Arab inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. In this we have followed the Camp David agreements. The initiative deals with two phases—a transitional period of a 5-year interim arrangement, followed by a permanent solution. The two are interconnected through a timetable and the principles of the process.

The only difference between the initiative and the Camp David agreements is that elections are offered prior to the detailed interim arrangement agreement. This was done in a bid to find appropriate interlocutors from among the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza District with whom we must live. The representation that will be elected in these elections will be given clearly-defined roles: to conduct negotiations on the interim arrangement; to constitute the authority for self-rule after the attainment of that arrangement; and also to serve as a participant in the negotiations on the permanent solution—if there is consent. The transitional period mentioned in the initiative is 5 years. During that time the Arab inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza District will be given self-rule in conducting their own affairs, while Israel will continue to be responsible for security in everything that pertains to the Israeli residents of Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza District. Also, in the detailed negotiations over the interim arrangement, the problems relating to the transitional periods—including infrastructure and central economic issues—will be discussed. Jordan and Egypt could join these negotiations, if they should so desire.

The negotiations on the permanent solution should by nature also be attended by Jordan because a peace treaty with Jordan will be signed concurrently. In these negotiations each party will be permitted to raise for discussion all the issues it wants, yet the purpose of these negotiations will be the attainment of a permanent solution that will be acceptable to all its participants. Until its attainment, the interim arrangement will apply.

Certainly this path involves risks, if and when the Arabs consent to cooperate with us. It has already been said, and should be mentioned again: The same risks prevailed when we conducted the negotiations over the Camp David agreements. Now, as then, we have safety valves and measures against anyone who might try to violate or distort the fundamentals of the initiative. The IDF and the security forces will be in the area. They will constitute the guarantee that the negotiations on the implementation of the initiative will be conducted exclusively along the path acceptable to us.

Consequently, it is evident that the initiative is not different in substance from the Camp David accords. Let me emphasize once again that we are talking about the problem of the Arab inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. We will therefore not agree to, nor allow the introduction into this process of any element that cannot be called a permanent inhabitant of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza—whether directly or indirectly. [applause]

Now, before any negotiations with the Arab side have begun, it would be beneficial for us to stop and sum up where we are so far, 6 weeks after our decision to raise the initiative. What is the advantage we have already achieved within this short period of time?

First, the initiative highlighted and stressed before the whole world that it is the product of Israeli national unity; that it represents the aspirations of the vast majority of the people and their representatives. This carries enormous weight in the international community. Second, the publication of the initiative put an end to the dispute and rift that prevailed among the Jewish communities abroad, primarily among the U.S. Jewry. Thanks to the initiative, the entire Jewish people in the diaspora united in firmly supporting Israel. This is a tremendous achievement of immeasurable importance. Third, the initiative registered one more enormous achievement on the tactical, diplomatic, and world media sphere: Immediately upon its publication, it won a central position in the international arena. We forced the Arab countries, their supporters, the terrorist organizations, the Soviet Union, and the Arab countries [as heard] to contend with our initiative first of all. They were pushed to a defensive position. Fourth, only a short time ago the international media teemed with views on suggestions and initiatives to activate the UN Security Council or convoke an international conference, and the like. Our initiative overshadowed all these proposals. If anyone raises any peace proposal for the Middle East, we are capable of striking it from the world agenda in favor of our initiative.

Let us remember, friends, where has the international conference which we so strongly fought against disappeared? No one sees it, no one hears about it anymore! [applause] The initiative greatly improved our standing in the United States, among the administration members, in Congress, and in the public eye. The messages sent by the 95 senators and the 235 congressmen have overturned the U.S. political scene. Its attitude toward Israel has changed without Israel retreating one bit on any principle included in the government's basic guidelines. We have not budged and will not budge from the basic principles over which there is a general consensus in Israel. An arrangement with the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza—yes. But there will be no negotiations with the PLO! [applause] Giving the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza the opportunity to conduct their own affairs within the framework of an autonomy—yes; but never an Arab-Palestinian state! [applause] Third, any Jew who so wishes will be able to settle anywhere throughout Eretz Yisra'el. [applause] He will enjoy support from and protection by the Government of Israel.

We therefore offered a fair and reasonable plan. Every day that passes without a positive response by the Arab side adds to the suffering of the inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, and adds to their unnecessary casualties. It is not in our interest to cause suffering and bitterness to the Arabs residing there. But it is once more evident that Arabs from the outside—the Arab countries and the terrorist organizations—conduct their war against Israel on the back and at the expense of the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el.

Those who think that continued violence will guarantee achievements and concessions from Israel are making a fatal mistake. They must understand that the fact that Israel treats them according to moral standards, evincing its respect for the principles of human rights, is not a manifestation of weakness or the outcome of international pressure. On the contrary: As long as the violence continues, it becomes clearer that its initiators, perpetrators, and the people who sustain it are cruel terrorists whose sole purpose is to burn, destroy, kill, and sabotage indiscriminately, drawing no distinction between Jew and Arab, soldier and civilian, man, woman, or child.

We tell our friends in the United States that their contacts with the PLO are a serious mistake which has already caused... [Shamir interrupted with applause] and will continue to cause serious damage to our interests and theirs, as well as to the chances for an arrangement. Any contact with the terrorist organizations, with the PLO, that grants further legitimacy to the terrorist organizations encourages the violent elements in the field, perpetuates the violence, further entrenches the Arab countries in their intransigence, and encroaches on U.S. credibility in our eyes. It turns the Arab inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza over to the hands of murderers and criminals who sow terror upon the residents of the Arab villages, pocketing hundreds of thousands [of dollars] in Arab aid intended for the population, and settling personal accounts by means of torture and cruel murders.

I call on the United States to stop contacts with the terrorist organizations which have not budged an inch from their despicable path. [applause]

Members of the Central Committee, I sympathize with those colleagues who ask today, before the negotiations with the Arab elements have begun, what our policy in the near and more distant will be. They have tried to condense these questions into four clauses. I will try to give my answers to these questions, one by one.

First, regarding the elimination of violence. [applause] Our colleagues rightfully call for an end to violence and terrorism. The government's initiative, as endorsed, states that the elections offered in the proposal should be conducted in an atmosphere free of violence, threats, and terrorism. Can anyone conceive that elections could be held in a different atmosphere? Can anyone conceive of us lending a hand to a farce of elections, to elections under the threat of terrorism? Throughout the recent past, many people in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza have been assassinated by their brethren for the simple reason that someone thought that they had expressed readiness to engage in political negotiations with Israel. This is not

new in the annals of the Palestinian Arabs. This was true in the 1930's, as well as later during the times of Camp David, when the government sought partners for negotiations. In fact, when did it ever stop?

The election process will be held only in complete calm, with everything that this entails. During my speech before the Knesset, when I first presented the initiative, I noted that we are all aware of the sentiments of the Israeli public at large, which wants first of all to conduct a bitter war against terrorism and violence. This war, conducted by the IDF, the security forces, and the Israeli police in the conflict that has been forced upon us as part of our struggle for survival in this land—this war will continue even more fiercely. Furthermore, we will succeed! [applause]

I pointed out then that, in contrast to the examples people try to present to us from other nations, for us this is the one and only homeland we have. We have no other, therefore we will be victorious in the struggle. That is why victory will be ours. The violence and terror, which have been the long-standing characteristics of Palestinian terrorism, will not be the gauge for the process of political negotiations or the elections. These will only be held in an atmosphere free of threats and assassinations. Otherwise, they will not be held at all.

Let me also point out that our peace initiative is based on control over security matters in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. [applause] We do not have the ability to play around when it comes to this business. What can be a subject for foreign policy for other countries, including friends, for us means our very existence.

In conclusion, let me say the following: Ending violence is not subject to negotiation. This mission has been conducted by our security forces, and they will continue their job. We will end it! [applause] We hereby send the security forces and the IDF words of encouragement: The entire nation is united behind you, with you! [applause] Let me emphasize: The implementation of the initiative and the engagement in negotiations with the Arab side will never materialize as long as violence continues! [applause]

Second, Jerusalem. [sustained applause] Some colleagues have raised various points regarding the peace initiative. They mentioned, for example, the issue of Jerusalem. Jerusalem is not part of the initiative. Jerusalem [sustained applause] is the eternal capital of our nation and our country. [sustained applause, the members rising to standing ovation and beginning to chant songs about longings for Jerusalem, and hopes for the Messiah's arrival in that city] It is engraved in the Bible, on which the exiled in Babylon vowed: If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand lose its cunning! Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I do not remember you, if I do not set Jerusalem above my highest joy! Pray for the peace of Jerusalem! These words are a holy tenet for all of us. The Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel, stipulates, in Article One: Jerusalem, as a single, united entity, is the capital of Israel. First and foremost, Jerusalem is imprinted in the hearts, in the heart of each one of us!

The Government of Israel's position regarding the participation of the East Jerusalem Arabs in the elections for the autonomy was stated in the resolution of the Cabinet under our leader, Menahem Begin... [Shamir interrupted for applause] in whose Cabinet I had the honor of serving. The following is the phrasing of that resolution, listen! On 5 September 1982, and I quote, the following was stipulated: The Camp David accords never mentioned such a right to vote. By that he meant the vote of the Arabs of East Jerusalem. Such a vote can have only one interpretation: the repartitioning of Jerusalem, its redivision into two authorities—one Israeli, and the other belonging to the autonomy's administrative council. The resolution further states that in the letter appended to the Camp David agreement, which does not mention Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Mr Menahem Begin wrote that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel; that it is one indivisible city; and that it shall remain undivided for posterity. [sustained applause]

I need not add that this is our position today as well. [sustained applause and hurrahs] This is the binding position of the Government of Israel. Any change in this naturally requires a Cabinet resolution. There is no need to add anything to it. We will continue to guard Jerusalem in accordance with the government's basic guidelines, which stipulate that united Jerusalem, the eternal capital of Israel, is one city under Israeli sovereignty, indivisible. Free access in the city to the places holy to members of all religions, and freedom of worship will continue and will be guaranteed.

Another clause regards continued settlement activity in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. [sustained applause and hurrahs] We urge a continued Jewish settlement drive in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. The right of Jews to settle throughout these regions can only be disputed by someone who believes that these zones should be another Judenrein, [previous word in German] free of Jews, God forbid. This will never come to be! [applause] The government's basic guidelines state that the existence and development of the settlements established by the various Israeli governments will be guaranteed. It further specifies their number and the methods to set up additional settlements.

I am aware of the fact that we have certain political differences both at home and with friends outside. However, just as we honor the democratic processes conducted by others, so we expect foreigners, friends, to respect our democratic procedure. Since this was agreed upon—and the universally accepted government basic guidelines so stipulated—there is no doubt in my mind

that it will materialize, and that friends will alsc nderstand that. [applause] It is clear to me that there are differences of opinion on this matter between us and our friends in the United States. Yet the settlement activity will continue! [applause]

Let me take this opportunity to send our hearty and very warm congratulations to the settlers in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. [sustained applause] I tell you, your plight is not for nothing, your war is our war, and it will prevail. Have courage! [sustained applause] This is a holy principle for us: Western Eretz Yisra'el will never again be repartitioned, and there will be no agreement to foreign sovereignty over parts thereof. [sustained applause]

My friends, dear friends, the ideology we represent in the Cabinet is very well known to all. We remain faithful to these roots and fundamentals of our faith, and will continue to remain faithful to them as long as the spirit still lives within our bodies. Yet inside the unity government there is disagreement regarding the permanent solution insofar as Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza District are concerned. This is no secret. The initiative does not contradict the proposals for the permanent solution suggested by the various components of the government. Furthermore, it harmonizes with the government's basic guidelines, according to which during the term of the unity government no change will occur in the sovereignty over Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza District unless both the Alignment and the Likud agree.

Obviously, the supreme national need for unity in order to govern our country and our people was our prime consideration in forming the government, in formulating its basic guidelines, and in drawing up the peace initiative. We know that we can march together quite a distance. As far as the future is concerned, when the time comes we will have to reach an agreement on the matter, or else put the issue up to the people's vote. Yet at this stage there is no need to go beyond this. As I have said before: There is no contradiction between our desire and faith, and the peace initiative, which should start with an interim arrangement during which the nature of the permanent solution will be determined.

As to Eretz Yisra'el itself, I repeat what I told the U.S. leaders: In the negotiations on the permanent solution, Israel's representatives will insist on Israeli sovereignty over areas that will be subject to negotiations. [applause] I cannot conceive any territorial component in the permanent solution which may, at the end of the process, be acceptable to us and our neighbors. [applause]

Let me add to these points further emphasis: We will not accept the establishment of an Arab-Palestinian state on Eretz Yisra'el land. [sustained applause] The State of Israel will not be able to exist if such a state is established alongside it. As you can see, this is included not only in my statements, or the resolution we will propose, it is engraved upon our hearts. They will be the candle lighting our path, and we will fight for their implementation, and win. [applause]

Finally, Central Committee members: The initiative which is the cause for our gathering here today, and which we are debating, has a noble goal and purpose: to bring peace to the people of Israel, Eretz Yisra'el, and all those living among or around us. The people of Israel, who regard us today as the main and central political power, expect us to deliver the desired peace. Our people know very well that the job is not easy, that guaranteeing security takes precedence over everything else. There is no peace without security, and yet the national responsibility requires both peace and security. [applause] This is the mission and the duty which we must fulfill.

No negotiations with any external element on the implementation of the initiative have begun as of yet. It is still entirely theoretical food for thought on the international arena. It is too premature to tell whether this initiative will become reality. I therefore say to all of us, all the inhabitants of Israel: It is too early, and unjustified, to turn the issue into a bitter internal feud. Such an unnecessary war will only gladden our enemies. The psalmist says: The Eternal will give strength unto his people, the Eternal will bless his people with peace. [applause] This is indeed the proper combination of our national goals: might and peace.

Finally, I will permit myself to return to the issue of unity, which for me was one of the main motives for the establishment of the Cabinet in this format, and for the consolidation of the above-mentioned initiative. Throughout our history we have known prosperity and success during times of unity, and disaster and calamity when divided. Our strength lies solely in our standing united opposite foes and those who wish us harm, who delude themselves that they might soon stand at the gates of Jerusalem. The truth is that it is we who will stand at the gates of united Jerusalem, from now to eternity, God willing, united and steadfast in pursuing our goals.

In the most recent Central Committee meeting I stood before you, dear colleagues, attempting to explain the great importance I attribute to the national unity government. You agreed with me, and the unity government was established and still exists, despite its woes and weaknesses. I see it as a great asset these days. It may well be, however, that in the future we will have to withstand unsavory trends that will grow from within, trying to undermine national unity in order to make it possible for Israel to capitulate to disastrous foreign dictates. We will then have to stand fast—all of us, the entire national camp—with all our might in the face of the onslaught [3-second break in transmission] to grow stronger in order to be able to advance the nation and the country.

For these future times of trial, we are duty-bound to preserve every morsel of strength and drop of energy. Our future depends on it. Therefore, friends and colleagues, let us preserve our unity. There is no better or stronger guarantee for our success and the success of the nation than unity in a strong and victorious bond! [applause]

Now, in conclusion, dear friends, we have all reached a joint draft proposal, agreed upon by all. [sustained applause, with the crowd, standing up, bursting into song] Let me read out the text of the accepted draft proposal. Article One: In its session today, Wednesday, the 2d of Tammuz, 5749, 5 July 1989, the Central Committee endorses the prime minister's political statement and the principles included in it, such as: Pursuing the peace process in accordance with the Camp David accords and the government's peace initiative; the nonparticipation of the Arabs of East Jerusalem in the elections; [sustained applause and hurrahs] an end to terrorism and violence before negotiations with the Arabs begin; [applause] the continuation of the settlement drive in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza; [applause] there will not be any foreign sovereignty over any part of Eretz Yisra'el; [applause] no Palestinian state will be established in Eretz Yisra'el; [applause] and no negotiations will be conducted with the terrorist organization, the PLO. [applause]

Toward the end of my speech, allow me, dear friends, to give thanks for the special effort made by Cabinet members, as well as many other rank-and-file members of the Central Committee and the Knesset, who felt strongly and deeply that there are no true differen of opinion between us, and thus that unity must be manifested in an agreed resolution. [applause]

Let me give special thanks to the acting chairman of the Movement. All the best, Shalom. [Shamir concludes his address at this point, and Industry and Trade Minister Ari'el Sharon, acting as chairman of the meeting, takes the podium. Shamir then ascends to the podium once again, delivering the following addition:

"Friends, in the heat of the debate and due to the general commotion, I managed to overlook one article. The second article of the resolution states that the Likud representatives are obligated to work, in the Cabinet and in the Knesset, according to the principles included in the prime minister's address, and in accordance with the Likud's platform."]

Interviewed on 5 Jul Vote

TA0507200489 Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Interview with Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir by Yoram Ronen and Yig'al Goren at the Tel Aviv Fair Grounds, "a few minutes after the Likud Central Committee convention ended"—videotaped]

[Text] [Ronen] Good evening to you, Mr Prime Minister.

[Shamir] Good evening.

[Ronen] The three ministers who oppose your initiative say that what was achieved at the Likud Central Committee today is, in fact, an overwhelming victory for them. From now on, they say, there will be no move with regard to the peace initiative without the acceptance of their four principles, which are an unequivocal condition for the implementation of the initiative. Do you share this view?

[Shamir] It is difficult for me to believe that anybody thinks or says so.

[Ronen] The three ministers say so.

[Shamir] There is nothing new in what was said today. Some of the statements made today are identical to the government's basic guidelines; some of them are clear, known, and open of the Likud, including me of course. One should remember that I wrote my entire speech yesterday....

[Ronen, interrupting] Did you not change anything in it today?

[Shamir] I introduced a word here and a word there, but I did not change anything substantive. I had the same principles written down. I must tell you that there is one element in the speech which perhaps directly concerns the peace initiative. This is the matter of the East Jerusalem Arabs, and there was no doubt that that would be our position; I said as much in speeches, in appearances, and among friends. This was Mr Menahem Begin's position during the autonomy negotiations. There is a government decision dating back to September 1982, whereby the East Jerusalem Arabs would not vote in the elections to the administrative body of the autonomy region....

[Goren, interrupting] But a national unity government did not exist then.

[Shamir] All right, but we were the same people then; I was a Cabinet member then, and I have not changed my view on such a principle matter since.

[Goren] Mr Prime Minister, the opponents to the plan, Ministers Sharon, Moda'i, and Levi, say today that the current plan, after the introduction of the reservations adopted by the Central Committee, is not the same peace plan, that we have, in fact, emerged with a new initiative which supersedes the old one, that the old one can no longer be implemented.

[Shamir] This is untrue. We have not changed one iota of the peace initiative we offered the United States, the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, and the Arab countries.

[Ronen] The only change or addition then concerns the East Jerusalem Arabs.

[Shamir] This was our position; we never said our position was different. We did not speak of this indeed; Jerusalem does not at all feature in the initiative, as well it should not since Jerusalem is part of the State of Israel. We would have broached this issue had the Arabs accepted the initiative in principle. We would have told them then that we do not agree that the East Jerusalem Arabs should participate in the self-government or self-administration which will be proposed to the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza for 5 years.

[Goren] Still sir, the government's decision on the peace initiative actually included two parts: One concerned the adoption of the initiative as such, and one stipulated that details concerning the elections in the territories, for instance, will be discussed after the Palestinians accept the initiative. This evening, though, something else happened: Even before the Palestinians announced whether or not they would accept the initiative, the Likud Central Committee has made several decisions; for example, on the East Jerusalem issue and on an end to the intifadah [uprising] as a condition for negotiations.

[Shamir] I agree on the East Jerusalem issue, but this was our position, and the Arabs have no grounds for complaint, as they had not given an answer in principle. As for the intifadah, it is clear it should be eliminated. It was also stated in the peace initiative that negotiations would not take place in the shadow of violence.

[Ronen] Mr Prime Minister, the question arising is which Arab element will be able or prepared to join us for negotiations on the basis of this very far-reaching decision by the Likud Central Committee?

[Shamir] What is new here? We said no to a Palestinian state, but this does not contradict what we are offering. What are we actually offering the Palestinian Arabs? We are offering two stages: first, a transitional agreement based on autonomy; and second, negotiations on a permanent solution without any preconditions. This is still valid. We have not made any decision that runs counter to this today.

[Goren] I held initial talks with senior Alignment ministers this evening. Minister Peres' office, for example, states this is tantamount to closing the door on the peace initiative, since the Likud today made decisions without consulting its government partners, that the Likud has, in fact, put the lid on the peace initiative.

[Shamir] This is not true. Somebody may be expecting this, but we embarked on this initiative together; we were partners in it and continue to be so. In fact, we viewed ourselves as the followers of Menahem Begin at the time when autonomy negotiations were held. Nothing has changed in our principles.

[Ronen] Formally speaking, Mr Prime Minister, perhaps nothing has changed. The initiative, formally speaking, is the same as that approved by the government and the Knesset, but there are four clear conditions here that the three ministers opposed to the initiative insisted on including in the Central Committee's decision. These ministers say they will take good care that the initiative does not move forward without these principles.

[Shamir] I do not see any four conditions. Where are the four conditions? There is only....

[Ronen, interrupting] The four principles are included in your speech.

[Shamir] My speech contained seven conditions.

[Ronen] The four conditions were among them.

[Shamir] Yes, but I have said so all along. Throughout, in explanations I gave my friends, in appearances before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, at every opportunity, I stated that this was my belief and view. I did not surprise anybody.

[Goren] If this is so, sir, if these conditions are so clear, if they do not cause complications, why were they not introduced in the Israeli Government's original initiative? It is a fact that they were not introduced for certain reasons, and you too, in fact, up until now—as much as we could gather from your opposition in recent weeks—had opposed this line by Sharon, Levi, and Moda'i. What has happened then that you suddenly....

[Ronen, interrupting] You said that nothing should be added to the initiative.

[Shamir] Please remember that the initiative is a joint product of the Likud and the Alignment. We took the Alignment's positions into consideration, then. We....

[Goren, interrupting] You are not taking them into consideration henceforth then?

[Shamir] No. This is the Likud, and these are its decisions, while the initiative is the product of the national unity government. It is binding on us too, but the Likud has its own positions. For example, it is known that there are disagreements between us and the Alignment about settlement in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. There are also disagreements with regard to the future borders of Eretz Yisra'el. As long as we can march together, we will do so. It is well known that at a certain stage we will face a problem and will have to decide whether it is the Alignment's or the Likud's road that will have to be pursued.

[Ronen] Has this stage not been reached yet? The Alignment may decide that in the wake of the Likud's decision today, it will no longer be able to cooperate with it.

[Shamir] I do not think this is logical since the Alignment has known our position all through the years. They knew our position before the national unity governments, this and the last one, were set up. There is nothing new here, then.

[Goren] The question, Mr Prime Minister, is who decides matters in the State of Israel. There are both large-majority Cabinet and Knesset decisions, and lo and behold, a partisan Central Committee comes along and adopts a decision which contradicts....

[Shamir, interrupting] Excuse me, this is untrue. The Central Committee has not changed a thing; it has not added anything either. The Central Committee announced that the government's initiative is valid. The committee has accepted the initiative; it has definitely accepted it. As one of the main points in the decision I presented, I said that the Central Committee endorses the government's initiative, endorses it, not adds anything to it. It is possible that in time, when negotiations are held with the Arabs on the implementation of the initiative, disagreements may occur between us and the Alignment, between us and the Americans, and possibly also within the Alignment. So....

[Ronen, interrupting] In other words, Mr Prime Minister, we have a peace initiative which is unchanged—the same initiative defined by Ari'el Sharon as the worst peace initiative in the history of the State of Israel—but today he still voted for it.

[Shamir] I think that he exaggerated greatly. He was simply wrong. This is a very logical peace initiative, and realistic, in my opinion. We should work for it, and we shall do so, to the best of our ability.

[Goren] Do you expect, sir, that the Palestinians will accept the initiative even after today's additions, even after the declarations made today?

[Shamir] As far as they are concerned, nothing has been added to the initiative. We are talking of self-administration in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. Jerusalem does not appear in the initiative; Jerusalem is the capital of Israel; Jerusalem is part of the State of Israel; there is no room at all for a mention of Jerusalem in such an initiative. So, what have we added?

[Goren] May the issue of the East Jerusalem Arabs in itself not torpedo this entire agreement?

[Shamir] First, I do not see them consenting to the principles of the initiative. Nobody has as yet said he accepts all principles and the course of the negotiations, without a declaration of self-determination, without the definition of a Palestinian state, that it is only the vote of the East Jerusalem Arabs that he is missing. I have not yet seen any Arab who has said this.

[Ronen] Egypt stated it accepts your initiative with 10 reservations, including allowing the East Jerusalem Arabs to vote.

[Shamir, sighing] Let Egypt first come to the negotiations. I would be very glad. We shall then sit with the Egyptians, and, in fact, continue the same negotiations they interrupted in 1982.

[Goren] What reaction do you expect from the United States now? Secretary Baker once sent a well-known message to Israel, addressing a number of issues, including settlement and East Jerusalem. How do you think the United States will react to today's decision?

[Shamir] Look, it is no secret that we have certain disagreements with the United States. We do not see eye-to-eye on the matter of settlements or East Jerusalem. This is nothing new. The present Israeli Government, as well as previous ones, never agreed with the United States on the Jerusalem issue. This is not new. There are disagreements. In my opinion, they will have to continue to work with us in order to implement the initiative.

[Ronen] In conclusion, Mr Prime Minister, the whole world had anxiously awaited the Likud Central Committee's decision today. This includes the United States as well as the PLO. The PLO's Executive Committee is convening in Tunis on the weekend, and it will have to make a decision in principle on the government's peace initiative. We do not talk with the PLO, but what happened today may again throw a wrench into the works of the initiative.

[Shamir] As you know, the PLO's position does not interest me. I do not want to address it, nor am I anticipating any salvation or solution from the PLO. So, I do not care what they might say about the Likud's decision today. We want to talk with the Arab countries and the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. They should know that if they want to live in peace with us, if they want to improve their condition, if they want to conduct negotiations on settling the conflict, even in the future, they should speak with us. They also know that to talk with us, with Israel, means they should also talk with the Likud, and this is the Likud. There is no other Likud. The Likud today did not undergo a revolution. It presented itself as it is; nothing has changed; this is the way we are.

[Goren] Who will dictate the political moves from now on? Will this be the Likud Central Committee or the Israeli Government?

[Shamir] Undoubtedly, the Israeli Government.

[Ronen] Have you gained peace of mind with regard to the Likud Central Committee at the expense of political erosion with regard to the United States and others?

[Shamir] I do not assess matters so. Whoever expected far-reaching changes was simply mistaken. What did people think, that Shamir suddenly turned into a member of MAPAM [United Workers Party], or MAPAI [Israel Workers Party, the historic component of today's Labor Party], or the Labor Party, or Peace Now....

[Goren] But it would still be stated that Shamir backed off in view of opposition within his party's Central Committee.

[Shamir] I have not budged a single inch. I do not know what that means.

Likud 'Overwhelmingly' Endorses Shamir Plan

TA0507210689 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] At the Herut Central Committee assembly at Tel Aviv's Exhibition Grounds, members overwhelmingly endorsed Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir's speech, presenting his plan for elections in the territories. A possible party split was averted at the last minute, when Shamir apparently gave in to demands by three dissident ministers—Ari'el Sharon, Yitzhaq Moda'i, and David Levi—and included their so-called four principles, which they regard as safeguards, in his speech.

Shamir emphasized the unity of Jerusalem and the continuation of settlement activity in the territories; and he got a standing ovation when he said Israel would never agree to a Palestinian state. Jack Katzenell reports from the Exhibition Grounds in Tel Aviv:

[Begin recording] When the prime minister and his rivals emerged from the back room after intensive last-minute negotiations, it appeared that the prime minister had won. Sharon, Levi, and Moda'i had agreed that there would be only one vote, on whether to endorse the prime minister's speech or not. True, the speech itself rejected the idea of participation by East Jerusalem Arabs in stronger terms than ever before. Jerusalem is not part of the initiative, Shamir said. However, he has been saying this one way or another all along, and his critics were saying: This is not enough. We want it in writing. In other words, they were demanding that the exclusion of East Jerusalem from the initiative be included in the resolution or resolutions which the Likud Central Committee would adopt. But when the prime minister completed his speech and read out the draft resolution, it transpired that Sharon, Levi, and Moda'i had got what they wanted. The resolution says: East Jerusalem Arabs will not take part in the elections. The intifadah [uprising] must end before negotiations can be held, and Likud Cabinet ministers and Knesset members must abide by these principles as the peace process continues.

On the face of it, this is a clear victory for the critics of the peace initiative in the Likud. [end recording]

Peres: Likud Vote 'Handcuffs' Peace Process

TA0507213289 Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1815 GMT 5 Jun 89

[Interview with Shim'on Peres, finance minister and vice prime minister by Elimelekh Ram in the Tel Aviv television studio—live]

[Text] [Ram] Good evening Mr Vice Prime Minister.

[Peres] Good evening.

[Ram] You have just come from the Alignment ministers' meeting, which in fact is still in progress. Referring to the statements made thus far, can you continue participating in the government after Shamir made, what I would call, a hawkish speech?

[Peres] The problem is not the speech, rather it is the resolutions made. I regret the fact that a partisan interest overcame a national need for a peace process. Mr Shamir can bow to Sharon's dictate. The Labor Party will not, even if Shamir does accept it the way he did. The issue is not only our relationship with the Likud. It is whether this resolution has increased the chances of the peace process, or to the contrary—placed a burden on it.

[Ram] Do you believe that the government initiative can proceed after Shamir's speech, after the points stressed at its conclusion?

[Peres] Look, Mr Shamir and we believed that there are points that should be left out, not to appease the parties, but to help the peace process survive— for example, the issue of the East Jerusalem Arabs' voting rights. First, I must make the Alignment position clear, whether they are formal positions, or—the way I see it—express the opinion of most party members. We believe that the East Jerusalem Arabs should be allowed to take part in the elections, without damaging Jerusalem's unity and without doubting Israel's sovereignty over all of Jerusalem. Second, beyond the five or eight settlements which we conceded, we strongly object to the continuation of the settlement process. This is not needed as it is, and certainly it is not needed for the peace process. Third, we believe that we should fight violence. The peace process, however, should not be made conditional on whether or not this struggle exists. We would like to launch the peace process without any further delay. Fourth, we are in favor of a territorial compromise according to UN Resolution 242. The way I see it, the Likud handcuffed itself—let it be so. It can do so for all I care. The question is whether these handcuffs were placed on the Likud arms, or on the peace. I believe they place heavy restrictions on the peace process, and the Labor Party will have to discuss its future course of action in its institutions.

[Ram] You say that the Labor Party will have to discuss the issue in the appropriate forums. The Alignment Central Committee is scheduled to convene tomorrow afternoon. Will you recommend that conclusions be drawn to quit the partnership in the government?

[Peres] I will make my recommendations at the session tomorrow. I do not think that I should make a statement before the committee makes a decision. All I know is that there are members who have reached the conclusion that we should leave the government, while others may have a different view.

[Ram] What is your position?

[Peres] I will state it tomorrow at the Central Committee meeting.

[Ram] How do you think the United States will respond?

[Peres] Look, I am no American prophet. This is not my main concern at the moment either. After all, if I may say so, this might be an issue that can wait as far the United States is concerned. Israel needs peace. Not because the United States wants it, and not because the Arabs reached such a decision. We have always believed that the peace process is needed, desired, and urgent for the State of Israel. I do not accept the view that Israel is miserable and weak and has to show off its muscles all the time. Israel is strong, prepared for whatever is required; and I believe we can achieve peace. What has taken place so far is that Egypt has boarded the peace train; Jordan is in a very delicate situation and could step out of the circle of powers immediately threatening Israel; and even among the Palestinians—certainly among the residents of the territories—the need and the desire has arisen to hold negotiations.

[Ram] Listening to you I get the impression that you feel that after what took place this afternoon the government initiative has perished.

[Peres] It has suffered a very serious blow. I did not like the sight of the prime minister giving in—in broad daylight, before a crowd of thousands—to the dictates of three people. I do not like it.

[Ram] Is this the case? Is it a matter of the personal problems the prime minister has with three of his ministers?

[Peres] Not at all. Come on, do you think he surrendered to them as individuals? He gave in to the contents. The way I see it, what these three ministers are proposing does not allow for the opening of a peace process.

[Ram] We will all have to wait for tomorrow to hear your recommendation to your party. Mr Vice Prime Minister, thank you very much.

[Peres] Thank you.

Alignment Sees Likud Vote as Reason for Split

TA0507213989 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Alignment Knesset Member [MK] 'Uzi Bar'am says that the Likud Central Committee resolution constitutes a fatal blow to Yitzhaq Shamir. He believes there is no room for further partnership with the Likud. Alignment MK Hayim Ramon believes that the resolution torpedoes the peace initiative and ties the prime minister's hands. Alignment MK Hagay Merom says that Mr Shamir drove the final nail into the peace initiative's coffin and the Alignment should secede from the Cabinet forthwith. He told our correspondent Ze'ev Kohen that the demand will be raised for a Labor Party Central Committee meeting to discuss secession from the coalition.

Shinuy says that the compromise the prime minister accepted is a blow to the peace initiative and capitulation to the camp of peace opponents within the Likud. It calls on the Alignment to withdraw from the coalition and try to set up a government of peace.

MAPAM [United Workers Party] says that when confronted with the choice of breaking the unity within the Likud or decreasing the the peace initiative's chance, Mr Shamir quite typically opted to preserve party unity.

CRM [Citizens Rights Movement] MK Yosi Sarid said that the prime minister in fact gave in to the demands raised by Ministers Sharon, Levi, and Moda'i.

HADASH [Democratic Front for Peace and Equality] MK Me'ir Wilner, too, called on the Alignment to immediately dissolve the government and steer clear of those who lead to destruction and war, preventing peace, as he put it. His faction in the Knesset will initiate cooperation among all the opponents of the Government's policy in a battle to overthrow the government of war, says HADASH.

SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim] Minister Yitzhaq Peretz expressed satisfaction with the Likud Central Committee resolution. He said that reason and the good of the people overcame the proclivity to factionalism. SHAS congratulates the prime minister and encourages him to continue to lead the unity government while defending the country, preserving the nation's heritage, and insisting on the need to strive for peace.

Tehiya also welcomed the Likud Central Committee's resolution, calling upon the government to make good on the operational principles included in the resolution regarding the termination of the intifadah [uprising] and settlement in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. Tehiya states that the resolution has sealed all the cracks in Mr Shamir's plan. These cracks jeopardized our sovereignty over Jerusalem and promoted the establishment of a

Palestinian state. The movement calls on the Likud leaders not to fear the Alignment's threats, because the dissolution of the Government is preferable to the partitioning of Eretz Yisra'el.

The NRP [National Religious Party] and Gush Emunim also welcomed the Likud Central Committee resolution. The NRP said that the Likud adopted a courageous and necessary decision in favor of a political breakthrough, coupled with assurances that would prevent any damage to the continuation of the Zionist enterprise in Eretz Yisra'el. NRP Secretary General Rabbi Yitzhaq Levi said that the prime minister should be asked to deliver the goods regarding a continued settlement drive.

Moledet says that in its vote, the Likud Central Committee halted the process that saw the party gradually drifting away from its platform. Moledet expressed appreciation for the three Likud ministers who it claimed brought Yitzhaq Shamir back into the national mainstream.

Rabin Sees 'Grave Significance' in Likud Vote

TA0607053689 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0405 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Telephone interview with Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin by Shalom Qital—live]

[Text] [Qital] Good morning, Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin.

[Rabin] Good morning to you and to the listeners.

[Qital] Mr Rabin, when the peace plan was launched, it bore the subtitle: the Shamir-Rabin plan. Do you believe you can still remain this plan's cosignatory?

[Rabin] I am proud of my part in the peace initiative as it was endorsed by the government and of having been partner to the plan's formulation and the process of obtaining the government's approval of it. Conversely, I am neither blind nor deaf to the grave significance of the Likud Central Committee's resolutions with respect to the chances of bringing the peace initiative to fruition and allowing it to take off. I will try to explain why. The initiative's survival will depend on one issue—our ability to find a partner among the Palestinian residents of the territories with whom we will hold a dialogue and whose agreement to hold elections we will obtain after negotiations with them. Without such a partner, the initiative has no significance. All the other clauses of the initiative are a fine declaration of intentions, but not a practical test.

In fact, the Likud's resolution not to hold negotiations with the Arabs as long as the intifadah [uprising] is not quelled contravenes the government resolution on the initiative, which I personally also endorse, to hold elections only under conditions of calm and an absence of terror; it will be impossible, however, to reach the stage of elections without a dialogue with the Arabs. What does the Likud resolution mean? That we speak only with the Americans? That as of today, we do not converse with residents of the territories? That we do not attempt to convince them? What if some of them declare that they accept the government's initiative? Will we not conduct negotiations with them? It is true that elections must be held in an atmosphere devoid of terror and violence, but a dialogue can be held even today. Therefore, I believe that the resolution adopted by the Likud—primarily on this point—in fact eliminates the possibility of bringing the government-endorsed peace initiative to fruition.

[Qital] Mr Rabin, perhaps this contains a challenge to you, although the Likud people probably did not intend to do so directly.

[Rabin] I am not interested in what they intended. Their resolution positions contravene the government resolution regarding the peace initiative.

[Qital] What should be done now? What are your conclusions?

[Rabin] I have no doubt that the Likud's resolutions have seriously damaged the chance to implement the peace initiative. Therefore, I believe that without trying to gloss over the issue, we must not take any rush action. I will recommend that the Alignment ministers adopt the position that what the Likud has decided is relevant for the Likud and is in no way relevant for the Alignment ministers.

I will also recommend that in the upcoming weeks, the Alignment ministers attempt to initiate talks with the Palestinian residents, in a bid to convince them that the peace process still stands a chance of succeeding; to acquaint them with the Alignment positions, which differ from those of the Likud; and to try to enlist their support. Another goal is to ensure that there is no settlement beyond that which was decided on by the government and stipulated in the coalition agreement.

My third point pertains to our dialogue with the United States. We must examine the possibility of making use of the good services of the United States to bring about a situation in which the Tunis PLO will cease intimidating the residents of the territories. If this happens, a dialogue between residents of the territories and Alignment ministers may allow us to find a partner with whom we will be able to hold a dialogue and reach an understanding which we will submit for the government's approval.

[Qital] Your remarks clearly imply your recommendation that the Alignment remain in the government in the upcoming weeks.

[Rabin] At this stage, I will recommend that we wait—I do not know whether for days or weeks—and test our ability to get the peace process moving in accordance

with the peace initiative as decided by the government, without any connection with or consideration for the Likud Central Committee's resolutions.

If we fail, I—as one of the Labor Party heads who had acted vigorously for the establishment of the national unity government, primarily in a bid to give peace a chance, break the circle, and achieve peace and security without abandoning any of the positions included in the government's guidelines—even I will doubt that the unity government and the Alignment's participation in it are possible or have a future.

[Qital] Did you understand in yesterday's meeting of Alignment ministers that your views have support among the Alignment leaders?

[Rabin] First of all, my views are my views. I believe there are some who support and others who object. It is only natural for the initial positions to be of this nature. I estimate, however, that a stance will be formulated in today's meeting of the Alignment ministers, although unanimity is not an absolute prerequisite. I assume, however, that we will attain a common ground which will acknowledge that the peace initiative, as it was endorsed by the government and not merely by the Alignment, has been dealt a severe blow and that the Likud Central Committee's resolution has put obstacles on the path to peace, perhaps even torpedoed it altogether, and which will, naturally, give another chance—I am not talking in terms of months, merely of a reasonable and defined period of time—to the possibility that we, the Alignment ministers, can get the peace process moving in accordance with the government resolutions, rather that the Likud's interpretation thereof.

[Qital] Thank you very much, Defense Minister Rabin.

Groups Submit No-Confidence Over Likud Decision

TA0607074289 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] The CRM [Citizens Rights Movement] is also submitting a motion of no-confidence in the government, in the wake of the Likud Central Committee's resolutions. Our correspondent Ze'ev Kohen reports that the CRM faction says that the choice now lies between the national unity government and the peace initiative.

It was learned earlier that MAPAM [United Workers Party] and Shinuy are also submitting no-confidence motions.

Abu-'Ayyash: Last Potential Peace Initiative Lost

TA0607045389 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0400 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Prominent Palestinians in the territories have expressed deep disappointment in the Likud decision. Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj says nothing is left of Prime Minister Shamir's peace plan except the name. He said in the wake of Shamir's speech last night: No Arab will accept Israeli-sponsored elections in the territories.

Another reaction came from the head of the Arab Journalists Association, Radwan Abu-'Ayyash:

[Begin Abu-'Ayyash recording] This proves our earlier assumption about the initiative of Mr Shamir: that it is a nonstarter initiative, and it also proves that he is becoming more and more radical by the elements around, and this puts an end for any potential chance for peace or any potential possibility to move things for a solution to the crisis in the Middle East. I do not believe that Shamir meant by this creation a plan for a settlement. I think he only meant to gain time and just to waste time at the same time. He might have won the Likud unity, but I am sure he has lost the last potential peace initiative. [end recording]

Further Palestinian Reaction to Likud Vote

TA0607124189 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Jul 89 p 1

[Report by territories correspondent Ori Nir]

[Text] Public figures from the territories said yesterday that the results of the Likud Central Committee meeting greatly diminish the chances of holding peace negotiations in the near future. Some of the notables interviewed by HA'ARETZ yesterday evening, however, said that a glimmer of hope is visible through the results of yesterday's Central Committee vote. They draw hope from the possibility that the toughening of Shamir's official position will lead to a substantive change in the stance taken by the U.S. Administration—a change that will cause the Israeli unity government to split up.

In general, the reaction was deep disappointment and a total lack of trust in both the Israeli Government's sincerity and the seriousness of its proffered political initiative.

Many notables from the territories followed the events at the Likud Central Committee convention, and keenly understood the significance of the accord achieved within its framework.

Gaza lawyer Fayiz Abu-Rahmah said that the results of the Likud Central Committee meeting make the Shamir initiative less acceptable to Palestinian eyes than before. The results have undoubtedly diminished the already meager possibility of achieving any progress toward a settlement in the near future.

Nabulus businessman Sa'id Kan'an, who is known for his moderate views, stated that the committee's results cause Palestinians to lose the last vestiges of trust in the Israeli Government and will lead to greater extremism in the public and official positions evinced by the Palestinians.

Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj said that actually he is pleased with the results of the Likud Central Committee vote. According to Frayj, the results prove there is no government in Israel. He added that the results have fomented two important conflicts: a confrontation between the two wings of the Israeli Government, which will compel the Labor Party to adopt a clear position on the new developments; and a more important clash between the U.S. Administration and the Israeli Government, which will force the administration to speak its mind and clearly come out against the line taken by the Israeli prime minister.

Ramallah businessman Jamil Tarifi expressed the hope that the lack of seriousness evident in the Israeli initiative will emphasize the earnestness of the Palestinian initiative recently launched by the PLO. Tarifi said that the "Palestinian peace strategy is clear and fair, and Israeli public opinion is aware of this fact."

Al-Matn, Jubayl Coasts Shelled by Syrians 6 Jul

NC0607052689 (Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon in Arabic 0445 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] The al-Matn coast and Jubayl beach were the target of Syrian artillery fire at 0400 today. The bombardment continued until 0430.

The Jubayl coast came under Syrian artillery fire at approximately 0100.

According to press sources in West Beirut, several shells landed in the vicinity of the military beach and 'Ayn al-Muraysah at around 0420 today.

Further on Shelling

NC0607062189 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 0515 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Syrian occupation forces intermittently shelled the Jubayl and Kasrawan coasts, beginning at 0115 and ending at 0330 today. The eastern coast and the villages in northern al-Matn and the fringes of al-Ashrafiyah were shelled at 0800.

Shortly after 0400 today, the villages and towns in northern al-Matn came under artillery and rocket fire for 30 minutes from Syrian rocket launchers in the areas of the hotels, the old markets, and 'Ayn al-Muraysah.

West Beirut media have reported that shells landed in the area of 'Ayn al-Muraysah at 0420.

The areas in al-Hadath and Kafr Shima had come under bursts of anti-aircraft gunfire from al-Shuwayfat and al-'Amrusiyah shortly before midnight last night, accompanied by flares.

Shelling Continues

NC0607064089 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 0615 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Syrian rocket launchers in Ra's al-Nab' and Bisharah al-Khuri areas opened fire on residential areas along the coast and in the central area of upper al-Matn at 0900 today. Meanwhile, intermittent shelling of the Kasrawan and Jubayl coasts has been continuing since 0800.

The residential areas on Kasrawan coast were shelled from upper al-Matn at 0910.

'Guarded Calm' Prevails

NC0607092989 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 0800 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Shortly before the scheduled return of Lakhdar Ibrahimi, Arab League assistant secretary general, to Beirut today, there has been a marked escalation in the exchange of artillery shellfire. Nationalist areas, which experiecned normal activities and congested traffic on athe crossing points between the two sectors of the capital this morning, came under shellfire.

It is known that Lakhdar Ibrahimi's talks, especially those with general Michel 'Awn, will center on the withdrawal of the Iraqi Frog missiles from Lebanon because they are causing anxiety among the citizens lest the destructive war resumes and are also an obstacle to the success of the higher Arab triparatite committee's efforts to resolve the Lebanese crisis.

However, a guarded calm now prevails with no important developments since the western area was shelled indiscriminately shortly after 0800 this morning. The shelling from the eastern area had targeted the vicinity of both Verdun and Bi'r Hasan and the area of 'Ayn al-Muraysah. We have not yet learned of any casualties resulting from the shelling.

However, we have been informed that the movment on the crossing points has not been affected by the sudden security setback and that cars and pedestrians continue to move in both directions.

4 Killed, 8 Wounded

NC0607093289 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 0915 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Excerpts] As of 0900 today, the Syrians renewed their attacks against the eastern areas, bombarding the outskirts of al-Ashrafiyah, the central and coastal sectors of al-Matn, and the Jubayl and Kasrawan coasts. [passage omitted]

The Army units returned fire when attacks extended to residential areas. [passage omitted]

Citing medical sources, REUTER reports that four persons were killed and five wounded in West Beirut and that three persons were wounded as a result of the sudden bombardment of the eastern area.

Syria Insists on Withdrawal of FROG Missiles

NC0507142189 (Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon in Arabic 1350 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] A short while ago, news agencies cited a source close to Syria in West Beirut as saying that Damascus has asked the tripartite Arab committee to force General 'Awn, as they put it, to withdraw the FROG-7 missiles, recently provided by Iraq, as a condition for lifting the blockade of East Beirut.

Syrian Intelligence Men Kidnap 3 Citizens

NC0507194389 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1915 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Syrian intelligence men in the al-'Ijjah-al-Barbir area of Beirut have kidnapped three citizens. Some Lebanese military personnel, who were stopped in the same area, are still under detention.

Syrian Naval Patrols Resume off Eastern Coast

NC0507151589 (Clandestine) Radio Free Lebanon in Arabic 1445 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] AFP reported this afternoon that six Syrian gunships resumed their patrols for the 2d consecutive day a few kilometers off the coast of the eastern areas, particularly in the area off Jubayl Port. The gunships intercepted a tanker carrying 1 million liters of gasoline this morning. After the nature of its load had been ascertained, the tanker was permitted to sail, but it was subjected to a concentrated bombardment by Syrian artillery a short while later. The tanker was not hit.

Citing security sources in Beirut, AFP reported that so far the Syrian naval units have intercepted six ships, two of which are still detained in Tripoli Port.

Al-Huss Comments on Reopening of Crossing Points

NC0607094489 (Clandestine) Voice of the Mountain in Arabic to Lebanon 0900 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss has said that the decision to reopen the crossing points and the airport was an embarrassment to Michel 'Awn since any security breakthrough will in the end weaken and corner him before public opinion. He said that 'Awn sought to set a trap for everybody in West Beirut by counting on his refusal to reopen the airport to compel those in West Beirut to retract their decision on reopening the crossing points, but, Dr al-Huss added, keeping the crossing points open to the citizens has frustrated this trap.

Regarding the FROG missiles with which the Iraqi regime has supplied 'Awn, Prime Minister al-Huss said: We have every right to express our fear because these missiles can be used against us, as General 'Awn had previously used the arms, which the Army possessed originally, to bombard large parts of Lebanon.

Al-Huss Comments on Naval Blockade, Arms Imports

NC0607072889 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 0430 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss is expected to continue his contacts with diplomats today. He began these contacts yesterday by meeting with Soviet Ambassador Vasiliy Kolotusha and the PRC charge d'affaires. The purpose of these contacts is to brief the foreign diplomats on the decision to lift the blockade on the eastern area completely.

Prime Minister Dr al-Huss has indicated that the purpose of the current naval blockade is solely to watch for those ships carrying weapons, and not any other supply ships. He noted that the Syrian naval movements are concerned only with the ban on weapons until an agreement is reached on a mechanism for controlling the import of weapons. He said: If some people pretend to safeguard sovereignty, why don't they reject the daily Israeli piracy in Lebanese territorial waters and airspace?

Prime Minister al-Huss has been cited as rejecting the logic of defending sovereignty by importing weapons that destroy the country, especially since the matter has reached the point of putting Lebanon at the center of a raging storm after Jordan announced that sophisticated missiles have entered the eastern areas.

Prime Minister al-Huss told the ambassadors that the Jordanian announcement and General 'Awn's statement to the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-SIYASAH prove that the ports are being used to import weapons and that this violates the Oran summit and the Arab tripartite committee's resolutions.

It is worth noting that the Syrian Navy yesterday lifted the blockade on ports in the eastern area yesterday by allowing all ships to proceed to these ports, including a ship loaded with gasoline, which was allowed to proceed to a port in the eastern area to unload its cargo after it was searched and found to carry no weapons. A security source in the eastern area has confirmed this.

Arab League's Ibrahimi Arrives, Meets Al-Huss

NC0607100389 Beirut Voice of National Resistance in Arabic 0930 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Lakhdar Ibrahimi, tripartite Arab committee envoy and Arab League assistant secretary general, arrived at the Algerian Embassy in Beirut shortly before noon today. He was received by Ambassador 'Asim Jabir, director of protocol at the foreign ministry, representing Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss.

Upon his arrival, Ibrahimi only said: We hope for the best, God willing.

The Arab envoy is scheduled to be meeting now with Prime Minister al-Huss to discuss the mechanism for the solution reached by the higher committee. Ibrahimi will then go to the eastern area to meet with General Michel 'Awn.

Meanwhile, Chamber of Deputies Speaker Husayn al-Husayni has affirmed that, Ibrahimi will complete the steps he had begun during his visit to Beirut. He indicated that a decision to invite the deputies to a meeting abroad has been made, that Ibrahimi might be bringing such an invitation with him, and that the atmosphere for this meeting is being prepared.

Mujahidin Launch Offensive on Major Cities

Attack on Kabul Kills 9

BK0507115289 Hong Kong AFP in English 1124 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Kabul, July 5 (AFP)—At least nine people died in a mujahidin rocket attack on Kabul Wednesday morning, residents and eyewitnesses said.

The rockets landed in the center of the city, one of them 100 meters (yards) from a petrol station near a vegetable market, residents said.

The number of injured was not immediately known.

The High Command here said that mujahidin rebels fighting the Soviet-backed government of President Najibullah were planning a general offensive mid-July on several eastern cities and on the capital Kabul.

The High Command has already reported renewed fighting around the eastern city of Jalalabad.

Scores of MiG-21 fighter jets could be heard over Kabul Wednesday morning, and were believed to be en route to the Jalalabad area from the adjacent Bagram Air Base.

Residents also reported that at least eight Soviet-supplied Scud-b missiles were fired from the Kabul area Tuesday night and Wednesday morning.

Kabul Reports 16 Casualties

LD0507145689 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1330 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Sold Pakistan-backed extremists committed another unforgivable and shocking crime by firing seven surface-to-surface missiles on the residential areas of the city of Kabul. The BAKHTAR military section reports that as a result of the attack launched by the extrmist criminals eight of our compatriots, including children and women, were martyred and eight others were wounded. The wounded were immediately transfered to hospitals for treatment.

Escalated Clashes in Cities

BK0507155089 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Reports from Afghanistan say that the fighting between mujahidin and Kabul regime forces in Laghman Province has intensified and Kabul regime fighter planes have bombed mujahidin positions in the mountains. According to reports, these attacks continued for about 90 minutes and were the fiercest in recent weeks. The mujahidin launched a rocket attack on Kabul this morning, killing at least nine persons. Mujahidin also destroyed many security posts in the Mazar-e Sharif area.

Meanwhile, Radio Kabul and Radio Moscow have confirmed mujahidin attacks on military installations in Kabul and Jalalabad, in which a number of soldiers of the Kabul regime were killed.

The Kabul regime High Command has said that the mujahidin are preparing to attack several eastern cities and Kabul by the middle of this month.

Military Roundup

LD0507175689 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] As previously reported in the statement from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan, Pakistani militarists, Saudi Wahabi armed mercenaries and armed extremists backed by them launched a new offensive on the city of Jalalabad yesterday. The Armed Forces of the area bravely replied to the enemy offensive and defended their positions and the local residents.

An authoritative Armed Forces source told the military section of BAKHTAR that as a result of an ambush and a search and clearing-up operation mounted in the south of Jalalabad, 145 82mm mortars, 384 long-range mortar shells 75 antitank shells, 122 recoilless gun shells and 95 rockets were captured from the extremists.

The source said that extremists associated with Pakistan fired heavy weapons on the city of Jalalabad, its security posts and the residential areas around it. This resulted in the martyrdom of 10 women and children and one member of the Armed Forces, 13 residents, mostly children were also wounded. Four members of the Armed Forces were also wounded. Six houses, one mosque, one shop and a sewing machine factory were partially damaged.

The source adds that our Armed Forces who heroically defend the country's national sovereignty and territorial integrity killed 37 enemies with artillery and rocket fire and air raids and four of them were wounded. A number of Pakistani militarists and Saudi Wahabis were among those killed.

One set of Sakar-20 [rocket launcher], 3 sets of BM-12 missiles, 16 rocket launchers, 3 mortars, 1 DSHK machine gun, one ZG1 machine gun, 19 infantry weapons, arms and ammunition, 5 supply vehicles were destroyed and 6 mules carrying weapons were killed. The report adds that obedient servants of Pakistan, the extremist groups, who will commit any crime to ensure aliens looting interests, fired long-range weapons on the area of Khowst District. As a result one member of the Armed Forces was wounded.

Extremists also fired on the surrounding area of Qandahar airport killing a member of the Armed Forces and wounding four others.

According to another report, as a result of Pakistan-backed extremists fire on some areas of Herat Province, one resident was martyred and three others were wounded. Our heroic Armed Forces launched reciprocal attacks crushing of a number of our Muslim people's enemies and destroying a large quantity of arms and ammunitions belonging to the criminals.

The Armed Forces source says that the security and operative situation in the rest of the country is calm and normal. Units and formations are in their previous positions.

Kabul-Jalalabad Highway Cut

BK0607012889 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu 0100 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Reports from Afghanistan say the mujahidin have cut the highway which links Kabul with the strategically important eastern city of Jalalabad. They have also repulsed an attack by Kabul forces southwest of Jalalabad.

Meanwhile, six people are reported to have been killed and six injured as a result of mujahidin rocket attacks on Kabul.

At a ceremony at Ghaziabad in Jalalabad, the mujahidin released a group of 37 Kabul soldiers who were captured a few months ago when the mujahidin overran a Kabul regime garrison in (Shakar Kheyl).

'Increased Pressure' on Kabul

BK0607062889 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu 0600 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] In Afghanistan, the mujahidin have reportedly increased pressure on the capital, Kabul, restricting the activities of the Kabul regime forces to the confines of the city.

The mujahidin attacked and captured a Kabul regime security post between Sorkh Rud and Jalalabad, besides killing five and wounding four Kabul soldiers and seizing a large quantity of arms.

Government Takes Towr Kham

BK0607095089 Hong Kong AFP in English 0944 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Kabul, July 6 (AFP)—Afghan Government troops Wednesday [5 July] recaptured the strategic Khyber Pass town of Towr Kham, blocking a major supply line of the Afghan resistance, officials said here Thursday.

The officials gave no details and there was no High Command announcement.

But observers said that if the report was confirmed it would mean the closing of a major supply route to mujahidin resistance forces around the strategic eastern city of Jalalabad.

Kabul government forces have been pushed back from Towr Kham at least twice since November to Jalalabad 60 kilometres (36 miles) away although its forces had managed to retain several artillery positions there.

The area, located on the tip of the Pakistani border, has been heavily attacked with Soviet-supplied Scud missiles and high-altitude aerial bombing, driving much of Towr Kham's sparse civilian population into Pakistan.

Towr Kham is strategically important to the mujahidin who in March launched a major operation to capture Jalalabad City, 150 kilometres (90 miles) from the Afghan capital of Kabul.

'All-Out' Offensive

BK0607111189 Hong Kong AFP in English 1057 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Islamabad, July 6 (AFP)—Afghan Government forces launched an all-out offensive on rebel mujahidin positions Thursday [6 July] and overran several guerrilla bases around Jalalabad, resistance sources said.

They were advancing towards Samarkhel garrison, some 15 kilometres (10 miles) southeast of the city, the sources said.

Mujahidin guerrillas were retreating from several fronts around the eastern city after a hail of Scud missile attacks and heavy bombing by government jets, they said.

"A number of villages were on fire and many areas were under dust after scores of houses were razed in the indiscriminate attacks," an eyewitness quoted by the resistance in Peshawar, near the Afghan border, said in a radio conversation.

The mujahidin rebels denied a Kabul claim that the border post of Towr Kham had been recaptured by the government troops in Thursday's attack.

"Fighting is now around Samarkhel," a key garrison which fell to mujahidin forces in early March.

Government troops had forced the mujahidin to abandon Kariz Kabir, Seracha and Parkan, all in a radius of 10 kms (six miles) from Jalalabad City, the sources said.

Iran

Musavi Supports Plan for Stronger Presidency

LD0507104589 Tehran IRNA in English 1035 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Tehran, July 5, IRNA—Prime Minister Hoseyn Musavi has praised the Constitutional Review Council for concentrating executive power in the presidency.

"It is a very good solution and it conforms better with our constitution," he said in an interview with the daily ETTELA'AT published Wednesday.

Under the amendments to be put to a referendum, on July 28, the post of prime minister has been removed. But a deputy president will carry out similar tasks.

He believed the future president based on the constitutional amendments had no room for "self-interest" as he was made responsible to the leader, the Majlis and the people.

The new president, to be elected in July 28 elections, would be in charge of a stronger and more stable government, he predicted. Musavi, premier since October 1981, did not rule out cooperation with the next administration.

"My experiences would be at the service of the new president and government... I will not hesitate from any kind of cooperation to advance the country's executive affairs," he stressed.

Musavi said the late Imam Khomeyni's will and guidelines would ensure pursuance of his path in the future.

Prayer Leaders Support Rafsanjani Candidacy

LD0507172689 Tehran IRNA in English 1233 GMT 5 Jul 89

(Text) Tehran, July 5, IRNA—Leaders of Friday prayers of the country declared support for Majlis Speaker Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's candidacy for the presidential elections to be held July 28.

The declaration was made in a scroll signed at the end of a 3-day gathering of the country's leaders of Friday prayers here.

In a 12-point resolution, the participants called on officials to give priority to attending to the needs of the oppressed and the deprived and try to eliminate poverty in the country.

The prayer leaders also condemned the Saudi regime for massacring Hajj pilgrims and considered the "U.S.-subservients" administering the holy shrines as inefficient and incompetent.

An unsparing campaign against narcotic trafficking was also called for in the resolution.

The participants discussed, in five commissions held for the purpose, various issues including the problems of Sunni brethren and practical ways to materialise the historical will of the late founder of the Islamic Republic Imam Khomeyni.

USSR Could Play 'Major Role' in Iraq Dispute

LD0607061489 Tehran IRNA in English 0600 GMT 6 Jul 89

[Text] Tehran, July 6, IRNA—The head of the Majlis Foreign Relations Committee has said the Soviet Union could play a major role in resolving the Iraq-Iran dispute.

"If the Soviets take effective steps it will be a political victory for the Kremlin leaders in the Security Council," Seyyed Rajaie Khorasani told the TEHRAN TIMES published Thursday.

Khorasani, who was Iran's former ambassador to the U.N., said the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 and the establishment of genuine peace between Tehran and Baghdad would enhance the council's credibility.

The Soviet Union, China, Britain, France and the U.S. are permanent members of the council.

Khorasani said Tehran-Moscow relations were not tactical but natural.

"We are not concerned whether the West likes it or not. The improvement of Irano-Soviet relations was quite natural," he said.

"The people of the Soviet Union like us and our people like them, and there are no hurdles in the way for further improvement in reciprocal relations."

He described last month's visit to Moscow of Majlis Speaker Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani as highly successful and added that improved were beneficial for both parties. [sentence as received]

On the late Imam Khomeyni's fatwa on the author of the blasphemous book 'The Satanic Verses', he said the decree would not change because it was issued on the basis of Islamic laws.

In addition, British attitude has remained unchanged. He called on London to reconsider its policies towards Muslims stressing that Muslim sentiments should not be ignored.

The minimum the British could do was to "ban, collect and condemn the book."

IRNA Director on Khamene'i Anti-U.S. Stance

LD0507183589 Tehran IRNA in English 1753 GMT 5 Jul 89

[Text] Tehran, July 5, IRNA—The enmity of the Islamic Republic with the U.S. is "strategic one" orginating from Tehran's revolutionary spirit and Washington's counter-revolutionary nature, a senior Iranian official said Wednesday.

"The future policy of the Islamic Republic towards the U.S. is not something which can be altered with the change of government," stressed Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, director-general of the Islamic Republic NEWS AGENCY (IRNA).

"The U.S. Administration has resorted to every possible means to deal a blow on us over the past ten years and therefore it is natural for us to consider it (Washington) as our arch foe," he said in a talk with reporters.

For this very reason, added the IRNA chief, the leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i, has explicitly announced his stance against the U.S.

"The maintenance of such a stance stems from Washington's hostile position against Iran during the post-revolution era and is a natural reaction to U.S. crimes against our nation," he said.

Kharrazi made the remarks on the occasion of the first anniversary of the U.S. downing of an Iran Air Airbus a-300 over the Persian Gulf on July 3, 1988, as a result of which all 290 passengers and crew aboard were martyred.

The Iran Air flight 655 was missiled down by an American frigate 'the USS Vincennes' shortly after it took off from the southern port city of Bandar-e 'Abbas for Dubai.

The IRNA head made it clear "the tragedy brought to light the U.S.' inherent terrorism, not even in the criminal act but in its refusal to bear moral responsibility or make compensations."

*** Montazeri Criticized by Ahmad Khomeyni**

Part One

WA46400087 Tehran RESALAT in Persian
15 May 89 pp 3, 4, 5

[Text] Preface: Some time ago, a letter addressed to Ayatollah Montazeri was written by Hojjat ol-Eslam Ahmad Khomeyni regarding the issue of succession to leadership. This letter was published in the form of pamphlets and booklets and was widely distributed. Due to overwhelming requests by our readers and, also, because the letter contains a variety of new issues and information regarding one of the most important events in the history of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, we decided to publish it.

As it is mentioned in the preface of this letter, this writing points out to the constant advise of the imam and the reasons, causes, as well as the basic problems which were ignored, thus causing the removal of Ayatollah Montazeri from the position of becoming the deputy leader.

[Letter] Part One

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful.

Dear children, respected ministers and Majlis representatives: Greetings. I have heard that you are not aware of the events regarding Mr Montazeri and do not know what the issues are all about. You need only to know that, for the last 2 years, your old father has tried his best, through announcements and messages, to avoid having this issue end up here. Regretfully, our attempts have failed. On the other hand, religious duty dictated that he make appropriate decisions to protect the regime and Islam. Therefore, with a bleeding heart, I put aside the product of my life for the good of the regime and Islam. God willing, sisters and brothers will be more informed in the future. Needless to say, the defense of Islam and the regime is not an issue to tamper with. In case of an offense, the culprit, without regards to his position, will be immediately introduced to people. I pray to God for everyones's success.

May Peace And Blessings Of God Be Upon You, Ruhollah Musavi-Khomeyni in the Name of the Almighty

The writing before you, points out to the reasons and the basic causes of the issues, as well as by not paying attention to these issues and the imam's frequent advice, this bitter event came about regarding the position of the deputy leader

Although writing this letter is very difficult and unbelievable for a person who has always loved you, I am doing this in order to repay my debt to the imam, who is innocent, and also to serve the people who eagerly seek the truth.

Because I wanted to submit this letter quickly, I did not organize these writings properly. Thus, the contents of this letter are not put in proper form and, in many instances, they are repetitions (which of course I thought necessary to repeat.) This writing is composed of the raw material of this bitter issue and contains very little analysis. I hope writers and analysts will attempt to work in it in due time.

The basis for my writing is to please God and clarify the truth. It is certain that after the publication of this writing the same gang which has been mentioned, will not leave me alone. I have no fear of what they say about me and abuse will not change the contents of this letter.

Because of my deep involvement in the events of the revolution and, especially, in details of your case and the imam's warm and friendly encounter with you in an attempt to save you from the claws of the conspirators and infiltrators, I thought it would be treachery towards Islam, the revolution and the imam if I do not repeat the truth.

It is possible for the present and future generations, due to lack of knowledge, think that you were dismissed overnight and without preplanning, which is not the case at all.

About the bitterness of this event, it suffices to say that the imam—after your dismissal—during the course of a few hours cried several times and repeatedly said, "There is not a moment that Mr Montazeri is not im my thoughts. But what can I do? It was in the interest of the regime to have him step aside."

My letter to you sheds so much light on the truth that I do not believe anyone, after studying the excerpts of tens of letters and documents, could reach any other conclusion different than mine.

The question which may arise is, "why did the regime not take this approach from the beginning and, with the knowledge of a series of weaknesses and difficulties, help your character and position?" The response to this question is that the imam, due to his overwhelming affection for you, always tried to correct, guide and protect you and save you from the claws of antirevolutionaries, hoping that perhaps you would change your ambiguous path. Secondly, recently the imam was confronted with certain issues which prompted him not to wait any longer.

Finally, I emphasize that it is never my intention to say, with this letter, that—God forbid—you have accepted the thoughts and the lines of the liberals and the hypocrites. What I mean to do is to prove that the conspiring band of Mehdi Hashemi with their suggestions forced you into a certain position. Therefore, some of your sayings were no more than the wishes of the sworn enemies of the revolution and Islam.

It should be noted that your letters to the imam also contain very useful points which show the results of pain, suffering and defense of the revolution and Islam. This dimension of the issue is not and never will be ignored. However, this writing is not so that it presents a picture of your services for your contributions befits a large book and no one can forget your sacrifices. The leader of the revolution and all your friends wonder how you reached this position from those aspirations.

This writing is to show what has to be done in order to avoid what happened and what were the basic reasons for what happened.

Yours truly, Ahmad Khomeyni 27 Apr 1989

In The Name of God, The Compassionate and The Merciful.

Your Excellency Ayatollah Mr Montazeri, may your wisdom last:

With greetings and prayers for your health, it has been some time since I decided to present to you certain issues. However, neither my time nor the state of your feelings and thoughts would allow me to analyze the facts for you. But, due to the occurrence of more bitter-than-poison events—and also my feeling of duty—provided me with the opportunity to do so. With your permission, without an introduction and the customary protocol, I shall go to the heart of the matter which is, "Who is guilty in the course of this event?".

If you can say anything about others who do not not have a good relationship with you, it cannot be said about me. Since I have known myself, I have been your follower and advocate. As you always endorsed the imam, I, in turn, advocated you to the imam. If your endorsement of the imam as a proper learned person was advantageous, then my endorsement of you, as the son of the imam, has been influential. In the year 1358 [21 Mar 1979-20 Mar 1980] I proposed your deputy leadership, thinking that God's pleasure belies it.

Your Excellency, Ayatollah

I never thought a day would come that I would have to write such a bitter letter to you. But, since I am still of the opinion—as I was in the year 1358—that the imam is innocent, I see it appropriate to bother you with a few sentences in regards to you and your positions.

Today, as I write this letter to you, deep down, I feel calm and confident that I have fulfilled, to the best of my abilities, my duties regarding friendship, sincerity and truthfulness. Because I felt that this situation is inevitable—due to clashes and your positions—I told your son-in-law, Mr Hashemi, several times and openly that, if issues progress in their present form, obviously the imam will not tolerate this any longer and will consider the interest of the regime to come before anyone and anything. I also sent the same message to you to no avail. I am certain that Mr Hashemi had reached the conclusion that the imam and the regime have no other alternative but to run after Mr Montazeri and, therefore, why shouldn't he say what he wishes. Then he should say it and the imam must accept it. I figured this out after several hours of discussion with him [Hashemi.]

In order to prevent this event from occurring, I traveled several times to Qom, solely, to talk to Mr Hadi. I spoke to him all about the background of the issues and, especially, about this bitter issue. I told him that my motivation for doing this is merely the friendship and love I have for [Montazeri.] He said he knew, but I was aware that he did not think so and believed that we are doing this only because of our need and it is not possible that you [Montazeri] could be removed, therefore, why shouldn't we (the band of Mr Mehdi) solve our problems through the mouth of Mr Montazeri?

Your Excellency, Ayatollah

I told Mr Hadi Hashemi in one of our several-hour meetings that, "Mr Montazeri is like a glass container and the imam is a metallic one. In case of a crash it will be he [Montazeri] who will be crushed. Please tell him

that the imam has shown that for the interest of the regime he will not let anything pass." Regretfully, when I later asked him, "Did you tell Mr Montazeri?" he said, "No, the subject was too harsh." I told him, "Tell Mr Montazeri that it is not right to say that either the television should broadcast all of my sayings or I will scream that there is censor." I said [to him] that his [Montazeri's] statements are detrimental to him. In the future, if his statements were put next to the imam's and, as an opponent, the imam will not allow him to get a strong footing.

Your Excellency, Ayatollah Montazeri

Before the revolution, all of us, except the imam, used to support the Hypocrites (defense of Bazargan and his band was not such a problem.) The letter signed by yourself, Mr Taleghani and Mr Motehari in defense of the Hypocrites—which was sent to the imam—and the backing of all involved in the struggle from that is not something that is not known. During a trip, which was intended for me to visit the imam in Najaf, I met with one of the friends who told me, "Tell the imam to endorse the Mojahedin as soon as possible, before it is too late and we fall behind." I related this to the imam and he stated: Messrs Montazeri, Taleghani and Motehari also encourage me to defend them but, you are all missing the point that these [Mojaheddin] have been playing with you. They do not believe in our Islam. Also, the friends outside of the country have put pressure on me. however, even they are getting the wool pulled over their eyes.

After the revolution I used to think, as you do today, that it is possible to attract the Hypocrites, liberals and other groups who took part in the struggle and get close to them. Several times I told the distinguished martyr, the late Dr Beheshti and Messrs Hashemi and Khamene'i that if you come to a problem I will act, but I believe that these groups can be attracted. It was not long before I realized that these groups had pulled the wool over my eyes.

One night I thought until morning and reached this conclusion: that I am different from Messrs Beheshti, Hashemi, Khamene'i and all the others on this level. They are all different from others but my difference with them is only that I am the imam's son. It is because I am the imam's son that I am liked by some friends and some people. I decided to write this and never do anything against the wishes of the leadership and the trusted friends of the leadership. I wrote this and newspapers reflected it. I have always prayed to God to position me where I should be and never claim to be anymore than I am. There are thousands of good students of theology in theological centers studying and the only difference with me is that they are not the son of the imam. Now, all your sincere friends want you to change your positions which were the result of satanic provocations. Certainly, this takes courage.

I told him that nowadays, the clergy and the people who follow are, either, the followers of the imam or are the followers of someone else. Those who follow other distinguished sources of emulation did not agree to change their source of emulation to the imam, let alone to you. On the other hand, it is obvious that if their sources of emulation pass away after the imam, due to their way of thinking, they will be attracted to people other than yourself. If their source of emulation passes away before the imam, in my view, many of them will not follow the imam and those who do, will certainly not become your followers. However, the followers of the imam are three groups: the are either your enemy, your friend or are neutral.

Those followers of the imam who are your enemy are not few in number. The issue of the Eternal Martyr, the issue of Fadak, the issue of Mehdi Hashemi and such issues where certain sensitivity towards them exist, are not few. It was exactly for this reason that we were insisting that Sheykh Ne'matollah Najafabadi (the writer of the Eternal Martyr) should not hold discussions in your Hoseynieh but, regretfully, you would not budge. There are even some clergies who not only are not on good terms with the revolution but also oppose it and, yet, they accept the imam because they know him as a man who is a jurisprudent, but they oppose you because they know you—however wrongly—as a man against the jurisprudent. Imagine the clergies in Esfahan—which is your city—and see how many distinguished clergies there are, who are not on good terms with you or are, your outright enemies. Now, what is the cause of this animosity? And, the fact that the situation is not any better in other cities we shall not discuss.

These people, after the imam, will not be your friends. However, they will gain the courage to exaggerate your weak points and overtly show their animosity. At that point, it will be said that the imam was against the liberals, but Mr Montazeri was for them. The imam was against the Hypocrites and Mr Montazeri was on good terms with them. The imam had recognized those at the Information [Ministry]—who take their lives into their own hands—as the soldiers of the Absent Imam and Mr Montazeri considered them worse than the Shah's Savakis. The clear evidence of this will be in your own handwriting, because those surrounding you want you to pose as a freedom-seeker.

However, some of those who follow the imam and are neutral may, possibly, follow you but since they are, apparently, without motivation, most of them will not follow you. Aside from that, this group is not of the kind that would rush into wind and fire (zealots) and since you lack the base that the imam has—and you have many enemies—as soon as they feel threatened they will cut away from you. Therefore, you cannot bank on this group either, because you are a man of struggle and need people who are capable of rushing into wind and fire. This group will be attracted to those clergies who have been made to believe that with a little money the Garden of Eden may be bought. They will be attracted to those who, as they say,

want this world and the eternal one. They will be attracted to clergies who, in Najaf and Qom, treated the imam in such a way that I ashamed to even repeat it. They will be attracted to those who, with utmost audacity and lack of piety, refer to you as a Wahabi.

However, those followers of the imam who are your friends will, after the imam, either follow you or follow someone else. This begins from the point that, during the time of the imam, their friendship with you was either because of your valuable service to Islam and the imam or for your own sake. From among those who care about you—the good clergy, the good people and the theological students who are sincere to the revolution and have suffered much—almost all will not let go of the imam and his goals and take your side. It means that they love you "for the sake of the imam." I mean to say that, if one day the imam tells them not to have anything to do with you they will not come around you. They recognize the imam as the leader of the revolution. They have grown up with his revolution and see great virtues in him. Also, they love you because you are in the line of the imam and have advocated him and have suffered in the path of the Islamic revolution. It is because of this that they know you as a learned man along whom they can fight with America and Russia. However, if you distance yourself from the imam, even if he only shows anger towards you, they, without delay, will show you their anger and will not accept you without the love of the imam [to support you.]

There is one group who follows the imam that loves you without the imam's support and will not abandon you. Now, you be the judge of who are in this group. Could you continue your struggle with this group or will you be, eventually, absorbed by them and will be guided according to their wishes? Regretabbly, this is what you have become. You have neither the number of the followers of other ayatollahs and great sources of emulation nor the friends of the imam while you have become "imamless." You are left with a group of misfits whereby, if you do not act carefully, you will be gone.

Since I know you to have purity, I believe that God will guide and protect you and, God willing, you will not distance yourself from the imam and, again, will attract your good and old friends. God willing, it will be so. Of course, this will be so if, for a couple of years, you refrain from attempting any unruly act, stay fully within the line of the imam, distance yourself from the liberals and the hypocrites; and also, from the reactionary mullahs who until yesterday called you a Wahabi and today call you the slave of the first imam. Those are he ones who until yesterday called you light-headed and today refer to you as the unwielding warrior. You should seriously separate yourself from these. Presently, I do not see the danger only in the hypocrites, unbelieving liberals and the painless wealthy. In addition, I see the danger in those disorderly and backward mullahs who, in Najaf, accused the imam of having forsaken his prayers and thus, for 15 years, brought pain to the heart of the imam. Keep your senses very sharp.

Let me go to another subject and talk about the problems of Mehdi Hashemi and other complications that concerns him:

Before discussing your letters to the imam and reviewing the letters, tapes and interviews of Mr Mehdi Hashemi, I would like to bring to your attention a part of the imam's message to the Assembly of Experts in Tir of 1362 [21 Jun-20 Jul 83]. This message dates back 3 years before the arrest of Mr Mehdi and it is as if it was written for you. And it seems that the only one who did not listen to it was you. Please note:

Document No 1: "You must know that criminal elements and murderers have their eyes on you, more than anyone else. And with misguided people infiltrated in your houses—with 100 percent Islamic and revolutionary postures—may, God forbid, create catastrophe. They may, with one deviating act, drag the regime towards deviation and with your hand slap Islam and the Islamic Republic in the face. Be careful in the selection of your friends. Avoid rushing into making decisions, especially the important ones. You must know, and surely know, that mankind is not safe from mistakes and wrongs. As soon as you make a mistake or commit a wrong return from it and confess to your mistake, for it is the ultimate of human values. Coming up with rational and insisting on a wrong issue is a shortcoming and the work of the satan. Consult with experts on important matters and be cautious."

It seems that the imam was reading what was to happen five years later and had aimed at the center of danger 5 years ago. Do you think God will be pleased if you do not listen to such a clever and intelligent man?

And now, I begin with the confessions of Mehdi Hashemi and your letters to the imam which, for the past 2 years, have brought pain to the imam but—for the good of the regime and the interest of the system—has borne this pain with a thorn in his eye and a bone in his throat.

It is certain that you have been in the mainstream of the sensitivity of people and officials in regards to the issue of Mehdi Hashemi. Also, despite becoming a target for accusations and warnings and friendly reminders by all of us and, especially, the imam, you failed to see his case as a serious one. Therefore, you continued to act under the influence of Messrs Mehdi and Hadi Hashemi.

Mehdi Hashemi, in page 20 of book one of his file says:

Document No 2: "....A year before my arrest, the comings and goings of the respected officials of the Islamic Republic began. They all brought up with [Montazeri] matters regarding my record before the revolution and my weak points after the revolution, i.e., contacts with SAVAK, gathering of radical forces, possession of arms and ammunition, the issue of Mr Shamsabadi and....This process lasted a few months and Ayatollah Montazeri was still resisting their assertions. I would get the news of these comings and goings from my brother. In turn, I

would submit wrong and deviating reports to him in order to gain his favor and, also, criticize government officials asserting that their motive for badmouthing me is their jealousy and annoyance. I thought in this way I could strengthen his support for myself. My brother had an important part in this and would present such analysis in person."

This issue is proof that the imam, one year before the arrest of Mehdi Hashemi, was trying to save you from the ditch that was dug for you. However, regretabbly, you insisted so much on defending Mehdi Hashemi that imam wrote a good and respectful letter—and at the same time giving warning—about the danger that threatens you from the side of Mehdi Hashemi.

Document No 3: "After greetings, my affection for you is more clear to you than others. In accordance with the length of our sincere and friendly acquaintance, your high practical and scientific position, your perseverance in struggle with tyrants, your unforgettable sufferings throughout the years for Islamic goals, your exceptional piety and beauty of soul, and even more, the high prestige that following these matters, with the will of God, has come to you and the dire need of the Islamic Republic and Islam to the likes of yourself are my motivations for my affection to you. Therefore, this holy respect must be kept, from all aspects, safe and sound. Protection of this prestige, due to several reasons, is required of you and all of us. The possibility of it being smeared is a reason for its extreme importance. After this introduction, I must say that this must-be-protected prestige is most likely or, perhaps, definitely in danger, especially due to its effective opponents in the circle of Qom who may be seeking an excuse.

This very grave danger comes from the direction of your relationship with Mr Mehdi Hashemi. I do not want to assert that he has, in fact, committed anything wrong, but wish to say that he has been accused of many crimes such as supervision of or direct involvement in murders and other such acts. Connection with such a person, even if acquitted, results in demeaning of your position which all are duty bound to protect. What is certain—and I shall insist on—is the investigation of the case and allegations against him. Investigation of having hideouts and storing weapons—using funds that belong to the nation—under the guise of helping the so-called liberation movements. In principle, such acts without the involvement of the government are illegal and he does not have the qualification or the authorization to do this even if it is indeed with the best intentions and for such organizations. This constitutes interference in the work of the government. The answer to this is decisive and what I ask of you, in the first place, is your direct recommendation for the involvement of the Ministry of Information and investigation of this case. And, if you have any problem with this, to the point that the religious decree in this regard does not apply to you, maintain silence. Even in private circles, defending such a person—which is dangerous for your prestige and could be the possible cause of corruption and spilling the blood of innocent people—is poisonous. All activities under the guise of helping the so-called liberation movements must be abandoned and all who have taken part in these matters must be tried. What is certain, and regretful, is that it is merely due to your favorable opinion about the deeds, acts, sayings and writings that you act as soon as you receive and discuss matters in public gatherings and make recommendations to the legal branch. As your old and present friend, I beseech you, who are favored by the people, to consult with trusted officials who are familiar with the affairs of the country and then act so that, God forbid, no harm could come to your prestige which, in turn, is the prestige of the republic. Freedom of a several hundred hypocrites, without methodology, due to the orders of a council which, with their soft hearts and favorable opinions, caused the statistics for explosions, terrors and thieveries to rise. Mercy to the sharp-fanged tiger is injustice to the sheep.

I emphasize that you wash your hands from your connections with Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi, for this is a better way, or, do not show any reaction regarding the investigation of this case. The investigation of the alleged crimes is definite. I wish you health and success."

12 Mehr 1365 [4 Oct 86], Ruhollah Al-Musavi Al-Khomeyni

Mehdi Hashemi, during his interrogation (page 23) has said:

Document No 4: "The last day before I intended to give myself up to the Ministry of Information [Montazeri] summoned me and said that the imam has written a letter to me and he read to me the part of the letter whicht was about me. Then, he added that, "I have written a letter to the imam." He read the part which was about me and then said, "the imam, with this letter, has taken the sleep from my eyes and I, also, wrote a letter which will take the sleep from the imam's eyes."

Mr Montazeri, I have quoted the imam's letter so that all may note what part of the letter may have taken the sleep from your eyes? Such a good letter which is filled with your praise was very fatherly and sympathetic. Why would this take the sleep from your eyes? You also said the same thing to me, in person, and said that you have written a letter to take the sleep from the imam's eyes. Do you know what part of this letter has taken the sleep from your eyes? The part where the imam says that the investigation of the alleged crimes is definite.

Now, I will quote portions of your letter in reply to the imam's good letter and write a few words about it. Of course your nine-page letter which was published on 65/7/17 [9 Oct 89] was the cause of the surprise. One reason being the question of why have you written so immaturely and provocatively to the imam of the Muslims who, also, was your teacher? Also what about your gullibility—which

will be determined later. In your reply, written 5 days after the imam's letter, in defense of your harsh treatment of responsible officials you have written:

Document No 5: "It is being said that, if it were not for such talks (meaning the talks against officials) it is not clear what would happen and what would be people's the reaction to all the wrongs and injustices."

Indeed, Your Eminence Ayatollah, who was telling you that if it were not for such talk, people would possibly revolt against injustices? Was there anyone else except Mehdi Hashemi and his band?

In page 27 of his file, Mehdi Hashemi writes:

Document No 6: "In short, my last and most dangerous deviating thought was, with the position I have made for myself before the respected jurist [Montazeri] and having gained the absolute trust of his House, to get revenge from the officials for their lack of kindness towards me and their planning to eliminate me from the [political] scene. In this path I did not stop short of conspiracies, revelations, making allegations, creating false atmospheres and creating suspicion."

Now, do you see who was telling you that, "If you do not curse officials, people will rise against the injustices?"

Document No 7: In the same letter of 65/7/17 you have written: "Members of movements come to pledge their allegiance to me as the deputy to Imam Khomeyni. They do not know that Imam Khomeyni, altogether, regards Islamic movements as illegal."

In page 17 of his file Mehdi Hashemi writes:

Document No 8: "From the time that the Movements' Unit was dissolved and I came out of the Guards [Corps], Ayatollah Montazeri—according to the honorable way—in order to boost my morale appointed me as the representative to the [Organization of] Movements and this resulted in the improvement of my relation with him and his House."

You see that the imam is against the movements that are headed by Mr Mehdi and orders its dissolution so that it may reorganize in another form. On the other hand you, once again without paying attention to this issue, appointed him as your representative in the movements and thus raised his stature.

Document No 9 says: "One foreign diplomat said: "If you want, once more, to become a factor on the national scene you must become an international factor. We have the power to pave the way for this. We will put all financial and military sources at your disposal needed for setting up the Organization of Movements in the region enabling you to start your work."

Did the imam, indeed, consider freedom movements illegal? Was the imam against freedom movements? Didn't he defend the movements in his declarations? Wasn't the slogan of creating Hezbollah resistance all over the world that of the imam's?

Yes, the imam was against movements which had their heads in the manger of foreigners. The imam was against movements which were financed and directed by foreigners, and what could he do except to oppose it.

In this letter, in connection with the explosives in Saudi Arabia, you have said:

Document No 10: "Now, those in the Guards [Corps] who have committed this wrong and caused us to lose face cannot be investigated but Mr Hassani and Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi must be investigated and tried?"

Firstly, it is said that this was, also, the work of Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi or his agents. Secondly, Is there any other way except what was done in Mecca for revolutionary work? Of course, such activities are sometimes carried out without any hitch and problem and sometimes they are revealed. This does not mean that I endorse such work but, in general, this is customary for these works. On the other hand, is it that Mehdi Hashemi was arrested and tried for these Movements? Is it not that Mehdi Hashemi was tried for murder, because he was a Savaki?

In this letter of 65/7/17 it is written: Document No 11: "At the time of the Shah, in the court of Esfahan, Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi was sentenced to three executions but the National Supreme Court of the Shah had the independence and the guts to rescind the verdict of the Esfahan court."

I beg you to read the first page of Mr Mehdi Hashemi's file in document 11/1 (P 20) of his interrogation so that it is determined if he was a revolutionary or a Savaki during the time of the Shah? Did the National Supreme Court during the time of the Shah have the guts or the independence to rescind the verdict of a court that—by the force of SAVAK—had sentenced Mehdi Hashemi to three execution unless he was a Savaki? Due to his weakness of character, as he had given all his information to the Unknown Soldiers of Imam-e Zaman, he had given all his information to Shah's SAVAK. He even gave them the names of all those whom he had ordered to kill, such as the late Shamsabadi and others. They were all arrested.

In this same letter of 65/7/17 you have written: Document No 12: "I do not fear from stating the truth. I knew Seyyed Mehdi from the time whent he used to study with the late Mohammad and would come to my class. His father was my teacher and his brother is my son-in-law. I know all his characteristics. He is a man sincere to Islam and the revolution and, even, to yourself (imam.) He is talented and intelligent, he writes well, in wisdom

and management is far better than the head of the Guards [Corps] and the Minister of Information with all their qualifications. In responsibility and piety, he is nothing less than them. He is, only, not a goat and is not willing to be, unknowingly, someone's pond."

However, in a letter dated 66/5/7 [29 Jul 87] and addressed to you, Mehdi Hashemi writes: Document No 13: "First of all, I thank you for your support and endeavors during the first month of my arrest and for thinking that I am a pure and innocent person. And, I am very sorry and ashamed for not revealing the true nature of my deeds and behavior, due to personal and selfish reasons. In general I am very sad and embarrassed for being a guilty person smeared in numerous impurities, involved in wrongdoings and caught up in my own desires and, yet, favored by you and having become close to you who are a holy man. My mental and practical identity, as per my own awareness that is clearly demonstrated nowadays, does not have anything in common with yours, your House's and the position of deputy leadership. The prevailing circumstances which had covered my relation with you was no more than taking advantage of the blessings of your generosity. I curse myself for the problems that some of my deeds and behavior, directly or indirectly, have caused you and, above all, caused heartache for the imam, this sole gift of God to us and the beating heart of the world of Islam.

Your Eminence Ayatollah Montazeri: Imagine to what extent Mehdi Hashemi—based on his own confessions—has influenced you in regards to all socio-political issues that when he wanted to leave you for the last time you encouraged him to say, "Whatever you do tell them that he [Montazeri] ordered it"?

On page 23 of his file, Document No 14, it is stated: "I left him, but deep down, I was aware of the fact that what a statue of evil, corruption and deviation was favored by the Gracious Jurist and how this great man was the victim of being taken advantage of and trickery by myself and some friends."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Are you not simple-minded? Were you indeed aware of all the characteristics of Mr Mehdi Hashemi?

On page 24 of the file, Document No 15, it is stated: "Satanic characteristics such as power-seeking, which was the result of pride, self-conceit, self-importance, mental despotism, deceit, haughtiness and feeling self-important surrounded me and my scientific approach in regards to murders, collecting weapons and ammunition and revelations against officials was the result of this Satanic characteristics."

Did you know all his characteristics? Is the man sincere to the revolution and Islam? On page 24 of his file, Document No 16, Mehdi Hashemi states: "Due to weakness in beliefs and religion and having been sunk in a swamp of factions and factional plays, my views of all values of the revolution was mixed with political and factional equations and I would view all events in the logical framework of factional politics, even the great position of the leadership."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Did you really know Mehdi Hashemi? Have you ever thought about what is it that you lack that makes you so hasty in your decisions? Have you thought about why you have not known Mr Mehdi Hashemi even though he was a friend of [your son] the late Mohammad Montazeri? May his soul reside in heaven, for if he were still alive, perhaps you would not be in this situation. Have you known his brother, your own son-in-law? What caused you to claim that you do not see his piety any less than Mr Reyshahri and Mohsen Reza'i? What is it about the imam, that even though he has not raised him, and his brother was not the imam's son-in-law, he has figured him [Hashemi] out, but you who raised him, did not figure him out? Did you have or do you have the capacity to become the imam's successor? In the letter of 65/7/17, Document No 17, you stated: "He is sitting in his home, keeping busy with studies and writing. Presently, it is fashionable in our country, to blame all wrongdoings such as murders, various announcements and such matters on him. Factional plays of the country have been encouraging such rumors and, regrettably, officials such as those from [the Ministry of] Information base their judgment on these rumors. These factional plays and cruel getting-even-with games are another one of our country's problems."

Has the prized intelligence of the Islamic Republic attributed everything that has taken place, such as explosions at Party [headquarters] and the Prime Ministry, to him?

Has the martyrdom of dear Ayatollahs Soduqi, Ashrafi-Esfahani, Dastgheyb, Qazi, Motehari and Madani been blamed on him? Has the responsibility for the martyrdom of martyr Qodusi and martyr Hasheminejad been pinned on him? Have all these difficulties in governmental and non-governmental organizations been blamed on him? What else but the confessions and behavior of Mehdi Hashemi is being related to him?

From page one to ten of his file, Mehdi Hashemi explains what he has done—the gist of which is as follows:

1. Confessing to being Savaki. 2. Revealing the names of the very same people whom he had assigned to assassinate the late Shamsabadi. 3. Praying for the royal family. 4. Ordering the murders of Jahansoltan and Mehdizadeh. 5. Ordering the murder of the late Shamsabadi. 6. Ordering the murder of Safarzadeh. 7. Ordering the murder of Engineer Bahrinian. 8. Escalating the differences between the Guards [Corps] and the Komiteh. 9. Ordering the hiding of a sizable cache of arms, ammunition and explosives. 10. Instigating the Guards [unit] of Lanjan and the Guards [units] of Khomeyni-Shahr, Darche and Mobarakeh to unite and resist the Esfahan Guards [Corp.] 11. The counterfeiting and publication of

some papers in the name of Afghan theology students and clergy against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12. Counterfeiting a document that Dr Hadi is a Savaki and allegations against some clergies of Esfahan. 13. Ordering murders of Abas'ali Heshmat and his two children. 14. Dissolving the Nasr Organization and [being responsible for the] clashes and murders in it. 15. Counterfeiting government documents. 16. Possessing classified documents. 17. Printing and distributing a declaration and booklet under the titles of the Awakened Clergy against officials of the regime and other such instances that require more deliberation.

Your Eminence Ayatollah Montazeri: Is a person like this only sitting home and studying? Was it really fashionable to blame all that happened on Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi? If Mehdi Hashemi had told only one of these to you—who have known him from his childhood and were aware of all his characteristics and do not think his piety is any less than Messrs Mohsen Reza'i and Reyshahri—would you still consider him pious? Now, have you known Mr Hadi? Have you known those around you who have caused the imam so much pain? With all these crimes of Mr Mehdi, are rumors the basis for the National Information's judgment?

In this letter of 65/7/17 you state: Document No 18: "Do you know that in the Islamic Republic, contrary to what we have read in the religious law, there is no respect for human life nor for one's possessions. The judge orders to give a man back his belongings and his home but no one listens, especially if it is confiscated by a revolutionary foundation. People from the Supreme Judicial Council, either due to being afraid of each other, fear of officials' phone calls, or misrepresentations approve all these sacrileges with their silence."

Now, let us see what is the cause of such judgment?

On page 2 of volume three of his file, regarding the activities of Mr Hadi Hashemi, Mehdi Hashemi says:

Document No 19: "Paving the way for meetings of problematic and protesting forces with [Montazeri] such as Dr Peyman and those related to the Freedom Movement."

Your Eminence Ayatollah Montazeri: Don't you think that the people who were, in calculated ways, being sent to meet with you were from the ranks of the hypocrites and the liberals? Thus, this was done in order to throw you into this improper position? With the confidence you have in Mehdi Hashemi and his brother and since you know them as pious and religious, don't you think that they have made you a tool for themselves and their group? Haven't you, yourself, selected the members of the Supreme Judicial Council except for the Chief Justice and the Prosecutor General? Shouldn't you be asked why you selected such gutless people (as you state) for the Council—who disregard the order of God with a single phone call? Or, why life and property of Muslims is unimportant to them? Do the officials of the Islamic Republic wish to turn a right into wrong? Are the officials of the Islamic regime any other than the [Majlis] deputies, ministers and the heads of the three branches of government? Since your meaning of "the officials of the Islamic Republic" is not a simple clerk of a ministry, then, the Supreme Judicial Council is so sacrilege that with a phone call from an official sells his faith and beliefs? You think such statements do not count before God?

In this same letter of 65/7/17, document number 20, you state: "Due to present conditions, at last, I am forced to remain outside of political activities of the country and attend my lessons and discussions of theological studies and other activities related to the religious center. Therefore, I request that no work be referred to me and, by the way, I will still accept the religious funds on your behalf."

Do you still believe that "you" decide and "you" have reached the conclusion to divorce yourself from political activities of the country and Mr Hadi and Mr Mehdi had no influence on you? Is it not that your claim of separation from the regime was in the agenda of Mr Mehdi and Mr Hadi and now it has come to light?

In a letter to Mr Hadi Hashemi, Document 21, Mr Mehdi Hashemi writes: ...that you judged everything with your fragmentary values which caused many atrocities and adverse effects for the revolution during the most crucial times in the history of the country. The revolution and the war brought up the necessity of Ayatollah Montazeri's separation from the regime and other officials. Only God knows what a major sin you have committed and hope that you have repented from your [past] deeds."

Mr Mehdi Hashemi, in a letter to you regarding the issue of your separation from the government, had this to say:

Document No 22: "I take God as my witness, and if this brother, for a moment uses his conscience as judge, will also realize the fact that severing relations with the regime was the result of a number of moves that he, for several months through making preparations for factional meetings, magnification of weaknesses and shortcomings in the country and the presentation of radical analyses and miscalculated suggestions caused."

The honorable people of Iran must note that the separation of Ayatollah Montazeri was a calculated program of Mr Hadi and Mr Mehdi which was planned several months ago and reached its goal today. Is it still the prevailing opinion that the imam's dismissal of Mr Montazeri was an unexpected and sudden move?

Is it still the prevailing thought that some, in order to gain power, conspired to purge him? Wasn't the imam's patience and warnings for three or four years not enough? Didn't the imam agree to grant an audience to Mr Hadi in order to prevent some people from saying that he was not given a fair chance otherwise it [his situation] would not come to this point? Didn't Mr Hadi

tell him [imam] what transpired between me and him during our many meetings? Didn't I accept the curses of the Hezbollah and met with Mr Hadi, for the pleasure of God and the imam? In the same letter, Document No 23, you have said: Document No 23: "Do you know that in some prisons even daylight is withheld from the prisoners—and not for one or two days, but for months—and, certainly, you will be told that these are all lies and he [Montazeri] is simpleminded?"

And there are several other "do you knows" which one is ashamed to repeat and curses those around you for playing with you, in order to topple you.

Your Eminence Ayatollah Montazeri: Please refer to pages 1, 2 and 5 of the third volume of Mehdi Hashemi's file to find out who were the ones who were saying these things and who are the ones who associate with you.

In regards to the association of Mr Hadi with the hypocrites and those outside of the country, Mr Mehdi Hashemi has made some statements which I quote as follows. I should mention that Mehdi Hashemi has said that, "I would like to say it all so that I meet with my maker clean." This statement has been recorded. His sayings are such: Document Nos 24, 24, 24, 24: "In the mind of Mr Hadi—I speak frankly—some issues had risen that we were tentatively confirming. Some of which were that, through a series of contacts, however weak, we must establish a spare channel with the forces outside the country. Mr Hadi had reached the conclusion that we should prepare some cautionary and additional channels abroad so that, in case of a transformation, we can have communication with the factions outside the country. And, Mr Hadi had a connection with a theology student who was one of the agents and they were coordinating [plans] together. Through the same channel, that is the theology student, Mr Hadi was told that a faction of the Mojahedin Organization and, also, there are certain forces attached to that organization, which have milder views regarding Ayatollah Montazeri. In general it is because of this faction, this band and this line, that Mr Hadi had adopted the view that he must have a connection with this channel. Mr Hadi also would say that the Mojahedin Organization is preferred to this regime and we believed that in case of internal reactions Ayatollah Montazeri's reputation would be very effective. Altogether, this connection with him, and afterwards the theology student Erami who was in contact wit Mr Hadi, were considered to be the communication channel with the People's Hypocrites."

This agent, who is a theological student, is Mr Erami who had been one of the hypocrites and was sentenced to 10-15 years prison—I am not sure [of the exact number of years]—or some other term. He was then placed in the list of Ayatollah Montazeri's members and was released. However, he was not allowed to wear the clergy robe. Mr Montazeri allowed him to wear the turban when he was summoned to appear before the court. He immediately notified Ayatollah Montazeri and the Ayatollah, in turn, through Sheykh Abolqasem Esfahani who is a member of his office, sent a message of protest to the chief of the court to release him immediately, saying that, "I have allowed him to wear the turban."

Part Two

46400087 Tehran RESALAT in Persian
16 May 89 pp 3, 10

[Text] Newspaper's Preface:

The first part of the full text of the letter from Hojjat ol-Eslam Ahmad Khomeyni addressed to Ayatollah Montazeri was published in yesterday's issue. Now, we draw the attention of our respected readers to part two.

Another subject that Mr Mehdi has brought up is the following: in the second file [of his interrogation] p 6, after mentioning several points (according to him) of treason by Mr Hadi (to Mr Montazeri) such as agreeing to move secret and top secret bulletins, the issue of preparing a fake list in order to weaken Messers Hashemi and Khamene'i, detailing and magnifying the weak points of the commander of the Guards [Corps] which resulted in barring Mohsen Reza'i's brother from seeing [Mr Montazeri], encouraging and instigating Mr...[name not mentioned].. with Mr Montazeri's mediation in order to slur over the issue of Bahreinian's murder, tasking ...[name not mentioned]... to create the assault unit, encouraging Mr [Montazeri] to adopt a negative position regarding the "Metro" plan which was suggested by Mr Hashemi [-Rafsanjani] and, which had a factional root and many more that he mentions and states:

Document Nos 25, 29: "Adequately facilitating meetings with problematic and objecting forces with Mr [Montazeri] such as Dr Peyman and those connected with the Freedom Movement. Also, agreeing with and allowing the comings and goings of such characters as Erami to the House of Mr [Montazeri]. He used to say that, since these people have repented, their comings and goings do not cause problems and factional objectives were observed in calling some of the meetings."

Regarding your simple-mindedness which is "clearer than the sun" it suffices to point out that, although you have raised Mehdi Hashemi from his childhood and know him to be a pious and religious man, he possesses many "bad" characteristics—according to his own confession.

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Are you still of the opinion that repeating the "do you knows," that I am embarrassed to repeat, comes from yourself? And, doesn't the imam have the right to scream, with a broken and bleeding heart: "We have to defend those people whose throats the Hypocrites cut before their wives and children while breaking their fast during Ramadan."

Regarding the murder of Dr Sami, did you not make an announcements which in effect indicated that the regime has killed him? Do you remember that during a visit with you I mentioned this, and Mr Hadi immediately said that your announcement was meant to exonerate the regime. I said to him, "Don't play dumb. Don't pretend that you are simpleminded and do not know what should be said and what should not. You said: Yes, Falahian has said that we will defeat the hypocrites. I told this to Mr Hadi and he, himself, confirmed that he intended to say this in a way so that the murder of Dr Sami would be blamed on the regime and, then, I told you that first of all it is not known that Falahian has said such a thing. Besides, Sami was not a hypocrite. Will it please God if you blame the regime for every murder and looting? And now I say: Just because the [Ministry of] Intelligence [and Security] has punished Mehdi Hashemi, should every murder be blamed on the Unknown Soldiers of the Absent Imam?

Thank God, a while later it became clear that you have made a big mistake. What we say is, "Why do you sign everything they write?" Can you answer for the blood of the martyrs? Could you answer to those who, for safeguarding the regime, sacrificed themselves while you, for the sake of a few liberals, are willing to—in an unreal way—propound the issue that Dr Sami was destroyed by the regime. It is due to these issues that the imam shouts:

"Infiltrators have declared time and again that they will have their words come out of the mouths of the simpleminded."

Should the imam not say, painfully, that: "We should not, in order to please a few liberals who have sold themselves, when we are expressing our views and ideas, act in a wrong way and make the dear Hezbollah feel as though the Islamic Republic is deviating from its principle stands."

Shouldn't he not shout at you and say: "I clearly say to those who have access to radio, television and the press—and repeat the sayings of others—that, as long as I am alive I will not allow the destruction of these defenseless people by the hypocrites against Islam."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: After mentioning all these documents and confessions, do you not believe that you have been simpleminded and that what you have written has been the reflection of the thoughts of the Freedom Movement and the hypocrites? I am certain that not even one of the "do you knows" which you have written to the imam is correct.

In the letter of 65/7/17 [9 Oct 87], document number 26, you say: "The fellows of the Komiteh—with all their sincerity—are, emotionally, somewhat harsh. In dealing with people regarding matters such as the [Islamic] Cover, [religiously] wrong behavior and other similar matters, an attempt should be made to have peole who are trained, are wise and know how to use human psychology."

Have you given any thought to the issue that in order to fight against [religiously] unlawful matters, how many thousands of psychiatrists are needed in the country? Where can we find so many psychiatrists willing to become agents of the Komiteh, for two or three thousand tumans a month, as enforcers of religious rules in all Iranian cities? Have you given any thoughts to the meaning of "psychiatrist?" Do you not agree that this way of writing is the sign of your hastiness?

In the letter of 65/7/17, Document No 27, you say: "The weakest and the most disorganized of all the organs is the judicial branch, when it is supposed to be the strongest organ of all"

Then you say: "It seems that, at least, Mr Musavi-Ardabili is the lesser of the two evils]."

Your Excellency, Mr Montazeri: If Mr Ardebili is the best there could be then, half of the imam's job in the Supreme Judicial Council meets your confirmation in this letter. What is left is the Prosecutor General of the country whom you have approved—from practical and technical view points—before the imam. The imam asked you how is he qualified for the job of the prosecutor? And you responded that he is fine. Then, why do you fault the imam? If the judicial situation is in a mess, we should ask you, "How come you picked candidates for the Supreme Judicial Council who do not think the same way?". In the previous page you wrote about Mr Musavi-Ardabili. You said that he is no good and does not know how to deal with matters and in the next page you said, he is the best there is.

We shall pass over these many contradictions, for this writing is not meant to pursue such matters.

In your letter written on 66/7/4 [26 Sep 1987] to the imam, which is a few days before Mehdi Hashemi's execution, you brought up certain unbelievable issues which surprised me.

In this letter you say: Document No 28: "He is not much worse than many who were the subject of the imam's forgiveness. His old mother and his wife and young children should be pitied and his family and household should be respected."

Now pay attention to Mehdi Hashemi's letter. He says: Document No 29: " After about one year I see clearly the deviation and the changes in my behavior and that of my accused friends. I praise the wisdom and awareness of the exalted and respected leader of the revolution, His Holiness Imam Khomeyni, may God's shadow be upon him, for decisively stopping the danger before it grew and expanded. I am certain that if you were, also, in the

same position as the imam and the other respected officials of the country and were looking at issues from outside of emotional ties and relations with us and our friends you would reach the same conclusion as the exalted leader."

Have you, indeed, left the boundaries of relationships and emotions of Seyyed Mehdi and his friends? Have you reached the same conclusion as the imam? Have your confidants accepted to transfer the issues to you outside of their own boundaries? Who was worse than Mehdi Hashemi and was pardoned by the imam? If you had come outside of the fence would you still write this letter to the imam and bring pain to his heart by asking why he does not pay attention to your religious values?

In the letter of 67/7/4, with the knowledge of most of his corruptions which were publicly confessed by him in his interviews and those of intelligence officials, you say: Document No 30: "He is not a heretic, has not waged war [against God] and is not corrupt [on earth] and, finally, fully believes in the revolution and Islam."

Was Mehdi Hashemi not corrupt, although he [is connected with] several murders, has prayed for the royal family, has hidden documents and ammunition belonging to the regime and tens of other issues whch have been explained? With all this, you claim that he has full belief in the regime and Islam. Then, if this is not corruption can we find any other definition for corruption?

In this same letter of 66/7/4: Document No 31, it is stated: "He still has many followers among the Hezbollah, thos who go to the front and the revolutionaries. His execution will have an adverse effect on their morale."

Have you considered Islamic principles in your request? Say it has adverse effects on the morale of some, however, according to Islam, shouldn't a person who has committed all these crimes be punished?

In this same letter of 67/7/4, Document No 32, you say: "His execution will be a great victory for enemies and opportunists."

On page 18 of his file, Document No 33, Mehdi Hashemi says: "One of my sins was that I did not discuss my practical and intellectual weak points with Ayatollah Montazeri so that they could be corrected or, at least, Mr [Montazeri] would not trust me to this extent. On the contrary, regarding every issue, in his presence I would try to pretend to be innocent and thus gain his sympathy and support."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: If you were simpleminded and were not able to know him then, why do you defend him now, when only 2 or 3 days are left to his death and he has confessed to everything? Shouldn't the imam's heart be full of pain for why you do not pay heed to Islamic principles? Of course, the imam regards all of this due to your simplicity of mind.

Document No 34: "At least, whatever was said was not for personal interest—for now I have none—but was only from the point of view of Islam's interest and the future of the revolution. It is only that execution and bloodshed has indignation and blood in its aftermath. Executions may take place any time but those killed cannot be brought back to life."

1. How can you say that you no longer have any personal interest? Was it not because of your affection for Mehdi Hashemi that you created so many problems for Islam and the revolution—which all [of us] so patiently tolerated—(on a world scale), in order to protect him?

2. If you have no affection for him then, why did you write to the imam [requesting] not to kill him because it creates a victory for the enemies of Islam? Why don't you write such a letter for others?

3. Your saying that blood and execution will create more blood later, is—with my apologies Your Eminence Ayatollah—demagoguery. Why should Islamic retribution be stopped because, firstly, blood causes blood and, secondly, the executed cannot be brought back to life?

The reason why I tend to these issues is because I want to prove that you have been dissolved into those who surround you in such a way that you even deny the obvious. Besides all of this, on page 24 of his file, Document No 35, Mr Mehdi Hashemi says: "Spiritual and obedience weaknesses and satanic characters such as power-seeking—which was the result of pride and conceit—, mental despotism, deceit and arrogance surrounded me; and my scientific approach in regards to murders, collecting weapons and ammunition and revelations against officials, etc...was the result of this satanic characteristic."

Would the revolution need him in the future? Would the interests of Islam prompt that such a person not be executed?

In another letter which you have written to the imam, Document No 36, you say with anger: "Why did you allow an interview which was against me, my house and my schools to be broadcast?"

Should I be sacrificed for your holy existence! Why is it that you can swear at any person or organization that you wish and if what you say is 100 percent against Islam and the revolution, then it it must be broadcast by radio, television and the press. However, if anyone says anything about you, your house or your schools, you object? What is the source of this double standard? Your cussing and cursing is clean, but others' objections to you are evil and they should be punished by pouring molten lead into their mouths? Aren't personal desires indeed the causes of this double standard?

In this undated letter it is said: [Document No] 37: "How come the library that is my personal concern—with approximately a thousand members and researchers and which the hypocrites' radio conducted propaganda against—has been sealed and closed to this day?"

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Certainly the library was not under your control, for on page 15 of his file, [Document No] 38: Mehdi Hashemi says: "Theology students of Qom and the political library: We viewed Qom and the Elmieh Center as the main base of power. Because craving for power and gaining a base—in the long run—were always a part of our way of thinking in order to propagate our ideas (which I will explain later) we tried to create a powerful clergy arm to be at our disposal. With the cooperation and sympathy of Messrs [names not specified] during numerous gatherings which were organized in various forms, we reached the conclusion that, initially, we should raise the level of political training for which the political library was to be the means of this achievment. Of course, this radical and extreme move was not limited to the schools of Mr [Montazeri]. We were attracting many theology students outside of this and were strengthening the ties to this school of thought and line."

Now you know why the library of your concern was rightfully sealed by the dear [Ministry of] Intelligence [and Security]. Did you know that this library was in control of Mr Mehdi's band? Did you know that this [band], with utmost injustice, took advantage of your sincerity and moved you in every which way they desired? Did you know that Mehdi Hashemi and those connected with him—which, regretfully, many of whom are still in your house or have substantial influence [on you]—need the arm of a strong clergy in order to satisfy their thirst for power and achieve that base of power. Thus, they have told you to set up such a library and school so that, under the protection of your umbrella, they may spread their radical and deviating move in your schools and, even, outside of them.

In this same undated letter you have said: Document No 39: "Seyyed Mehdi was guilty and supposedly he would be executed..." and then you add: "But why have some people satisfied themselves by disappointing and dragging to emptiness the youth—who defend the revolution and clergy and, also, were in your own line—in a way that effected the fronts?"

Do you believe that Mehdi Hashemi was, in principle, in the same category as a defender in the line of the imam so that his execution results in their disappointment? Was the execution of Seyyed Mehdi so important as to effect the fronts? Did the Hezbollahi youth of the first line of the front and subsequent lines know Mr Mehdi and thus were affected or did [his execution] have any other ill effect? What kind of reports were these that you were receiving?

In this same undated letter to the imam, Document No 40, you say: "Where in this world does a father and a friend treat a son and a sympathetic friend in such a way?"

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Please believe that writing this letter for someone who has loved you for many years and has cared about your family as he has for his own is a very bitter and unpleasant matter. Imagine what it must be like, when the day comes when he has no other alternative but to write such a letter. What else is the alternative? To understand the sweet facts one must get help from bitter memories. In my opinion and the opinion of almost all your other friends, the imam has done everything he could for your benefit, in order to protect his friend and sympathizer from dangers. Three years before the arrest of Mr Mehdi, the imam referred to some very important points in a message to the Assembly of Experts; such as: "Be careful in the selection of your friends." One year before the arrest of Mr Mehdi Hashemi, he dispatched various people to you saying that Mr Mehdi is a dangerous character and you should get rid of him. Did you listen? The imam sent Ayatollah Taheri-Esfahani to you with the message saying, "Tell him [Montazeri] that [Khomeyni] said Mr Mehdi Hashemi is a dangerous person and you should expel him from your house." Did you listen to this advice and message? The only use of this message was that Mr Taheri, who was a very serious fan of yours, became the subject of your anger.

Didn't the imam dispatch me and Mr Musavi-Khoi'niha to tell you that Mr Mehdi Hashemi is a Savaki and it is best that you appoint someone to cooperate with someone from the [Ministry of] Intelligence [and Intelligence] to investigate this issue? Also, I suggested that his brother Mr Hadi Hashemi act as your representative in this investigation. Did you listen? The imam told me, "When you [Ahmad] accompany Messrs Khamene'i, Musavi-Ardebili, Hashemi-Rafsanjani and the Prime Minister to see Mr Montazeri, bring up the issue of Mehdi Hashemi and perhaps he will agree to expel Mr Mehdi from his house. I brought up the subject and Mr Rafsanjani—in order to resolve the issue—suggested that, since the imam is concerned about this, it may be best to assign him [Mehdi] to serve in one of the cultural offices of Iran, abroad. Later you had said that they want to exile him. What else could the imam do?

One year before his arrest, the imam tried, in every way possible, to ensure that when he [Mehdi] is arrested, he will not be a member of your staff. But you never let go and, therefore, he wrote that respectful letter to you, which I reproduced at the beginning of this painful letter.

In response to this letter, you sent a harsh reply which surprised all of us. However, the imam was tolerant. It was not long after that when you attempted the strike. The mysterious band of Mehdi Hashemi put out fliers with the big print, "Why have the appointments of the

deputy to the leadership been canceled?" and one of the reasons was stated to be the arrest of Mr Mehdi Hashemi, your representative in the Movements [Organization.]

Despite all this, the imam, in all graciousness, summoned you to a meeting in my house, attended by the heads of the three branches and the Prime Minister. From the beginning, it was obvious that you were told not to agree to any suggestion unless Mr Mehdi is released, this was why you had angry encounters with everyone. In this meeting, the imam, with humility, asked you to break your strike against the regime. He told you: "Do you see us as your enemies? Certainly you cannot say this." Then, with a warm and friendly manner, he said: "I beg you to stop these acts and get on with your duties." You did not accept. Then he said: "I admire you. I am your friend. Please accept this from your friend and admirer and get on with your job." With anger you responded: "God does not assign any duty beyond one's capacity."

At this point I looked at our friends and saw that they all had their heads down from embarrassment and shame. Mr Khamene'i had tears in his eyes. Mr Rafsanjani and I, in front of the imam, told you that you are a believer in the rule of jurisprudence and, according to yourself, have written 700 pages about this subject (of course up to that time), then, why don't you listen to what the imam says. You repeated the same phrase. The imam was looking at you coolly. Obviously, the unscrupulous ones had told you not to give in unless Mr Mehdi is released.

Mr Mehdi wrot that Mr Hadi said that Mr [Montazeri] must be separated from the regime. Then, in view of Mr Hadi's decision and your unconditional obedience from him, what more could the imam do? Should he have allowed the prestige of the regime, as well as yours as the deputy to the leader, be smeared? Didn't the imam ask you, many times, to clear your house of suspicious characters? Did you do this? The Ministry of Intelligence [and Security] fearing you, obtained the exile order of Mr Hadi Hashemi from the imam, for being a dangerous pawn, and later, when the problems surfaced, and Mr Hadi was supposed to be summoned to come to Tehran you hid him in your house and later told me, "I stole Mr Hadi from the Ministry of Intelligence [and Security]" Do you know how intolerable was such behavior for the imam? But the imam told me that the interest of the regime requires that we, presently, do not do anything and sent a message to Mr Reyshahri saying, for the time being, do not act [on this issue].

A while later there was a discussion about you and the imam said, "I am ready to meet with Mr Hadi." I was very surprised. This was after your letter to the Prime Minister, the one, which those around you distributed in the form of leaflets. The imam had a warm encounter with Mr Hadi and told him, "Save Mr Montazeri from the grip of the Freedom Movement and reactionary mullahs (something close to this.)" The imam wished to cover all the paths for protecting you and this was why he permitted the news of his meeting with Mr Hadi to be broadcast. Was it a small step for the imam to go from ordering the exile of Mr Hadi to granting him an audience and allowing its news to be broadcast from radio and television? The issue of Mr Hadi and his audience with the imam was an issue which could not be digested by any Hezbollahi. [Due to this,] I went through tough times because all of them, such as the Intelligence guys, the Komiteh, the Guards [Corps] and the [Reconstruction] Jihad to Qom and Mashhad theological centers, and other cities, were cursing me, but I tolerated it. Is it not true that, "What comes from a friend is good?" Although I am the imam's son and twenty years older that Mr Sa'id, I asked him for an appointment but he did not accept. Because we had agreed not to allow anything to upset us, a few days later, I repeated this request, but he did not comply. Wasn't all of this because of affection for you? Wasn't reminding you of the danger of liberals and hypocrites a sign of sincerity? However, I swear to God, I could understand well that Mr Hadi, deep inside, was thinking, "You don't have anyone but Mr Montazeri. Then, why shouldn't I solve my problems from this angle?"

I told him time and again, to no avail, that the imam will not trade the interest of the regime with anything else. In all of his meetings with me, Mr Hadi was emphasizing the issue that, "Mr [Montazeri] is sensitive about persons [connected with] and the band of Mr Mehdi who are imprisoned. Free them." I repeated that this is not within my power. You, yourself, asked me for the same thing two times. It seems that all religion has been summarized in this band.

In short, Your Eminence Ayatollah, whatever was in the imam's power he did for you; i.e. granting you the power of attorney and the title of Jurist, suggesting caution, giving you an open hand in the Judicial Branch and the Supreme Court of Qom, agreeing to appoint your representatives to universities and abroad, appointing [your] representative to the seven-member Land Council and may other generous gestures.

Aside from all of this, although he [the imam] was against your appointment to the post of deputy leader—and Ayatollah Mr Mohammadi-Gilani is a witness to this—for the sake of the regime's interest he chose silence. In answer to all of these kindnesses, what did you do when he asked of you, in a calm tone and using phrases such as "I am sincere towards you", to abandon Mehdi Hashemi and do not go on strike? Do you still think that the imam did not act well toward his friend and sympathizer?

There was a time when we believed if, for example, the imam asks you to sacrifice your child for the protection of Islam and greatness of the regime you would do this without a second thought. However, that night you destroyed that image and, up until now, we did not say anything because we didn't want to weaken you.

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Do you think that your recent letters, in defense of the hypocrites, were written by you [as published]? Later, I will quote Mr Mehdi Hashemi on how his band, by working on you for several years, led you to defend the hypocrites and pulled you to a total fall before the Hezbollah.

Do you remember that in your last meeting with the imam you spoke for 30 minutes and the imam kept silent? Only when you got up to leave, the imam said: "Most of your sayings were incorrect, may God forgive me and grant me death." All that the imam said were these two sentences. Did you ever ask yourself what had you done for the imam, for him to ask for his own death from God and tell you about it? In this regard, Mr Mehdi says: "Mr Hadi was much more anxious than I. He would say that Khomeyni would die soon and the problem would be solved." Do you know when Mr Mehdi said this? When they wanted to execute him. He said that he wanted to tell it all and leave nothing out so that God would forgive him. The exact copy of his tape is available. I will mention the original of this document, along with another document, somewhere else. Your Eminence Ayatollah, do you still believe that your house is completely clean? Are you still of the opinion that the imam has not acted well toward his friend?

In that same undated letter to the imam, document No 34, you have written: "With this act you have encouraged the opposing mullahs who, until now, were afraid or shy to strike, the opportunity to do so."

Is it better to do away with the fear and shame of the opposing and enemy mullahs with the arrest of Mr Mehdi Hashemi or, because of defending him, have your friends turn against you? You have no friends except some of the imam's friends. Do not lose them because of miscalculating Mr Mehdi's band.

In this same undated letter regarding the issues of Mehdi Hashemi, Document No 42, you have written: "The damage that was done to me in your name and under the guise of protecting me and my house was far worse than all other damages [done to me] during the previous regime and at the present time."

Was it not in your support that the imam wanted to separate Seyyed Mehdi from you? And now you say that in the guise of protecting me you hurt me?

Mr Mehdi, according to his own confessions in several volumes of his file, admits that: 1. He was a Savaki. 2. He participated in murders and conspiracies. 3. He used to, falsely, play innocent and instigate you. 4. He was giving you false news and information. 5. Committed great mistakes within your boundaries. 6. Ignited fires of factionalism against officials of the country. 7. Shared the classified information that was coming to you with inexperienced and naive people. 8. Before the revolution, he encouraged people to join the Rastakhiz Party. 9. Prayed for the royal family. 10. Created splits between the Guards [Corps] and the Komiteh, resulting in several deaths and instigating the Guards [Corps] of Lanjan and Khomeyni-Shahr to resist the Esfahan unit. 11. Keeping classified intelligence of the the Guards [Corps] after the dissolution of the Movements unit. 12. Published and distributed pamphlets, in the names of the Vigilant Clergy and Tabriz theological centers and clergies, against officials of the country. 13. Printed and distributed some counterfeit papers under the name of Afghan theological students and clergy against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 14. Conducted Conspiracies in the ranks of Afghan fighters which resulted in bloodshed. 15. Supported the objecting forces of Najafabad.

In short, he has admitted to possessing satanic characteristics such as irresponsibility, corruption, deceit, power-seeking, pride, self-importance, despotism, liying, arrogance, weakness in submission and religion, sinking in the dirt of factions and factional games, deviation, full of faults and being implicated. Is it not a service to you if someone separates this person from you? And you [dare] say that under the guise of protecting you [this person] has hurt you? On page 27, document number 43, he says: The long and he short of it all was that, it was my last and most dangerous deviating thought, to use the position I had gained with the Great Jurist and with the absolute confidence of his house and get revenge from the officials of the country for their lack of attention, unkindness and their trying to eliminate me from the scene through his position. In this path, I did not spare any effort, including conspiring, revealing, accusing, creating false atmosphere and causing pessimism. Personally, I saw myself supported from various directions such as the support of the future leader of the revolution and being favored by unsatisfied strata of the radical's society...."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: With this explanation, isn't the imam supporting you when he says he [Mehdi] should not be beside you? If you are not willing to praise the imam for saying that Mr Mehdi should not be there, Mr Mehdi in this file, in effect, says, "I praise the imam's cleverness because he recognized [my true intentions] during a few meetings and did not allow me to remain by the side of the future leader." In this undated letter, Document No 44, you say: "I do not know how aware you are of the exploitation and happiness of the anti-revolution, the opposing mullahs and editorials of foreign radios."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: I ask you if the standard for doing God's work is causing happiness or sadness of an antirevolutionary, if they become pleased, should God's work not be done? If today we execute Salman Rushdie, foreign radios, the antirevolutionaries, the West and the East will exploit this. Then, shouldn't we implement the God's decree in regards to him? By the way, the antirevolutionaries are not happy at all, about Mr Mehdi's execution. In the letter to the imam you have written: Document No 45: "It was heard that you have said that such and such [Montazeri] has taken me for the Shah. Of

course, I do not consider you as the Shah but crimes of your Information and your prisons have [surpassed those of] the Shah and Savak. I say this with thorough knowledge."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Your knowledge is clear. It is like the statement you made in one of your letters to the imam, "I have more information about prisons than the prison keepers of the Intelligence [Ministry]." For God's sake, is this not funny? Do you have more information about the prisons and prisoners than the Ministry of Intelligence [and Security]? Aside from this perhaps you have not forgotten that you wrote to the imam—I am just stating the truth, however bitter—"I know all the characteristics of Seyyed Mehdi. He is true to Islam and the revolution. He is a religious person whom I have known from his childhood and his piety is no less than Mr Reyshahri's."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Isn't your thorough information not like what I have written? In fact this question has always been on my mind, "Why do you gain such rapid knowledge of issues?". Have you ever asked yourself why you become absolute so quickly? In order to clarify the source of this "precise information" I urge you to note the writings of Mehdi Hashemi. Document Nos 19-46: "Providing adequate facilities for meetings of problematic and objecting forces with Mr [Montazeri] such as Dr Peyman and those connected with the "Freedom Movement, agreeing to comings and goings of such people as Erami (the hypocrite-agent theology student) to the house of Mr [Montazeri]. He (Mr Hadi) used to say that, as far as Mr [Montazeri] is concerned, since these people have repented there is no problem with their comings and goings."

Now you be the judge: What are the reasons behind such a viewpoint—considering the comings and goings of liberals and the hypocrites—keeping in mind the analysis of Documents 24/1 to 24/4 in Mr Mehdi Hashemi's file? Also, you judge for yourself: What could be the source of your viewpoint—considering [the fact that] Mr Hadi believed in a spare and cautionary "overseas" channel, specifically that of the hypocrites, and, also, his belief that the hypocrites are superior over this regime? In view of what has been discussed, could there be any other conclusion by you, except the one that you say [in your letter], "Crimes of your Intelligence [Ministry] and crimes committed in your prisons have made the shah and his SAVAK look good."?

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Are our good brothers in the Intelligence and prisons—such as Hojjaj-e Eslam [plural of Hojjat ol-Eslam] Reyshahri, Falahian, Razini, Nayyeri, Pur-Mohammadi, Rai'si and many other good people, I mean the combative brothers who, according to the imam, tolerate all curses from simple-minded people without any complaining—worse than Gen Nasiri, Gen Moghaddam, Sabeti, Manuchehri-Hoseyni, Kamali and other torture masters of the shah in other cities? Have these gentlemen made the shah's agents look good? Are the director generals of the [ministry of] Intelligence [and Security], heads of intelligence organizations and those responsible for revolutionary courts and prisons—who are, mostly, selfless clergy who have taken their lives in their hands and defend the security and comfort of these people and this country—worse than director generals of SAVAK? Are the Children of the Absent imam in Intelligence [Ministry], the courts and the prisons the same as those who were selected from amongst the most treacherous and dirtiest individuals of the satanic society? Was Mr Mehdi Hashemi so important that you disregarded the most obvious issues and brought yourself to this deadly abyss? Aren't the guys in the Intelligence [Ministry], mostly, religious children of this society? Do you have any answer for these on the Day of Judgment? Are you not truly sorry for such talks and judgments? God willing you are.

Part Three

46400087 Tehran RESALAT in Persian 17 May 89 pp 3, 10

[Text] Newspaper's preface:

In previous issues we presented two parts of the full text of Hojjat ol-Eslam Ahmad Khomeyni's letter. Now, we invite the attention of those interested to the third part.

In response to Mr Reyshahri's letter of 66/4/16 [7 Jul 87] regarding the band of Mehdi Hashemi, the imam says: Document No 47: "With many thanks for the troubles of the respected members of the Ministry of Intelligence [and Security]—these unknown soldiers of the Absent Imam who have suffered much in fighting against the agents of arrogance inside the country and abroad and have not become disappointed by innuendoes and curses of the antirevolution and the misguided while continuing to fulfill their Islamic and patriotic duties—I agree to conditions of the respected Minister of Intelligence, Mr Reyshahri. May God grant all of you more success. [Signed] Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeyni"

Your Eminence Ayatollah: I would like to ask you, what hand was at work which separated you so far from the imam to the point that you consider the Intelligence and the prisons officials of the sacred regime of the Islamic Republic to be worse than the Shah's Savakis while the imam calls them the unknown soldiers of the Absent Imam (may God's peace be upon him)? Is it anything but the fact that you consider people who, according to their own admission, possess satanic characteristics such as irresponsibility, representing evil and corruption, power-seeking, conceit, self-importance, anti-religious, misguided, full of faults, sinful and many other characteristics. You know him to be pious, a manager and a wise person whom you have raised from childhood. Indeed, how well did you know him!! On the other hand, the imam, with his special cleverness, was able to recognize his character. Later it was determined that the imam's recognition was based on solid facts and yours on

simpleminded assumptions. Regretfully, your confidence in such people—who are not few in your house—was the reason why they passed such baseless information, with ulterior motives to you, to the point where you consider the unknown soldiers of the Absent Imam (may God's peace be upon him) to be worse than the Shah's Savakis. Please pay attention to a part of Mehdi Hashemi's letter addressed to you: Document No 48: "Who else but he (Mr Hadi Hashemi)—under the influence of emotions and wrong analyses of the revolutionary process and the country's transformations—was nurturing satanic thoughts against the imam (may my soul be sacrificed for him) in his own mind and the minds of those surrounding him. The result of which were my [as published] deviative written reports and his (Seyyed Hadi) manipulative inspirations—which were aimed at you—were, indeed, a grand instigation to destroy [Khomeyni] the Spirit of God and the Memory of Great Prophets and the House of Ebrahim (may God's peace be upon our prophet and his House.)"

Perhaps God will forgive him for reciting facts that will result in enlightening the minds of the future generations.

Your Eminence Ayatollah: If we had not shown these letters, interviews and writings of Mr Mehdi Hashemi to you and the people of your house, today we would not be able to prove that you have become the megaphone of the hypocrites and the liberals. We would not be able to prove that all your writings have been based on deviative written reports of the band of Mehdi Hashemi and the manipulative inspirations of Seyyed Hadi to you, as well as instigating to destroy the Spirit of God and the Memory of Prophets [Khomeyni]. Because God is with the imam, Mr Mehdi Hashemi should be guided to tell the stories and neutralize the great conspiracy of your house against the imam.

In God's name, it is due to piety of the imam that members of your house—who intended to make you write harsh letters to the imam—be [introduced and] recognized. It is due to the imam's sincerity and loneliness that, all of a sudden, Mehdi Hashemi screams and confesses that Mr Hadi Hashemi intends to instigate the destruction, on a grand scale, of the Spirit of God and the Memory of Prophets. Will anyone, now, believe the assertions of the antirevolution that elimination of Mr Montazeri is a purge of a faction within the regime by another? Does anyone believe that the imam's decision was a hasty one? Is it not your perception of the unknown soldiers of the Absent Imam—the pious and combative sons of the honorable people of Iran—that has caused the imam's heart to become bloodied and with a broken heart, speak with you in his most recent letter?

In this undated letter you have written: Document No 49: "I was guessing that one day Your Holiness will be cut from your fans but I did not think it will be so soon."

In a letter to his brother, Mr Hadi, a few moments before his execution, Mehdi Hashemi has written: Document No 50: "Now that but a few moments is left before my death, I will, briefly, mention a few points. With your self-centeredness and narrow-minded mentality, measuring everything with your deficient standards, you, regretfully, brought on many atrocities which resulted in the appearance of many symptoms for the revolution. You, in the most crucial time of the revolution and the war, sounded the necessity of the separation of Ayatollah Montazeri from the regime and the officials. Only God knows what a major sin you committed."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: The imam did not separate himself from his friends. The soundings of Mr Hadi caused the separation of you from the regime, the officials and the Hezbollahis. Those who separate themselves from the regime will [automatically] separate themselves from their friends because your friends are the managers of the regime, not your enemies. Regretfully, Mr Hadi struck the final blow against you and the regime, which was to drag you to the point where he did not let you hear the objecting cries of the people who were angry about your defense of the liberals and the Hypocrites. However, he had decided to recite the sayings of the Hypocrites through your mouth and as you see, he succeeded.

I beg you to focus your thoughts slightly outside of the circle of the thoughts of Mr Hadi and Mr Mehdi. Whom have you lost and, in return, whom have you attracted? Is it not regretful to lose the imam? Is it not regretful to lose the good theology students who were depicted as bad before you? Was it a small feat for you to lose the children of the Absent Imam (may God's peace be upon him) in the [Ministry of] Intelligence [and Security], Komiteh, Guards [Corps], the Jihad and other revolutionary institutions?

Once more, in a friendly way, I want you to think a little about whether those who are noble and have been in the struggle are willing to let go of the imam and take you [as their leader] instead? If you commit one more mistake and get close to the mullahs who, until yesterday, called you Wahhabi, you will lose face. They thirst for the imam's blood. Keep your senses and from now on be more careful about the thoughts of Mr Hadi. It is better for you to know Mr Hadi from the statements of his brother Mr Mehdi which were uttered moments before death.

Document No 51: "Regarding Mr Hadi's way of thinking, of course I said only a little. Privately, I spoke to some officials, however, I did not put anything in writing about the issue of the imam and waiting for his death, whereas, Mr Hadi has said many things. I mean, he was even more adamant than I in saying that Imam Khomeyni will die soon, may I be muted for saying this. He would say, God willing, Khomeyni will die in a few days and the problem will be solved."

There is a strong possibility that he had truly repented because he had said these things, according to himself, in order to meet his Maker clean.

In your letter dated 67/5/9 [31 Jul 88] to the imam, which certainly was the cause of jubilation among the hypocrites and the liberals and brought pain to the heart of the imam, may my soul be sacrificed for him, you say: Document No 52: "The announcement of the latest arrests is acceptable to the nation and the society and, apparently, it has no adverse effect. [Shall we assume that], perhaps, in case there were any adverse effects, it was best to be stopped and that those who have massacred the children of this land must be abandoned!?"

In this same latter dated 67/5/9 you have written: Document No 53: "Our judicial, prosecuting and intelligence officials are not on the same level as Moghaddas Ardabili. Mistakes and effects of the [prevailing] atmosphere are many and with your latest decree many an innocent are being executed."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Mehdi Hashemi in his file says: "We would give him [Montazeri] the news that made him sensitive towards the intelligence and the Guards [Corps] and, finally, we succeeded in doing this."

Of course, you know that I see the guys from the Intelligence and Prosecutor's Office who are fighting against the antirevolution the same as Moghaddas Ardabili. I also believe that if Moghaddas Ardabili were ruling and wanted to implement the decrees of God he would not act any better. Besides this, if the guys from the Intelligence and the Guards [Corps] are not like Moghaddas Ardebili does it mean that we should stop implementing God's decrees and assume everyone is a heretic? Do all judges have to be like Moghaddas Ardabili and if they are not, does it mean that the judicial branch does not have legitimacy? Besides, would Moghaddas Ardabili do anything differently than the guys from the Intelligence and the Prosecutor's Office, if he were involved with the issue of Mehdi Hashemi? In this case, would you not accuse Moghaddas Ardabili for making the shah's Savakis look good? Why? Because he executed Mehdi Hashemi!

In this letter of 67/5/9 you have written: Document No 54: "So far, we have not achieved anything by resortong to violence."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: In principle, we have not shown any violence. Were Ayatollah Sodduqi, Ayatollah Ashrafi-Esfahani, Ayatollah Dastgheyb, Ayatollah Madani and Ayatollah Ghazi killed as a result of our violence? Were the martyrs of the Islamic Republic Party killed because of our violence? Were the dear martyrs, Raja'i and Bahonar, killed by our violence? Were hundreds of dear children of the imam all over the country—from Guards, Komiteh and Mobilization—killed with our violence? Did we, with violence, martyr Qoddusi and Rabbani-Amlashi? Did we violently kill thousands of the Hezbollah and the common folks? Did we violently kill dear ministers and respected deputies of the Majlis? Did we try to assassinate Hashemi and dear Khamene'i? Did we plant bombs in the streets, hijack planes and cut the throats of revolutionary guys when they broke their fast during Ramadan, in front of their wives and children?

The only thing we have done is not allow Mehdi Hashemi, some of the repented, the Freedom Movement, Peyman, other liberals and the hypocrites to be introduced as just and pious. We did not write, nor distribute to foreign radios, their lies and fabrications. Many times the great martyr Mr Mohammad Montazeri would say: "The house of my father is a safe haven for the hypocrites. I will not allow them to conquer it." But you saw that they brought him down by any means they could and your house was conquered. I beg your forgiveness if my pen becomes harsh sometimes for we have learned frankness from you.

In the 67/5/9 letter you have written somethings that has brought pain to the heart of the imam and the people of Hezbollah. Whoever is the source of these things will, surely, belong to the depth of hell.

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Your sayings were nothing new. It has been 10 years since foreign radios have been saying the same things and accusing the regime and the imam of fabricated charges of killing women with children and massacring thousands in one day.

In the letter dated 67/5/11 [2 Aug 88] you have written: Document No 55: "Three days ago the religious judge of one of the provinces—who is a trustworthy person—had come to Qom in anger about the method of implementation of your latest decree. He was saying that Intelligence or the Prosecutor (I am not sure), in order to determine the position of a prisoner, asked him [/her]: "Are you willing to condemn the hypocrite's organization?" He answered positively. He was asked: "Are you willing to participate in an interview?" He answered positively. He was asked: "Are you willing to go to the war front to fight against Iraq?" He said yes. He was asked: "Are you willing to walk on mines?" He said: "Are all the people willing to walk on mines?"....."

Your Eminence Ayatollah, you have then concluded and stated that because this person said that he will not walk in the mine fields he was sentenced to death and thus was treated according to the "accepted line". On the other hand, the same religious judge, who has your confidence, came to me and unequivocally stated: "Mr Montazeri has related a lie to me and I have not said such things." I directed him not to say anything to you because, "He might have understood [the situation] incorrectly." Then I summoned the Intelligence and Judicial officials of that province. When they came,I told them what had transpired and they stated that this was not what had been discussed and denied almost all that you have written.

Now, if these problems are brought up and told to us by the Intelligence and Prosecution, because they are the words of the unknown soldiers of the Absent Imam and they are the ones who executed Mehdi Hashemi, they are lies to you. However, if their opponents and their assistants say something,it is a fact!

My argument is, how come all those who defend the hypocrites and the liberals are trusted by you but those who have been with the revolution and the imam from the beginning, and still are, are criminals? On 67/7/9 [1 Oct 88] you wrote a letter to the Prime Minister—which was distributed internally and outside the country by those pious members of your house that you know well—and this letter is full of "musts" and "must nots." But it is not known, according to whose authority [should actions be taken]? Perhaps you say that, "this is not my concern because I do not interfere in executive matters and have stated this distinctly in my writings and speeches" and the Prime Minister and others involved must implement these dos and don'ts.

1. Nowadays, even radical countries have realized that they have made mistakes. The officials who are close-minded, harsh and careless to the people must, fundamentally, be changed. 2. Today, the war has come to an end. Eventually queues and coupons must be set aside. 3. The Intelligence, Guards, Komiteh, Prosecution Offices and Interrogators must review their methods...and eight or nine other "musts" of this nature.

Your Eminence Ayatollah: You see in what a far out atmosphere, from the one prevailing in the society, you are breathing? If these musts were to be implemented, Iran would become a garden. However, is there the implementation capacity under present circumstances? One of your characteristics, according to the imam, is to depict your history well. You have nothing to do with the confirmation of the regime or Islam, if your history is to be unfavorable. Therefore, the imam constantly says: "I have nothing to do with history. I must fulfill my religious duty." However, you do not understand what is your problem which causes the imam to speak this way.

If the goal is that only "musts" and "must nots" be written on paper so that a beautiful and pleasant history is depicted for mankind, it is easy to talk and and write. I can also write. Every Iranian must own a 500 square meter house. Every Iranian must own a car. Every Iranian's salary must be twice his expenses and.....In principle, we have always had this argument with you that, there is nothing wrong if what you say, the imam says or other officials of the regime say is in the way of guidance in order to draw the outline for general domestic or foreign policies. It is expected of the guides of the revolution to show the correct path. However, the difference between you and the others is that you do not care about the ability to implement what you demand and, whenever you see any of the officials, you angrily ask why your sayings have not been implemented.

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Due to the fact that the people around you concentrate on the propaganda aspect of issues and you are a prisoner in their hands, it has gotten to the point that if one should tell you that many of the problems of this letter have nothing to do with the Prime Minister you, inevitably, have no answer.

Every coupon queue is a result of many factors and as long as those factors exist, the queues will remain. Regretfully, you have brought up certain issues in this letter that are in line with the antirevolution and the hypocrites. Time and again, Mehdi Hashemi has said that, "Our band was trying to make Ayatollah Montazeri think negatively towards the institutions of the revolution and the Intelligence." You see that the same band, still, has not left you alone because, in this letter, you have nothing to say about the [Ministry of] Justice—although it has raised the objections of everyone—but you say this about the [offices of] the Revolution Prosecutors: "The [offices of] the Revolution Prosecutors must review their methods." Although there is an Army, only the Guards [Corps] must review their methods. Although there is a Police [department] and a Gandarmeri, only the Komiteh must review its methods. And, from among all the ministries and offices, only the Ministry of Intelligence [and Security] must review its methods.

These are nothing but sensitivities which the hypocrites and the liberals, in general, feel about the Guards, the Komiteh, the Ministry of Intelligence and offices of the Revolutionary Prosecutors. Thus, as soon as the Prime Minister gets an audience with you, immediately the subject of "them" comes up, even though it has nothing to do with the Prime Minister. I beg your forgiveness for speaking so frankly but we have learned this from you. Please think a little about the closed-minded and harsh officials who should be replaced. This is similar to the issue which stated that the Komiteh agents should be psychiatrists. If we fire one person, you would strangle us. Then, how could we fire all these people?

Your Eminence Ayatollah: I beg you, as a friend, to act independently regarding various issues and do not accept everything you hear, let alone write about them.

Mehdi Hashemi on page 18 of his file says: Document No 56: "I was trying hard to create weaknesses and sensitivities in Mr [Montazeri]. This was started in the beginning and continued in an escalating way. "A few lines later he adds: "My brother and I were very active in purging pure people from various organs. Each of us, in turn, in our separate contacts with Mr [Montazeri] would bring up our deviating views in acceptable covers. Certainly, this was effective. Relentless efforts to arrange meetings between individuals who were unhappy about and objecting to the current affairs of the country and Mr Montazeri who, due to the frequency of these meetings, was briefed such that his mind would be oriented in the direction of our own deviating problems."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Do you still doubt that this group was the reason for the [problems] to be dragged to this point? Regretfully, you accepted everything that was offered by these [members of this group], even this issue whicht was mentioned in your letter to the imam, dated 65/10/19 [9 Jan 87]:

Document No 57: "In some documents, a theology student was expelled from the school for participating in the funeral of a martyr."

Didn't the imam, through me, asked you the whereabouts of this school and the source of this news? Didn't the imam ask many times about the identity of this person who has been expelled? And you never replied to the imam. Indeed, what principal dares to expel a theology student from a school for participating in funerals of martyrs? As long as you were by yourself, your positions were fine and revolutionary but, since falling in the trap of the band of Mehdi Hashemi, [you have changed.] You used to say that the hypocrites are treacherous and now you say differently. Before the martyrdom of Mohammad Montazeri, you used to say Shari'atmadari must be executed. However, after his death you were objecting to the fact that his funeral was not permitted. I can recount many such instances but I won't bother you with them.

In this same letter of 65/10/19 [9 Jan 87], you have written: Document No 58: "Today, the family of Omid Najafabadi came here and said that he (that is Omid), crying on the phone [was able only] to give this message before the phone was disconnected, "Tell Mr [Montazeri] to come to our aid." This Mr Omid is a learned man and one of the past and present scholars who, during the time of oppression, used to print and distribute your writings."

"Mr Montazeri, you certainly know what evils Omid Najafabadi possessed and that his fate was tangled with that of the tribe of Lot. Is it that printing, selling, writing of [religious material] and struggling are sufficient reasons to defend someone who has been sentenced to death? Even, your defense of Omid Najafabadi is as a result of your simple-mindedness, suggestions and—calculated—all encompassing pressures by the people of your house who have been able to use your sensitive feelings to advance their own desires and goals. This was to the extent that, in suitable times, [the people of your house] wrote letters to you under the names of the families of prisoners or instigated them to write such letters to you in order to confuse you with baseless assertions about pressures and harsh treatments [of prisoners in prisons.] It is interesting that Mehdi Hashemi, in his four-page letter to you, emphasizes this point and writes that, "We thought that even in prison your support will be soothing for us, therefore, we used to suggest to the relatives of prisoners that their kins are under torture and thus, prompted them to instigate you." Now, pay attention to the text of the letter of Mehdi Hashemi to you: Document No 59: "The same baseless thought we had before the arrest, that until the last moment you will defend this band was, also, prevailing and soothing to many of the accused. It was for this reason that in their phone calls to and visits with their relatives they suggested that people [prisoners] are tortured savagely. Thus, they tried to provoke your sensitive soul in the direction of supporting them. However, surely the truth is different than the fact that you were, on one hand, getting involved in every aspect of country's affairs and, on the other hand, wrote to the students studying abroad, I am not involved in any work."'

And, in the letter dated 65/10/19 to the imam you wrote: Document No 60: "Allow me to be busy with lessons and discussions as a theology student without any title or responsibility."

You know that this suggestion was only as an objection to the issue of the arrest of Mehdi Hashemi. In fact, this was the beginning of your separation from the regime. This separation was planned and it is natural that everyone, from impressions given by yourself, understands your dislodging from the regime. Mehdi Hashemi, in his letter to his brother, objects to him because he has tried to separate you from the regime. Then, it is obvious that the plan for separating you from the regime is a calculated one and your positions, also, indicates this to be the fact. It is interesting that Mr Hadi said the same thing, in front of you, to Mr Rafsanjani. It was, why should Mr [Montazeri] move in a way to suffer the consequences of bad deeds of the regime? He said the same thing to me two or three times and, since you were under such influences, in your Thursday night gathering—according to Mr Khoe'niha—you stated that, "I am not from this regime." Now, the dear people should note that Mr Montazeri was not suddenly removed from the position of the deputy leader. In the announcement to the Assembly of Experts, 3 years before the issue of Mehdi Hashemi and, one year before his arrest, the imam and the true friends of the revolution, the imam and Ayatollah Montazeri tried to prevent him [Montazeri] from moving in the direction of supporting the antirevolution. Personal efforts of the imam, himself, were most noticeable but fruitless. Only the conspiracies of Mehdi Hashemi were effective. As he had said during his interrogation, "Our band had conqueuered all sensitive points of the house and would not allow anyone to tell the truth to [Montazeri.]" Regretfully, Ayatollah Montazeri has chosen the path of separation from the realities and went in a direction the result of which was catastrophic. Now, pay attention to a part of Mehdi Hashemi's confessions: Document No 61: "I am ashamed to say that, in those days, due to our satanic imagination, we would try to make sure that the position of the Exalted Jurist [Montazeri] is different from that of His Holiness, the imam."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: Do you remember that I was telling you that these [people] are writing fake letters to you and talk about their own issues under the guise of people's letters and you would not believe me. Perhaps, still you do not believe that those harboring the same ideas are around you.

When Mr Hadi Hashemi was nurturing the thought of separating you from the regime and the imam, one could not expect anything but what transpired. Now, once more, please pay attention to Mehdi Hashemi's letter to Mr Hadi which was written a few moments before his execution: Document No 62: "With your selfisness and narrow-minded mentality and measuring everything with your incompetent standards, you, regretfully, brought on many atrocities which resulted in the appearance of many symptoms for the revolution. You, in the most crucial time of the revolution and the war, sounded the necessity of the separation of Ayatollah Montazeri from the regime and the officials. Only God knows what a major sin you committed."

Your Eminence Ayatollah: The band of Mehdi Hashemi still does not let you go. According to the imam, because they believe in having connections with the hypocrites and the liberals, they did not see any bridge more suitable than you. He [the imam] has said this many times. When the imam was emphasizing the investigation of the issue related to Mehdi Hashemi it was clear that he was analyzing the problems with his intelligence and smart deductions. Unfortunately you—whose son-in-law is his brother, his father your teacher and, according to yourself, have raised him from childhood with absolute knowledge of his characteristics—never recognized him and his band. You did not even recognize your great son and called him crazy when, on the other hand, the imam called the late Mohammad Montazeri the true guerrilla of the world of Islam and the son of Islam and the Qoran. In short, several times during his interrogations, Mehdi Hashemi has said that, "We have been working on Ayatollah Montazeri for several years now. "On the other hand, Mr Hadi had reached the conclusion that, "Now that the officials treat us (our band) this way, then, we must get close to the Hypocrites. "Mehdi Hashemi has said that the first contact was made with the one time famous, and later repentant, Hypocrite who was a theology student, Mr Erami—because Mr Hadi preferred the Hypocrites to this regime. Also, you had allowed the repentant Hypocrites to come and go to your house without any problem. Mr Hadi, on the other hand, was facilitating the comings and goings of the liberals, such as Peyman, and those of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Movement, the likes of Meysami, the Freedom Movement and the hypocrites. The most sensitive position of your house was taken by the band of Mr Mehdi and you, with your simple-mindedness, were treating all that this band had to say as God's words. To show your weakness in recognition of people, it suffices to point out that in your letter to the imam you claim, with bravery, that you have raised him from childhood and know all his characteristics; that he is a religious man, a [good] manager, a wise individual and a pious person. On the other hand, Mr Hadi and his band have reached the conclusion that you must be separated from the regime and, in this regard have not spared any efforts. From another angle, Mr Hadi was of the opinion that the imam will die and they [Hadi's band] will get rid of him [the imam] and all will be resolved. Beside all of this and much more, such as agreements with foreign radios and policies, we reach the conclusion that, this corrupt and suspicious group has decided to do several things. First, depict a rough picture of the imam before the world, by the sayings and writings of the deputy to the leader, saying that he kills women with children and then tell the world that Mr Montazeri is different from the imam. In the next step, separate Ayatollah Montazeri from the regime and, then, with a wide change of management on the highest level, as was mentioned by yourself, conclude everything to their own advantage.

The dear people of Iran, see how well documented and clearly I have revealed the inauspicious plan of this dirty band and showed that the issue of Mr Montazeri was never the result of a few slight criticisms about the affairs of the country—which, [by the way], have been broadcast by the radio and television. It was not because of his foul-mouthing and thoughts in regards to officials of the regime or purges of one faction, within the regime, against another. It has been the result of calculated plans which were duly coordinated with policies of foreigners which, according to the imam, this plan was supposed to be implemented with Mr Montazeri acting as the bridge and, immediately afterwards, he would be killed and the blame would be put on the Hezbollah followers of the imam.

Time and again the imam has said that those surrounding Mr Montazeri will destroy him the moment they finish using him. This statement of the imam, which was stated several years ago, has now been clarified for us.

Because the imam, who knows Mr Montazeri to be a gullible person, asked him to get back to studies and discussions, I will not write about studies and discussions. What I have brought up is a sample of a deep conspiracy against the regime of Islam, Muslims and our Islamic country. It was a calculated conspiracy against the person of the imam and the high officials of the regime. A conspiracy against all the people who lived loving the imam and struggled with love for the imam and, which was going to be implemented by the hands of a pious jurist who has been beside the imam for many years. Since liberals and the hypocrites do not have any base among people and cannot, on their own, enter into action, then, there is no other way but the house [of Montazeri.] Of course, it is clear that after this letter, some may composer a letter claiming that all that is said here is incorrect but, God and the people who look at the issues with wisdom and deliberance are the best judges. God, I take you as witness that I loved Mr Montazeri. God, you know that the imam has tried for over 3 years so that Ayatollah Montazeri, who was the fruit of his life, finds out what an inauspicious plan is in the works. God, you help so that he finds out and rejoins the multitude of the imam's friends. I conclude this letter with your most recent thoughts which were mentioned in the letter to Mr Nayyeri—which, again, points to the line of the People's hypocrites in you. You have written: Document No 63: "Mojahedin-e Khalq are not people. It is a school of

thought, a way of understanding, a kind of logic. Wrong logic must be answered by correct logic. It cannot be solved with killing because, instead, it propagates."

Your Eminence Ayatollah Montazeri: Firstly, how was it that the hypocrites, after 10 years, became the Mojahedin again and, if they correct their logic, they have superiority over the Islamic regime?

Secondly, did the Mojahedin-e Khalq murder the Friday Prayer Leaders, the martyrs of the alter, with logic?

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq blew up the [Islamic Republic] Party and killed 72 loyal friends of the imam?

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq murdered the president, the Prime Minister and others?

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq murdered many of the dearest to this regime such as Qoddusi, Hashemi-Nejad and....?

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq smeared the Friday Prayers in fire?

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq murdered all these ministers and [Majles] deputies of this republic?

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq hunted the Hezbollah at night and murdered hundreds of common folks in streets and alleys.

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq stole the planes that belonged to these people and sold them to Iraq?

Is it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq are spying in Iran?

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq cooperated with Saddam in killing the Hezbollah youth during various operations in the fronts?

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq wanted to come as far as Tehran?

Was it with logic that the Mojahedin-e Khalq spotted and informed the government of Iraq to shoot down the plane carrying Martyr Mahallati and the others from judicial and military delegation?

Mojahedin-e Khalq with logic.....?????

Only, Mojahedin-e Khalq with their logic, changed the people of your house over to themselves such that you allowed the ones among them who had repented to come and go in your House.

With their logic the Mojahedin-e Khalq dragged you down to the point that you depicted the imam as the killer of women with children.

With their logic the Mojahedin-e Khalq dragged you to the point that you considered the guys from the Intelligence and the children of the Absent Imam to be worse than the Shah's Savakis.

With their logic the Mojahedin-e Khalq dragged you to the point that you wrote letters in their defense.

This letter has come to end and we are still at the beginning of revealing the treacheries of those around you. Believe me when I say that I pass my nights and days thinking about you because you were the hope of all of us. Once more I besiege you to free yourself, with a revolutionary move, from the band of Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi and float yourself in the wide sea of the love of the imam's friends. With the hope of that day, I ask God for your health, happiness and victory over the monster of injustice and treachery of those around you and mention the following points: 1. I beg your forgiveness for the repetitions in this letter. 2. I apologize if some sentences are harsh. After all, we learned frankness from you. 3. If the harshness of the letter has upset you, put yourself in the imam's position and think a little. Is God pleased that you, in order to please some liberals and hypocrites, call an old man of God who has spent all his life to elevate the word of God a killer of people and, especially, the killer of women with children and, with this un-Islamic and inhumane act, pleased the sworn enemies of Islam, the regime and Iran? Think a little on how the imam, for months and years, under the lashes of your baseless accusations and those of the liberals and the Hypocrites, waited in solitude and, for the good of the regime and Islam, and suffered with a broken heart.

Your Eminence Ayatollah: If you do not part from the hypocrites, the liberals, and the band of Mehdi Hashemi be sure that in the Day of Judgment all the Hezbollah will confront you before the Prophet.

Good bye. 68/2/9 [29 Apr 1989]